Maharlika's NGCP Investment: Economic Nationalism or a Bailout?

 

Don’t you need some ‘wealth’ to create a ‘wealth fund?’ Norway did it with the money it got from North Sea oil. China’s trillion-dollar wealth fund comes from its trade surpluses. Where will the US wealth come from? The government runs deficits—Bill Bonner 

In this issue 

Maharlika's NGCP Investment: Economic Nationalism or a Bailout?

I. Introduction: Maharlika's First Test: Can Conflicting Objectives Deliver Optimal Returns?

II. The Legacy of NAPOCOR: A Historical Overview and its Cautionary Lessons

III. Geopolitical Tensions Permeate the Power Sector

IV. MIC’s Investment in NGCP: A Revival of Economic Nationalism? Shades of Napocor?

A. Advance National Security by Strengthening Oversight of NGCP Management?

B. Economic Benefits: Lowering Electricity Costs by Enhancing Grid Efficiency?

V. Maharlika's NGCP Investment: A Bailout in Disguise? Potentially Inflating an SGP Stock Bubble?"

VI. Maharlika’s Risks and Potential Consequences

VII. Conclusion 

Maharlika's NGCP Investment: Economic Nationalism or a Bailout? 

Is Maharlika’s exposure to the National Grid Corp. about investments, economic nationalism, or a bailout of SGP? Or could hitting all three birds with one stone be feasible? 

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Nota Bene: This post does not constitute investment advice; rather, it explores the potential risks associated with the recent acquisition of the National Grid Corp. (NGCP) of the Philippines by the Maharlika Investment Corporation, through its controlling shareholder, Synergy Grid and Development Philippines Inc. (SGP).

I. Introduction: Maharlika's First Test: Can Conflicting Objectives Deliver Optimal Returns?

First some news quotes. (all bold mine)

Philippine News Agency, January 27, 2025: Under the deal, MIC will purchase preferred shares in SGP, granting the government a 20 percent stake in the company, which holds a significant 40.2 percent effective ownership in NGCP, the operator of the country’s power grid. Consing noted that the deal will also provide the government with board seats in both SGP and NGCP. “Once the acquisition is completed, we shall be entitled to two out of nine seats in the SGP board, after the total seats are increased from seven to nine. At NGCP, the government gains representation through two out of 15 board seats, following an increase in the total seats from 10 to 15,” he explained. The investment is seen as a crucial step for the government to regain control over the nation’s vital power infrastructure.

Inquirer.net, January 29, 2025: The country’s sovereign wealth fund is investing in the National Grid Corp. of the Philippines (NGCP) to allow the government to monitor the possible emergence of external threats, the head of Maharlika Investment Corp. (MIC) said on Tuesday. MIC president and chief executive officer Rafael Consing Jr. said they would also be interested in buying the 40-percent NGCP stake owned by a Chinese state-owned company once the opportunity arises. 

Inquirer.net, January 28, 2025: The way NGCP can contribute to lower electricity is by ensuring that that rollout indeed happens. Because once you have that transmission grid infrastructure being rolled out successfully, then you would have more power players that can in fact get onto the grid and provide supply to the grid. And, obviously, just like any commodity, as you’ve got more supply coming in, the present power will, at some point in time, come down

The Philippines' sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Maharlika Investment Corporation (MIC), has made its first investment by acquiring a 20% stake in Synergy Grid and Development Philippines Inc. (SGP), the majority holder of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), a firm listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) 

Is this move primarily about economic interests, or does it also serve geopolitical objectives? 

Is the MIC being used to facilitate the re-nationalization of NGCP by phasing out or displacing China’s state-owned State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), which holds a 40% stake? 

Or has this, in effect, been an implicit bailout of SGP? 

If so, how can achieving domestic and geopolitical objectives align with the goal of attaining desired financial returns?  

Or how could competing objectives be reconciled to achieve optimal returns? 

II. The Legacy of NAPOCOR: A Historical Overview and its Cautionary Lessons

To better understand the current situation, let's first examine the origins of NGCP, tracing its roots back to its predecessor, the National Power Corporation (NPC). 

The NAPOCOR (NPC), was once the behemoth of the Philippine power industry, centralizing control over both the generation and transmission of electricity. 

Established in 1936 as a non-stock, public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 120, nationalizing the hydroelectric industry. It was later converted into a government-owned stock corporation by Republic Act 2641 in 1960. Its charter was revised under Republic Act 6395 in 1971. 

While consolidating significant influence over the Philippine electricity market, this monolithic structure came with its pitfalls. 

NAPOCOR accumulated substantial debt due to a combination of over-expansion, mismanagement, political interference, and corruption. 

The corporation's financial stability was further undermined by subsidies, price controls—both contributing to market imbalances—and costly contracts with Independent Power Producers (IPPs), which led to a cycle of financial losses. 

In response, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001 was enacted, marking the beginning of the sector's restructuring through privatization. 

The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) was created to manage the sale and privatization of NPC's assets, also assuming NPC's liabilities and obligations.

Figure 1

At its peak, NAPOCOR’s debt, as reported by PSALM, had reached 1.24 trillion pesos by 2003. (Figure 1) 

The National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) was established to manage the transmission facilities and assets previously under NAPOCOR.

This restructuring ultimately led to the formation of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) in 2009, a consortium that included local business tycoons Henry Sy Jr. and Robert Coyiuto Jr., along with China’s state-owned enterprise, the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). NGCP assumed operational control of the country’s power grid. 

The key takeaway from NAPOCOR’s experience is that its monopolistic structure created and fostered inefficiencies, corruption, and imbalances, which culminated in massive debt. 

Despite the privatization, NGCP remains a legal monopoly. 

Once again, NGCP operates and maintains the transmission infrastructure, such as power lines and substations, that connects power generation plants—including those owned by NAPOCOR and private generators—to distribution utilities. 

III. Geopolitical Tensions Permeate the Power Sector 

The current Philippine administration's foreign policy can be viewed through the lens of U.S. influence. 

Evidenced by hosting four additional bases for access to the U.S. military in 2023 amidst ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, this stance marks a contrast with the previous Duterte administration's more China-friendly policies. 

This foreign policy shift has also been manifested in actions such as the banning of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs) and the legal actions against Ms. Alice Guo, a former provincial (Tarlac) mayor accused of espionage and involvement in illegal gambling. 

These tensions extend to the NGCP, where the Chinese stake has been cited by media and officials as a national security risk.  

According to a US politically influential think tank, "Fears in both Manila and Washington that Beijing could disable the grid in a time of crisis have lent urgency to efforts to reform its ownership and operational structure". (CSIS, 2024) 

Therefore, heightened scrutiny of China’ government involvement in sectors like NGCP, justified on the ‘kill switch’ or national security risk, combined with increasing military cooperation with the U.S., suggests a Philippine foreign policy trajectory heavily influenced by Washington's strategic objectives. 

IV. MIC’s Investment in NGCP: A Revival of Economic Nationalism? Shades of Napocor?

The stated objectives of MIC’s entry into NGCP through a 20% stake in SGP are twofold: 

A. Advance National Security by Strengthening Oversight of NGCP Management? 

MIC contends that this investment allows for governmental oversight of NGCP management, potentially counterbalancing foreign influence, particularly from China. They have also expressed interest in acquiring the entire SGCC’s stake. 

However, this approach risks "political interference," one of the critical factors that historically plagued the National Power Corporation's (NPC) financial stability. 

Furthermore, a move towards re-nationalization could represent a regressive step, potentially leading to deep financial losses reminiscent of NPC’s past.

B. Economic Benefits: Lowering Electricity Costs by Enhancing Grid Efficiency?

MIC has promoted the investment as a means to improve grid infrastructure, with the expectation that efficiency gains would eventually translate into lower electricity rates for consumers.

First, the latter objective appears secondary to the former. Since all government actions must be publicly justified, MIC’s interventions are presented as beneficial to the consumer.

Figure 2

The Philippines is often cited as having one of the highest electricity rates in Asia. (Figure 2, upper chart) 

However, subsidies on power firms have distorted this metric. The NPC’s subsidy program significantly contributed to its debt accumulation.

Similarly, the government’s attempt to regulate fuel prices via the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) ended up as a net subsidy, requiring large bailouts, as noted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD, 2014). 

In short, Philippine experiences with subsidies have historically been unsuccessful. 

It is also questionable whether dependency on energy imports directly equates to high electricity prices. (Figure 2, lower image)

This simplistic logic would lead to the conclusion that nations that are most dependent on oil and energy imports would have the highest electricity rates, which is not necessarily true—because of many other factors. 

Second, MIC argues that "investing in NGCP could improve the rollout of transmission grid infrastructure, allowing more power players to supply energy to the grid."  

While this proposal is ideal in theory, its practical implementation faces significant challenges. 

One of the primary drivers behind high energy costs is the oligopolistic market structure, characterized by a concentration of power among a few large conglomerates.

Figure 3 

The most prominent players include San Miguel Corporation (PSE: SMC), Aboitiz Power Corporation (PSE: AP), First Gen Corporation (PSE: FGEN), and Manila Electric Company (PSE: MER). In Luzon, for example, seven generation companies hold an estimated 50% of the total installed capacity. (ADMU, 2022) (Figure 3) 

Despite partial deregulation, the concentration of market power among these firms potentially reduces competitive pressures and limits market alternatives, leading to price-setting behaviors that do not reflect true supply and demand dynamics. 

The Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) was introduced in 2006 to foster competition, yet allegations of anti-competitive behavior emerged soon after its inception. 

Moreover, while EPIRA led to privatization in segments of the industry, the slow pace of implementing reforms, such as open access provisions and retail competition, has maintained high electricity prices, as highlighted in a World Bank study. 

Furthermore, the incumbent regulatory framework, despite its intent to limit market power, has not fully mitigated oligopolistic tendencies, resulting in persistently high prices for consumers. Examples: Bureaucracy and red tape, cross ownership, system losses, conflicting laws, over-taxation and more. 

As a result, the oligopolistic market structure and high energy costs deter foreign direct investment (FDI), as investors seek markets with lower operational costs. 

The likely substantial influence of these oligopolists on the political sphere, which protects their interests through legal frameworks, raises the risks of collusion, cartel-like behavior, and barriers to entry, thereby constraining competition.

Therefore, while MIC’s argument for infrastructure rollout benefiting consumers through competition is necessary, it is crucially insufficient. 

Market concentration among large firms may have significant influence on regulations and their implementation, particularly in the upstream and midstream segments (generation, transmission, and distribution). 

The slow pace of reforms aimed at fostering a competitive environment has severely limited efficiency gains, and consequently, the reduction of electricity rates. 

Third, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) low interest rates regime has enabled these firms to accumulate substantial or large amounts of debt to finance their commercial operations, which implicitly creates obstacles for competitors unable to access cheap credit. 

Alternatively, this debt accumulation poses systemic financial and economic risks. 

In essence, despite EPIRA and its privatization efforts, monopolistic inefficiencies coupled with readily available cheap credit have effectively transferred NPC’s debt dilemma to the oligopoly. 

Lastly, decades of easy money policies from the BSP have driven a demand boom, resulting in a significant mismatch in the sector’s economic balance. This is evident in overinvestment in areas like real estate, construction, and retail, potentially diverting resources from necessary energy infrastructure and even potentially leading to overinvestment in renewable energy sources at the expense of reliable baseload power from coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. 

In sum, prioritizing the expansion of a competitive environment where the sector’s pricing reflects actual demand and supply dynamics is essential. 

Liberalization, which should lower the hurdle rate, would intrinsically encourage infrastructure investment without the need for political interventions. 

MIC’s promotion of economic gains from its interventions appears more as a "smoke and mirror" justification for politically colored actions. 

V. Maharlika's NGCP Investment: A Bailout in Disguise? Potentially Inflating an SGP Stock Bubble?" 

An even more fascinating perspective is SGP's financial health. 

Certainly, as a legal monopoly, the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) holds a significant economic advantage—an economic moat. 

Grosso modo, SGP, as the majority shareholder of NGCP, seemingly operates within a rent-seeking paradigm, where wealth is accumulated not through value creation but through leveraging of economic or political environments to secure favorable positions. 

OR, for monopolists, the focus shifts from open market competition, innovation, or improvement, to maintaining their monopoly status by currying favor with political stewards. Subsequently, they leverage this privilege to extract economic rents, often at the expense of consumers or other market participants. 

SGP’s financials and recent developments appear to support this narrative.

Figure 4

Revenue Stagnation: Since Q3 2022, SGP's quarterly revenue has grown by an average of 5.9% over 13 quarters through Q3 2024, with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of only 0.52% since Q3 2020. 

Slowing Profit Trends: During the same periods, quarterly profits expanded by 2.67%, but shrank by 2.25% based on CAGR. 

Notably, a spike in net income in Q2 2022 was attributed to "higher iMAR as approved by ERC effective January 1, 2020 and the recording of Accrued revenue for incremental iMAR 2020 for CY 2020 and 2021." 

iMAR Explanation: As per Businessworld, "iMAR stands for "Interim Maximum Annual Revenue," which refers to the maximum amount of money a power transmission company like the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) is allowed to earn annually from its operations, as approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) during a specific regulatory period; essentially setting a cap on how much revenue they can collect from electricity transmission services"

Figure 5

Mounting Liquidity Issues: SGP's cash reserves have been contracting, with an average decrease of 3.9% over 13 quarters through Q3 2024 and a -6.7% CAGR since Q3 2020. 

Surging Debt Accumulation: Conversely, debt and financing charges have escalated. Debt has grown by an average of 12.1% over 13 quarters, with a 2.1% CAGR, while financing charges increased by an average of 5.7% with a 1.9% CAGR. 

SGP’s finances are not exactly healthy. 

Yet NGCP’s recent activities gives further clues. (bold mine) 

ABS-CBN, May 23, 2023: "The National Grid Corporation of the Philippines on Thursday said it was not to blame for delayed projects, and fended off criticism that it was making consumers pay even for delayed projects. The country’s power grid operator also insisted that power transmission improved since it took over operations from the government. A recent Senate hearing found that 66 projects, of which 33 were in Luzon, 19 in the Visayas, and 14 in Mindanao, remained unfinished. " 

ABS-CBN, December 23, 2024: "The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) has imposed a total of P15.8 million worth of fines on the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) over "unjustified delays" in 34 out of 37 projects. "

SGP’s tight finances, mainly evidenced by stagnant revenues, declining profits, and deteriorating liquidity, could reflect the challenges faced by NGCP. 

Further, despite the complex political nature of the operations of the grid monopoly, the ERC caps the revenue that NGCP is allowed to generate (Php 36.7 billion annually). 

This limits NGCP’s financial health, potentially leading to liquidity strains and increased borrowings by SGP to finance their projects. 

Fundamentally, his dynamic might resemble a high-stakes path towards Napocor 2.0. 

Besides, the Department of Energy (DoE) sets the plans and policies, while NGCP, as the exclusive franchise holder, is in charge of the operation, maintenance, development, and implementation of projects for the country's power transmission system. 

The ERC regulates and approves rates, monitors performance, and can impose penalties for delays or inefficiencies. 

In short, since NGCP prioritizes fulfilling the administration's political agenda, it seemingly does so with little concern for consumers—does this reflect the rent-seeking paradigm? 

This raises two crucial questions: aside from economic nationalism, could MIC’s entry into NGCP amount to an implicit BAILOUT of SGP? 

And could this package include a deal for China’s SGCC to exit? 

While we are not privy to the legal technicalities leading to MIC’s initial investment in NGCP via a 20% stake in SGP, SGP’s share prices have experienced a resurgence, or spike, since hints of MIC’s entry began to emerge late last year. 

Year-to-date (YTD) returns of SGP shares totaled 17.6% as of February 7th. 

Once again, this raises additional questions:

Figure 6

-Is a stock market bubble being inflated for SGP shares, benefiting not only corporate insiders and their networks, but also political figures and their allies behind the scenes? 

-Considering the price plunge of SGP shares from over 700 in 2017 to the present, resulting in substantial losses for its shareholders, could this potential bailout include efforts to pump up SGP shares to recoup at least a significant portion of these deficits? 

VI. Maharlika’s Risks and Potential Consequences 

The paramount concern revolves around what might happen if MIC's investment, re-nationalization, or its policy of economic nationalism regarding NGCP goes awry. 

What if NGCP replicates the pitfalls of its predecessor, the National Power Corporation (NPC)? How would the resulting losses or deficits be managed? 

Maharlika's investment capital is derived from public funds. If MIC incurs losses, would additional taxpayer money be on the line? Would there be a necessity for a bailout of MIC itself? 

How would potential deficits from MIC affect the country's fiscal health? Could this lead to higher interest rates and a weaker peso, exacerbating economic pressures? 

VII. Conclusion 

Ultimately, Maharlika's NGCP investment, executed through SGP, reflects a tension between seemingly conflicting objectives: securing national security interests and generating optimal returns. 

While proponents tout the deal as a means to lower electricity costs and improve grid efficiency, our concern—given SGP's financial weaknesses—is that MIC’s infusion could, in effect, function as a bailout. 

That is to say, the potential exposure of public funds through the SWF for political goals may conflict with, or potentially override, the Maharlika Investment Corporation’s stated goals: "to ensure economic growth by generating consistent and stable investment returns with appropriate risk limits to preserve and enhance long-term value of the fund; obtaining the best absolute return and achievable financial gains on its investments; and satisfying the requirements of liquidity, safety/security, and yield in order to ensure profitability of the GFIs’ respective funds." 

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references 

Harrison Prétat, Yasir Atalan, Gregory B. Poling, and Benjamin Jensen, Energy Security and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2024 

Maria Nimfa Mendoza Lessons Learned: Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Energy Sector Reform in the Philippines, March 2014, IISD.org p. iv 

Majah-Leah V. Ravago, The Nature and Causes of High Philippine Electricity Price and Potential Remedies, January 19, 2022 Ateneo de Manila University

Ron Paul: Lessons from Paris

Former US congressman and libertarian Ron Paul explains that the latest terror events in Paris partly represented a blowback from foreign policies.

From the Ron Paul Institute  (bold mine)

After the tragic shooting at a provocative magazine in Paris last week, I pointed out that given the foreign policy positions of France we must consider blowback as a factor. Those who do not understand blowback made the ridiculous claim that I was excusing the attack or even blaming the victims. Not at all, as I abhor the initiation of force. The police blaming victims when they search for the motive of a criminal.

The mainstream media immediately decided that the shooting was an attack on free speech. Many in the US preferred this version of “they hate us because we are free,” which is the claim that President Bush made after 9/11. They expressed solidarity with the French and vowed to fight for free speech. But have these people not noticed that the First Amendment is routinely violated by the US government? President Obama has used the Espionage Act more than all previous administrations combined to silence and imprison whistleblowers. Where are the protests? Where are protesters demanding the release of John Kiriakou, who blew the whistle on the CIA use of waterboarding and other torture? The whistleblower went to prison while the torturers will not be prosecuted. No protests.

If Islamic extremism is on the rise, the US and French governments are at least partly to blame. The two Paris shooters had reportedly spent the summer in Syria fighting with the rebels seeking to overthrow Syrian President Assad. They were also said to have recruited young French Muslims to go to Syria and fight Assad. But France and the United States have spent nearly four years training and equipping foreign fighters to infiltrate Syria and overthrow Assad! In other words, when it comes to Syria, the two Paris killers were on “our” side. They may have even used French or US weapons while fighting in Syria.

Beginning with Afghanistan in the 1980s, the US and its allies have deliberately radicalized Muslim fighters in the hopes they would strictly fight those they are told to fight. We learned on 9/11 that sometimes they come back to fight us. The French learned the same thing last week. Will they make better decisions knowing the blowback from such risky foreign policy? It is unlikely because they refuse to consider blowback. They prefer to believe the fantasy that they attack us because they hate our freedoms, or that they cannot stand our free speech.

Perhaps one way to make us all more safe is for the US and its allies to stop supporting these extremists.

Another lesson from the attack is that the surveillance state that has arisen since 9/11 is very good at following, listening to, and harassing the rest of us but is not very good at stopping terrorists. We have learned that the two suspected attackers had long been under the watch of US and French intelligence services. They had reportedly been placed on the US no-fly list and at least one of them had actually been convicted in 2008 of trying to travel to Iraq to fight against the US occupation. According to CNN, the two suspects traveled to Yemen in 2011 to train with al-Qaeda. So they were individuals known to have direct terrorist associations. How many red flags is it necessary to set off before action is taken? How long did US and French intelligence know about them and do nothing, and why?

Foreign policy actions have consequences. The aggressive foreign policies of the United States and its allies in the Middle East have radicalized thousands and have made us less safe. Blowback is real whether some want to recognize it or not. There are no guarantees of security, but only a policy of non-intervention can reduce the risk of another attack.

Deglobalization: Chinese State owned firms to sever ties with US consulting firms

Geopolitical strains have begun to spillover into the economic realm.

The Chinese government orders her state owned companies to cut ties with US consulting firms

From Reuters:

China has told its state-owned enterprises to sever links with American consulting firms just days after the United States charged five Chinese military officers with hacking U.S. companies, the Financial Times reported on Sunday.

China's action, which targets companies like McKinsey & Company and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), stems from fears the firms are providing trade secrets to the U.S. government, the FT reported, citing unnamed sources close to senior Chinese leaders.

These are seeds of protectionism. If there will be more tit-for-tat responses, protectionist policies will spread and swell to cover many economic areas. This implies deglobalization or a potential significant slowdown of global trade and finance or capital flows. Importantly, protectionism increases the risk of a military showdown. 

Very bullish no?

Along with the French, Chinese Police to Patrol Paris

From the Guardian

Paris police are to draft in reinforcements from China to help patrol the French capital during the summer tourist boom.

The foreign officers will be deployed to key landmarks to prevent Chinese visitors – around 1 million of whom come to France every year – being targeted by pickpockets and muggers.

A plan originating from the French Interior Ministry proposed that Chinese police officers would patrol with their French counterparts in Paris tourist spots. A ministry spokesperson refused to give details or numbers, but said their role would be preventative, and that they would operate as part of a global operation to protect tourists across the city.

Police say Chinese tourists often carry large amounts of cash, making them a target for attacks. Tourists from China are estimated to spend an average of €1,300 during their holidays, much of it on designer goods.

The move follows a rise in assaults by thieves on tourists from China. In March last year a group of 23 Chinese visitors were robbed in a restaurant shortly after arriving in Paris. The group was on a 12-day tour of Europe but stopped for dinner at Le Bourget in one of Paris's northern suburbs, where they were robbed of €7,500 cash, plane tickets and passports. The group leader was injured in the attack…

In central Paris, officers struggle to deal with organised gangs of thieves and pickpockets, many of them children, from the Balkans and eastern Europe, who harass tourists with fake "petitions" or demands for charity donations.

Some thoughts

Given how the Philippine government has been eager to embrace US bases, will the Philippine government do a copycat and ask US police to patrol the streets of Manila for the "protection of American tourists"?

Chinese cash rich tourists as targets by domestic thieves and Chinese police presence in Paris exude a crucial shift in the balance of economic and geopolitical power

The above also demonstrates the incompetence of centralized political institutions that are supposed to protect people within their defined political boundaries.

The French socialist government’s drafting of external police force exhibits such patent government failure.

If the French government “struggle to deal with organised gangs of thieves and pickpockets”, how will the Chinese police help solve such problems when the latter seems hardly familiar with the French geography, the political, legal and or cultural system?  

Yet the Chinese police seem to have a handful of domestic criminal issues to deal with.

The Chinese police may “help victims to make a police complaint” but farther than these they are unlikely to succeed, unless the French are convinced of a Jet Li solution.

Private Police anyone? 

 

Showbiz Politics: The Myth of US-Philippine Defense Pact Promoting Regional Peace

As I said yesterday, showbiz has practically consumed most of social affairs in the Philippines.

More evidence of showbiz in the context of the bilateral military agreement between the heads of state of the US and the Philippines. 

From the Philippine Inquirer:

“The Philippines-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) takes our security cooperation to a higher level of engagement, reaffirms our countries’ commitment to mutual defense and security, and promotes regional peace and stability,” Aquino said during their joint press conference.

Hours after the EDCA was signed, Aquino said the two countries’ defense alliance, even before the agreement, served as a “cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 60 years.”

The populist model for attaining "peace and stability" can be summarized as: the “bullied” should get a “big backer” to ward off the “bully”.

This may work perhaps if the object of contention has been about the bullied. But what if it isn’t? What if the target has been instead the “backer”, where the “bullied’ is really just a pawn in their rivalry?

[As a side note, the reason why the "bully" behaves this way maybe due to the actions of the "backer" or the "rivalry". That's one aspect offered to us by US political insider K. Philippa Malmgren, who observed that "access to the shipping lanes in and out of China has become an increasingly high-priority issue. After all, that's how 90 percent of critical food and energy supplies arrive in China and also how most things leave China. Yet all China sees is the ever-increasing presence of the U.S. Navy encircling them and rendering sea access less certain. Let's not forget that 10 percent of the world's fish supply comes from "near seas". (bold mine)]

History shares us some lessons here

Philippine participation in World War II according to the Wikipedia.org (bold mine)

The Commonwealth of the Philippines was invaded by the Empire of Japan in December 1941 shortly after Japan's declaration of war upon the United States of America, which controlled the Philippines at the time and possessed important military bases there.

Let us put on the military tactician’s thinking hat on. Let’s say the opposite side has decided to go to war with the “backer”.  Which would the military planners of the aggressing nation attack first? Nations allied to the enemy with bases or without bases? Well, world War 2 has provided the answer; The Philippines was bombed a day after Pearl Harbor in December 8, 1941

I rightly predicted that the Philippine political trend has been headed towards this direction in early 2012. Sell nationalism to get popular approval to justify the defense agreement.  But then I wrote about the treaty, the recently concluded agreement is reportedly a “pact”—between the two executive offices—without congressional approval.

Yet despite the ”pact”, the peace and stability model—the “bullied” should get a “big backer” to ward off the “bully”—unfortunately seem to have fallen through.

From today’s headlines at the Inquirer. (bold mine)

Obama gave no categorical commitment whether the 62-year-old Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the two countries—the backbone of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Edca) signed by Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and US Ambassador Philip Goldberg—would apply in case the Philippines’ territorial dispute with China escalates into an armed confrontation.

Steering clear of the question, Obama instead pointed to Beijing’s “interest” in abiding by international law, saying “larger countries have a greater responsibility” to do so.

“Our goal is not to counter China; our goal is not to contain China,” he said in a joint press conference with President Aquino in Malacañang, reflecting a delicate balancing act throughout his weeklong trip that earlier took him to Japan, South Korea and Malaysia.

So the “pact” turns out to be a noncommittal military agreement which reveals of the extent of its lopsidedness in favor of the US. The US President Obama seem to have stiffed the Philippine administration and their mainstream supporters when he said that the US had no "specific position on the disputes between nations". Ouch. The Philippine government and the mainstream seem to have heavily been expecting a "big backer" role the US should have supposedly assumed.

Why the noncommittal stance? Most possibly because the US cannot commit to fight each, and engage in, every conflict of her allies. The US has already had her hands full in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Yemen and etc. The Washington Blog estimates 74 different wars which the US has been engaged in. Ukraine may now be in the pipeline. 

You see, to expect the US to make a full commitment and yet deliver her promises with overstretched resources and personnel…well, that’s entertainment! Aside from the dozens of wars, the US has hundreds of bases around the world (estimates vary: Ron Paul 900, Charlmes Johnson 737) if not more than a thousand (Aljazeera, Global Research). The US budget for military spending in 2014 has been estimated at US$ 630 billion

And the non-committal stance by the US essentially debunks the one of the many impossible things believed by domestic populist politics, particularly Nationalism (and Nationalism based spending) is BEYOND the scope of economics and economic reasoning.  The lesson here is Economics drives politics.

The US President may have also been aware that an explicit support could have raised the risks of moral hazard, where the Philippine goverment may become more adversarial in her relationship with China.

With the base pact, I expect that the political trend, as I wrote in 2012, will now revolve around...

In reality, military bases have mostly been used as a staging point for political interventions in local affairs and for justifying the maintenance and or growth of the defense budget for the US federal government.

Promoting regional peace? Hardly. Maybe more of amplifying risks of geopolitical instability. 

And this “pact” looks more like a validation of the 2 time war medal the late Major General Smedley Butler’s claim that “war is a racket”

Quote of the Day: The Evil of Chávez is Dwarfed by that of the Governments of the "Free World”

Hugo Chávez may have been oppressive, but at least he wasn't a lapdog for Washington like so many other heads of state. The world would be a much more free and decentralized place with more anti-imperialist "rogue" nations. And it is important to put his depredations in perspective. Bush, Obama, Blair, Hollande, etc., have caused more death and suffering in the world than Chávez ever did. And this should be no surprise.It is often the less authoritarian states that afflict more humans more seriously, even if those afflicted the worst happen to be foreigners.  That is because the most "free" countries are also often the most imperialistic. This is what Hans-Hermann Hoppe calls the "paradox of imperialism."  States that allow more domestic freedom have more wealth to tap to fund more conquests and interventions.

Considering the chaos, terror, and wanton murderous destruction perpetrated on a daily basis by the West upon its recipients of "liberation," the evil of Chávez is dwarfed by that of the governments of the "free world."

This is from Mises.org editor Daniel J. Sanchez as quoted by Lew Rockwell at the Lew Rockwell Blog.

By the way, Hugo Chávez has reportedly amassed a personal fortune worth about US$ 2 billion as of 2010. The Criminal Justice International Associates said that “the Chávez administration have subtracted around $100 billion out of the nearly $1 trillion in oil income made by PDVSA since 1999.”

Some social justice from the Socialist of the 21st century eh?

Scarborough Shoal Dispute: The Politics of Nationalism

The Inquirer.net reports

As the dispute between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal entered its 18th day Friday, Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile called on the nation to rally behind President Aquino in asserting the country’s sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea)…

At the hearing, Enrile explained that the dispute over territorial waters in the West Philippine Sea was not political.

“This is a national issue that requires the support of the entire nation, and we support the President on this,” Enrile said. There should be no deviation. “There should be unanimity of all Filipinos in supporting Malacañang regardless of political persuasion and affiliation on this particular issue,” he said.

“We must show the People’s Republic of China that in this particular issue, the Filipino nation is one in supporting the leadership of the Republic of the Philippines in asserting the sovereign rights of this republic and the Filipino people over the Scarborough Shoal and the Reed Bank, and all the areas the Republic of the Philippines occupy in the South China Sea,” said Enrile.

Say what? Asking for popular approval is NOT about politics?

The definition of politics according to dictionary.com

exercising or seeking power in the governmental or public affairs of a state, municipality, etc.: a political machine; apolitical boss.

of, pertaining to, or involving the state or its government: apolitical offense.

So seeking power in public affairs and or the involvement of the state IS political. And we have a national politician stirring up dangerous nationalist fervor with sloganeering based on untruths.

As George Orwell once wrote,

Political language…is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

As I earlier pointed out, the Scarborough Shoal territorial dispute has NOT been about oil or resources and which has mostly likely been about political DIVERSION amidst internal political divisions in China and or the PROMOTION of arms sales for the military industrial complex. Further it is not in the interest of China to provoke military conflagrations when she has been promoting her currency as the region's foreign currency reserve.

And the seeming insouciance of financial markets over the brinkmanship politics, expressed through the price mechanism, has limned on the perceived risk environment where political sensationalism has departed from people voting with their money. The Phisix closed the week at record highs while the local currency the Philippine Peso closed the week up at 42.37 and seems to be approaching the February highs.

In other words, what politicians sees as urgency that requires “unanimity of all Filipinos” which is being touted by mainstream media, seems to depart from the actions of the marketplace, where the latter sees the risks of a shooting war to be negligible.

Of course, politicians know that in case of a real military skirmish, they or their families will not be at the battlefront (they will most likely be ensconced abroad), thus their audacity to call for implied aggressive populist nationalism that might justify an armed confrontation.

Furthermore, considering that both Spratlys and Scarborough Shoals have largely been uninhabited or has no population, the main benefits over the disputed “resource rich” islands will likely accrue to the cronies and the interests of political authorities than that of the nation. Yet the masses are being conjured to fight for their interests via calls for pretentious nationalism.

The history of war, said Michael Rivero, is the history of powerful individuals willing to sacrifice thousands upon thousands of other people’s lives for personal gains.

Finally, the real target of these war mongers are our civil liberties and economic freedom.

As French historian Alexis de Tocqueville wrote,

All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a democratic nation ought to know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish it.

Thus, the call for nationalism over territorial disputes is like putting the proverbial lipstick on the political pig.

Unintended Consequences from the Libyan Intervention

Benjamin Friedman of the Cato Institute enumerates the unintended consequences of the foreign policy of military interventions in Libya in 2011

Writes Mr. Friedman (bold emphasis added)

Advocates of both interventions underestimate coercion’s contribution to political order. Autocratic rule in these countries is partially a consequence of state weakness—the absence of strong liberal norms, government institutions, and nationalism. By helping to remove the levers of coercion in places like Libya and Syria, we risk producing anarchy—continual civil war or long-lived violent disorder. Either outcome would likely worsen suffering through widespread murder, a collapse of sanitation and health services, and stunted economic growth conducive to well-being. And the most promising paths to new of forms of unity and order in these states are illiberal: religious rule, war, or new autocrats. The humanitarian and liberal cases for these interventions are unconvincing.

Aside from Qaddafi’s fall, U.S. leaders gave three primary rationales for military intervention Libya (I repeatedly criticized them last spring). One was to show other dictators that the international community would not tolerate the violent suppression of dissenters. That reverse domino theory has obviously failed. If Qaddafi’s fate taught neighboring leaders like Bashar al-Assad anything, it is to brutally nip opposition movements in the bud before they coalesce, attract foreign arms and air support, and kill you, or, if you’re lucky, ship you off to the Hague.

The second rationale was the establishment of liberal democracy. But Libya, like Syria, lacks the traditional building blocks of liberal democracy. And history suggests that foreign military intervention impedes democratization. Whether or not it manages to hold elections, Libya seems unlikely to become a truly liberal state any time soon. As with Syria, any path to that outcome is likely to be long and bloody.

Meanwhile, Libya’s revolution has destabilized Mali. Qaddafi’s fall pushed hundreds of Tuareg tribesmen that fought on his side back to their native Mali, where they promptly reignited an old insurgency. Malian military officers, citing their government’s insufficient vigor against the rebels, mounted a coup, overthrowing democracy that had lasted over twenty years. Thus far, the military intervention in Libya has reduced the number of democracies by one.

The most widely cited rationale for helping Libya’s rebels was to save civilians from the regime. Along with many commentators, President Obama and his aides insisted that Qaddafi promised to slaughter civilians in towns that his forces were poised to retake last March. Thus, intervention saved hundreds of thousands of lives. A minor problem with this claim is that Qaddafi’s speeches actually threatened rebel fighters, not civilians, and he explicitly exempted those rebels that put down arms. More importantly, if Qaddafi intended to massacre civilians, his forces had ample opportunity to do it. They did commit war crimes, using force indiscriminately and executing and torturing prisoners. But the sort of wholesale slaughter that the Obama administration warned of did not occur—maybe because the regime’s forces lacked the organization needed for systematic slaughter.

The limited nature of the regime’s brutality does not itself invalidate humanitarian concerns. It might be worthwhile to stop even a historically mild suppression of rebellion if the cost of doing so is low enough. The trouble with the humanitarian argument for intervention in Libya is instead that the intervention and the chaos it produced may ultimately cause more suffering than the atrocities it prevented. Libya’s rebel leaders have thus far failed to resurrect central authority. Hundreds of militias police cities and occasionally battle. There are many credible reports that militias have unlawfully detained thousands of regime supporters, executed others, driven mistrusted communities from their homes, and engaged in widespread torture.

The looting of Libya’s weapons stockpiles is also likely to contribute to Libya’s misery, in part by arming the militias that obstruct central authority. The weapons depots reportedly included thousands of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), some of which may still work. It is worth noting that the widely-reported claim that Libya lost 20,000 MANPADS appears exaggerated. That figure comes from Senate testimony last spring by the head of Africa Command, who did not substantiate it (my two requests to Africa’s Command PR people for information on this claim were ignored). A State Department official recently gave the same figure before essentially admitting that we have no idea what the right figure is.

As always, the politics of interventionism has been veneered with noble “humanitarian” intentions which not only fails to meet their goals but eventually backfires.

In reality, "noble intentions" has always been used as cover to promote the interests of parties who operate 'behind the curtains' through the state.

Global Weapons Exports and the Spratlys Dispute

I previously asked if the Spratlys dispute has partly been about promoting weapons exports for the benefit of the military industrial complex and domestic politicians.

The Economist gives us some clues (bold emphasis mine)

GLOBAL transfers of large conventional weapons such as tanks and planes were 24% higher in 2007-2011 than in 2002-2006, according to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Deliveries to South-East Asia rose particularly steeply, jumping by 185% as tensions mounted over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Three-quarters of all exports in the past five years were made by five countries, as can be seen in the chart below. A notable recent development is China's ability to manufacture its own weapons. Consequently it now ranks as the sixth-biggest exporter, and having been the second-largest importer in 2002-06, it was only the fourth-largest in 2007-11. India remains the biggest importer of arms, buying 10% of the world's total. Perhaps surprisingly there was little change in the volume of arms sent to Arab Spring countries in the past year, though exports to Syria in 2007-2011 (supplied overwhelmingly by Russia) increased by nearly 600% on figures for 2002-06.

We never really know if governments, through their respective foreign policies, have been working in complicity to promote undeclared political agenda.