Showing posts with label savings. Show all posts
Showing posts with label savings. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 01, 2022

Chart of the Day: PSE October Gross Trading Volume Plummets to 2011 Level!

 Chart of the Day: PSE October Gross Trading Volume Plummets to 2011 Level!  

 

Before proceeding to the "chart of the day," here is a summary of the events last October at the PSE. 

 

Higher in three of the four weeks, the main benchmark index, the PSEi 30, posted an impressive 7.18% return in October, the second-highest monthly return since August 2021's 9.33%. 

But the intense reaction signifies a recoil from the 12.8% rout last September.  The index was also down by 9.2% in July 2021. 

  

The thing is, massive selloffs that result in oversold conditions have resulted in violent melt-ups. 

 

But even among members of the PSEi 30, there was barely support from the majority.   

 

Instead, the substantial gains of a few of the biggest market cap issues delivered this outcome.  

 

Increases in the free float market cap were most evident in SM, BDO, and ALI; their returns were up 13.1%, 14.2%, and 11.6%, respectively. 

 

And part of October's returns represented many of the mark-the-close pumps.  

 

Yet, even the PSE universe suffered a selloff amidst the index's dead cat's bounce.  Aggregate decliners outclassed advancers 1,847 to 1,710. 

 


The crux of October's activity is the shocking plunge (58.2% YoY and 32.7% MoM) in gross volume to Php 90.243 billion, which fell to the 2011 level! 

 

The sharp shrinkage in volume is likely a manifestation of escalating liquidity shortfall from the sustained drain in savings.  

 

Ironically, this is happening despite the sharp uptick in bank credit growth. 

 

The rapidly thinning turnover makes the equity market highly susceptible to dramatic liquidations or distress selling for funding purposes. 

 


Friday, April 12, 2013

Harvard’s Carmen Reinhart: Pensions are Screwed, Higher Inflation is a Safe Bet

Harvard economist and professor Carmen Reinhart, who along with co-Harvard peer authored a book chronicling world crises in the bestseller, This Time is Different has recently been interviewed by the Der Spiegel. (bold mine, hat tip zero hedge)

On the real reason for negative interest rates and QEs… 
Reinhart: No central bank will admit it is keeping rates low to help governments out of their debt crises. But in fact they are bending over backwards to help governments to finance their deficits. This is nothing new in history. After World War II, there was a long phase in which central banks were subservient to governments. It has only been since the 1970s that they have become politically more independent. The pendulum seems to be swinging back as a result of the financial crisis.
Oops. Financing government deficits has indeed become the norm. This is an essential ingredient to the risks of hyperinflation

On the difference between today and World War II…
Reinhart: No, but after World War II austerity was easier to pursue, because you had a younger population and therefore less entitlements. Furthermore, military expenditure was easier to reduce. So, the build-up in debt we have seen since the crisis is very rare. Usually you get that kind of build-up when there is a war.
Why huge debt has been a burden…
Reinhart: I am not opposing this change, I am just stating it. You have to deal with the debt overhang one way or the other because the high debt levels are an impediment to growth, they paralyze the financial system and the credit process. One way to cope with this is to write off part of the debt.
Why governments resort to plundering of people’s savings by financial repression…
Reinhart: The technical term for this is financial repression. After World War II, all countries that had a big debt overhang relied on financial repression to avoid an explicit default. After the war, governments imposed interest rate ceilings for government bonds. Nowadays they have more sophisticated means..

Monetary policy is doing the job. And with high unemployment and low inflation that doesn't even look suspicious. Only when inflation picks up, which is ultimately going to happen, will it become obvious that central banks have become subservient to governments.
Financial repression policies only adds to the debt stock, real austerity is required.
Reinhart: No. Restructuring, inflation und financial repression are not substitutes for austerity. All these measures reduce your existing stock of debt. Unless you do austerity you keep adding to the debt. There is no either-or. You need a combination of both to bring down debt to a sustainable level.
Why we should expect higher inflation…
Reinhart: There are no silver bullets. If central banks try to accommodate and buy debt, there are risks associated with it. Somewhere down the road you are going to wind up with higher inflation. That is a safe bet -- even in Japan
Again financing deficits heightens risks of hyperinflation.

Surprisingly Ms. Reinhart offers an implied Austrian school solution (except for the higher inflation advice)…
Reinhart: The best way of dealing with a debt overhang is to never get into one. Once you have one, what can you do? You can pray for higher growth, but good luck! Historically it doesn't happen -- you seldom just grow yourself out of debt. You need a combination of austerity, so that you don't add further to the pile of debt, and higher inflation, which is effectively a subtle form of taxation …
Why savers are screwed…
Reinhart: No doubt, pensions are screwed. Governments have a lot of leverage on what kinds of assets pension funds hold. In France, for example, public pension funds have shifted money from shares (on the stock market) to government bonds. Not because their returns are great, but because it is more expedient for the government. Pension funds, domestic banks and insurance companies are the most captive audiences, because governments can just change the rules of the game.
The morality of financial repression…
Reinhart: Let me be a little blunter: A haircut is a transfer from the creditor to the borrower. Who would get hit by a haircut? French banks, German banks, Dutch banks -- banks from the creditor countries. So you can see why this is politically torched. This is why it is not done, it's a redistribution. But ultimately it is going to happen, because the level of debt is too high.
The US will default too but by the inflation route
Reinhart: Yes, but who are the large holders of government bonds? Foreign central banks. You think the Bank of China is going to be repaid? The US doesn't have to default explicitly. If you have negative real interest rates, the effect on the creditors is the same. That is also a transfer from China, South Korea, Brazil and other creditors to the US.
Why the system will keep continuing until it can’t…
Reinhart: Why do we have such low interest rates? The Federal Reserve Bank is prepared to continue buying record levels of debt as long as the unemployment situation isn't satisfying. And China's central bank will also continue to buy treasuries, because they don't want the renminbi to appreciate.

Tuesday, April 09, 2013

War on Savings: Australia Doubles Retirement Taxes

Crisis or no crisis, Cyprus may have set a trend for governments to seek ways to tax private sector savings. 

Australia has reportedly doubled taxes on retirement savings.

Here is the eloquent Simon Black of the Sovereign Man
Though Australia’s national balance sheet is comparatively quite strong, the government has been running at a net deficit for years… and they’re under intense pressure to balance the budget.

The good news is that Australia now has a goodly number of investor-friendly immigration programs designed to bring productive foreigners into the country, similar to the trend we’re seeing across Europe.

On the flip side, though, the Australian government has just announced new rules which penalize citizens who have responsibly set aside savings for their own retirement.

Any income over A$100,000 drawn from a superannuation fund (the equivalent of an IRA in the United States) will now be taxed at 15%. Previously, all such income was tax-free.

The really offensive part about this is that the government is going to tax people’s savings ‘on both ends,’ meaning that people are taxed on money they move INTO the retirement fund, and now they can be taxed again when they pull money out.

The Cyprus debacle drew a line in the sand– fleecing people with assets, or income, in excess of 100,000 dollars, euros, etc. is now acceptable. This is the definition of ‘rich’ in the sole discretion of governments.

And make no mistake– if it can happen in Australia, which still has reasonable debt levels despite years of deficit spending, it can happen in bankrupt, insolvent nations like the US.
We can see from the following charts why.
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The Australian government has embarked on a spending spree since 2009. Australia’s fiscal balance has been deteriorating since.

This shows of the Emmanuel Rahm syndrome or Austrian economist Robert Higgs’ ratchet effect where crises have always been an excuse to justify government expansion.
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And by doing so Australia’s government has been ramping up debt. External debt grew by about 30% since 2009, while debt to gdp has began to reverse from years of austerity or fiscal “discipline”. 

And as I have earlier pointed out, Australia has also been manifesting signs of bubbles

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Australia’s credit to the private sector as % to gdp is now about 128%
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While the banking sectors exposure account for 145.76% of the gdp in 2011.
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And like almost every country, low interest rates have been a principal factor in driving credit expansion
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Despite the above, Australia’s stock market has hardly recovered from the 2008 global financial debacle. (all the wonderful charts above are from tradingeconomics.com)

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This means much of the credit expansion has been directed to the property sector, as measured by the phenomenal manic growth of housing prices (chart from vexnews). 

This proves that much of today's statistical economic growth have been Potemkin Villages

Yet once the global pandemic of bubbles pop, we can expect governments coordinate the dragooning of the public’s resources via more confiscation of savings to advance the interests of the political class via bailouts and more quack Keynesian fixes.

Of course this relationship will persist until people tolerate them. However, eventually the curse of the laffer curve will prevail or a financial repression (tax) revolt can also be an expected response.

Thursday, December 27, 2012

Quote of the Day: Nobody is More Generous than the Miser

In this whole world, there is nobody more generous than the miser—the man who could deplete the world’s resources but chooses not to. The only difference between miserliness and philanthropy is that the philanthropist serves a favored few while the miser spreads his largess far and wide.

If you build a house and refuse to buy a house, the rest of the world is one house richer. If you earn a dollar and refuse to spend a dollar, the rest of the world is one dollar richer—because you produced a dollar’s worth of goods and didn’t consume them.

Who exactly gets those goods? That depends on how you save. Put a dollar in the bank and you’ll bid down the interest rate by just enough so someone somewhere can afford an extra dollar’s worth of vacation or home improvement. Put a dollar in your mattress and (by effectively reducing the money supply) you’ll drive down prices by just enough so someone somewhere can have an extra dollar’s worth of coffee with his dinner. Scrooge, no doubt a canny investor, lent his money at interest. His less conventional namesake Scrooge McDuck filled a vault with dollar bills to roll around in. No matter. Ebenezer Scrooge lowered interest rates. Scrooge McDuck lowered prices. Each Scrooge enriched his neighbors as much as any Lord Mayor who invited the town in for a Christmas meal.

Saving is philanthropy, and—because this is both the Christmas season and the season of tax reform—it’s worth mentioning that the tax system should recognize as much. If there’s a tax deduction for charitable giving, there should be a tax deduction for saving. What you earn and don’t spend is your contribution to the world, and it’s equally a contribution whether you give it away or squirrel it away.
 This is from author and University of Rochester economics professor Steven Landsburg on the virtue of savings.

Sunday, September 12, 2010

Philippine Phisix In A Historic Breakaway Run!

``Genius is the act of solving a problem in a way no one has solved it before. It has nothing to do with winning a Nobel prize in physics or certain levels of schooling. It's about using human insight and initiative to find original solutions that matter. Genius is actually the eventual public recognition of dozens (or hundreds) of failed attempts at solving a problem. Sometimes we fail in public, often we fail in private, but people who are doing creative work are constantly failing. When the lizard brain kicks in and the resistance slows you down, the only correct response is to push back again and again and again with one failure after another. Sooner or later, the lizard will get bored and give up.” Seth Godin

After this week’s remarkable and historic breakout by the Philippine Phisix to a fresh all time nominal record highs, we should be having our victory lap.

Another Sweet Vindication

Sorry I can’t help but vent this pleasant and pleasurable feeling of total exoneration: I TOLD YOU SO!

That’s because it’s been years since my analysis and forecasts have been met by various incredulous expressions of scepticisms from almost all quarters.

And it’s not just the breakout that matters; it has been the operational process of the domestic and global financial markets which seems to have aligned in near precision with our analytical methodology predicated mostly upon a combination of non-mainstream theories: Austrian economics, Public choice theory, Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability hypothesis, George Soro’s reflexivity theory, Alvin Toffler’s “Knowledge Economies”, behavioural finance (Nassim Taleb) and other theories on psychology (e.g. PTSD, Pavlov’s experiment).

Given the momentous force that had accompanied the recent breakout, wherein a whopping 9.44% of accrued gains had been established over the last two weeks, one should expect to see a reprieve over the coming week/s.

We don’t know of the scale of the pause, whether it should signify a substantial correction or a mere consolidation. But we know one thing: no trend goes in a straight line, and that the upcoming countertrend should signify as an opportunity to accumulate than for exit.

As we have previously pointed out, not all bullmarkets are like[1]. As the growing conviction phase of the bubble cycle deepens, as represented by the recent buyside calls of “Golden Era”[2], one should expect to see heightened volatility in market actions which means more frequent explosive moves.

Timing the markets, unless one is very lucky, could translate to lost opportunities, as sharp losses can equally translate to even swifter recoveries.

As a side note, attribution bias, or claiming skills as reasons for ‘trading’ successes, will predominate the coming atmosphere. This especially will be amplified for retail participants, but unknowingly for most, they would be just plain lucky, as the rising lifts most if not all boats.

In a bullmarket, as an old saw goes, everyone is a genius.

Peso Remains A Buy, Politicizing Market Success (Peso Bond Float)

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Figure 1: Yahoo/Bloomberg: Milestone Phisix, Lagging Peso

The difference in today’s secular bullmarket compared with the past (1986-1997) is that this time the Phisix (right window) will be accompanied by a rising Philippine Peso. Lately the Peso has apparently lagged (left window).

In late 2007 where the Phisix made a new high, the Peso likewise belatedly caught up and peaked in January of 2008 (Php 40 to a US dollar).

And perhaps we can expect the same trailing performance by the Peso as foreign fund flows (compounded by immigrant and OFWs) into local assets magnify the demand for the Peso.

Meanwhile, the monetary accommodation by the US government and other developed economies will enlarge relative supply scale of the money supplies in favour of ASEAN and Asian currencies.

Importantly, the sustainability of the relative outperformance between asset prices of developed economies and that of the ASEAN (or emerging Asia) powered by the divergences of monetary policies will prompt for more inflows into the region.

And one of the glaring example of the unfolding of such dynamics has been the recent success by the $1 billion Peso bond float.

Yet like always, unfortunately events like this will always be tainted with political colour, as political personalities speedily associate these events with populism.

As we have argued this administration has been so image conscious, such that it would seem that the elections have never ended. To impute the successful bond float to “landslide vote of confidence[3]” for the new administration is no less than PR work meant at propping up imagery of the administration, even if the relevance of the purported linkages were less than half true or constitutes a logical fallacy.

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Figure 2: AsianBondsonline.adb.org[4]: Size and Composition of Emerging East Asian Local Currency Bond Markets

The alleged “vote of confidence” does not consider the larger spectrum which would show that the region’s local currency bonds markets have been vastly improving (see figure 2).

In fact, the Philippines have lagged our Asian neighbours and falls below the average performance of the total Emerging Asia, (perhaps even if we add the latest US $1 billion float).

So on a relative scale, the vote of confidence on the Philippines isn’t that impressive, because investors have voted with more confidence on the markets of Thailand (which ironically just experienced a nasty city-wide riot[5] last May), Indonesia and has only been at par with Malaysia.

Given the above picture, I would dare argue that even under the past unpopular regime, the bond issuance would have had a similar magnitude of “warm” reception.

That’s because in a world where prices have been distorted by government’s manipulation of the interest rate (price of time), people conjure up all sorts of excuses, valid or not, just to chase for yields. In short, as the reflexivity theory would say, prices shape opinions.

Yet politicians are quick to grab credit for any actions as their own doing even if these are unrelated, unsupported or has little correlations.

And evidence from the above exhibits that politics have had little effect on the supposed “vote of confidence” of the latest Philippine bond float (or even applied to Thailand).

Another reason why the Philippine Peso has lagged has been due to domestic politics[6]. Particularly that of the politics of OFWs, and secondarily, of the exporters.

So yes, the Peso remains a buy and should be expected to appreciate towards the 40-levels by the yearend, barring any unforeseen circumstances (e.g. war on Iran) and unless our central bank will match the US Federal Reserve in inflating the system (our tail risk).

Unlikely A US Double Dip Recession

These sanguine forecasts are likewise predicated on the conditions that there will be NO double dip recession in developed economies, as a recession will likely drain liquidity in the global financial system despite the proclivity of central banks to counteract such dynamics by flooding the system with money.

Unless we can see further proof where domestic liquidity can get insulated from a liquidity drain abroad, it would be imprudent to bet against “convergence”, which apparently have been the hallmark of globalization.

And a recession is NOT inevitable for earlier reasons cited[7] plus some additional inputs:

1. Global central banks have placed under their stringent sponsorship the banking industry.

Unlike the Great Depression where collapsing banks had a domino effect throughout the economy, today global central banks led by US has backstopped their banking system (specifically creditors) with trillions of taxpayer money. This signifies as a pyrrhic short term victory whose enormous costs would certainly emerge sometime in the future.

Yet it would be a folly for the mainstream to declare victory on what is clearly a short-term panacea. Paying the Piper will be different from what the mainstream expects.

2. Globalization continues to progress.

In contrast to the Great Depression, collapsing banks, protectionism and regime uncertainties via a slew of massive regulatory obstacles caused a standstill and a decline in trade and investments. This is hardly today’s picture.

During the height of the recent crisis, marked by the Lehman bankruptcy, the near seizure of the US banking system rippled throughout the global banking system. However, many entities persisted to trade and channelled them via barter[8] and local currency[9]. And this empirically disproved the mainstream notion that the crisis was one of the failures of aggregate demand. Thus, the mainstream had been caught unaware of the 2009 “recovery” which was likewise supported by the Fed’s (Quantitative Easing) printing press.

Importantly, while the banking system of crisis affected areas like the US have resulted to large scale deterioration in the credit conditions as the crisis culminated, there appears to be material improvement over some aspects of the credit markets as previously discussed[10]. It is likely that the credit markets in the US could finally be responding to the yield curve dynamics which cyclically has had a 2-3 year lag period[11].

Another feature of globalization has been the financing dynamics outside of the banking system, or in particular the explosive growth of the bond markets.

According to Bloomberg[12],

``Global high-yield bond sales are poised to exceed 2009’s record issuance as the riskiest companies take advantage of plunging borrowing costs and investor demand to refinance debt.”

So while the permabears continue to tunnel onto the credit growth as a reason to argue for another recession, the complexities brought about by globalization is certainly keeping them on the wrong side of the fence.

Finally, in contrast to conventional wisdom, credit isn’t the foundation growth, savings is.

As the great Professor Ludwig von Mises wrote[13],

The only source of the generation of additional capital goods is saving. If all the goods produced are consumed, no new capital comes into being.

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Figure 3: Deutsche Bank[14]: The Rising Impact Of Asia On The Global Economy

Flushed with savings, emerging markets have not optimized the utility of savings into investments due to their underdeveloped state of the markets (see figure 3). However, globalization appears to be reconfiguring this role as markets are liberalized to accommodate on foreign investments.

Yet of course, artificially suppressed interest rates have been also been a major factor into generating policy “traction” or having to accelerate such dynamics.

And for as long as interest rates will remain at über-accommodative levels in developed economies, emerging markets, like the Philippines, should generally be expected to outperform compared to the debt hobbled counterparts in developed economies.

3. More signs of transition to the Information Age.

The transition to the information age is no more than an extension of the highly competitive and increasingly diversified markets brought about globalization that has spurred massive technological innovation.

Most experts still use industrial age metrics to measure economic activities, which has increasingly become obsolescent. To analogize, the mainstream still think in terms of analog instead of digital, even when many of them increasingly use digital instruments to transact or engage in commerce or conduct many activities in their lives.

In the US, since the adjustment process from a bubble economy to a rediscovery phase takes a longer period, especially in the light of a growing specialization of trade patterns, government intervention only delays these rediscovery phase.

Nevertheless, signs of such transitions have become manifest as seen in the growing mismatch between job availability (high skilled) and manpower supply (labor exposed to malinvestments) as we have pointed out earlier[15].

It isn’t necessarily that there has been a paucity of jobs, but in many instances, the skills required for specialized jobs have been inadequate or have been in a mismatch. And this has mainly been due to the distortive effects from previous inflationary policies that has caused massive misdirection of use in terms of labor and resources. And currently, interventionist policies (unemployment benefits, Obamacare, prospects of higher taxes et.al.) have proven to be an obstacle in the retooling process required for their labor force to adapt to the new reality.

Additionally the latest trade data shows that capital spending has led the economic growth of the US, which has mostly been seen in the industrial machinery and computer exports sectors.

As this Wall Street Journal article illustrate[16],

``While capital projects abroad, especially in emerging economies, are designed to expand production capacity, U.S. businesses are spending to modernize existing facilities and to boost productivity in their work force. Business spending on equipment accounted for one-third of gross domestic product growth in the first quarter and almost all of second-quarter GDP growth.

``The increased foreign demand, coupled with spending here in the U.S., is why business equipment is leading economic growth. U.S. output of business equipment jumped 11.7% in the year ended in July, compared with a 7.7% gain for all manufacturing production.

So specialization, division of labor and comparative advantages highlight substantial part of the economic conditions in the US.

In short, for the mainstream there is alot more for them to chew on, which apparently they refuse to do.


[1] See How To Go About The Different Phases of The Bullmarket Cycle, August 23, 2010

[2] See The Rationalization Phase Begins: ‘Golden Era’ Equals The ‘New Paradigm’?, September 8, 2010

[3] Inquirer.net Peso bond sale nets $1B, September 11, 2010

[4] AsianBondsonline.adb.org, Asian Bond Monitor: Summer Issue Bond Market Developments in the First Quarter of 2010

[5] See Politics And Markets: Bangkok Burns Edition, May 20, 2010

[6] See Global Policy Divergences Favors A Rising Peso, August 22, 2010

[7] See Why Deflationists Are Most Likely Wrong Again, August 15, 2010

[8] See What Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Have To Do With Today’s Financial Crisis, February 1, 2009

[9] See Emerging Local Currencies In The US Disproves The 'Liquidity Trap’, February 16, 2010

[10] See The Road To Inflation, August 29, 2010

[11] See Influences Of The Yield Curve On The Equity And Commodity Markets, March 22, 2010

[12] Bloomberg.com, Treasury 10-Year Note Yields Climb to One-Month High on Economy, September 10, 2010

[13] Mises, Ludwig von The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality by Ludwig von Mises, Section 4

[14] Lanzeni Maria Laura Lanzeni The Rising Impact Of Asia On The Global Economy June 2010

[15] See US Unemployment: It’s Partly About Skills-Jobs Mismatch, August 10, 2010

[16] Madigan Kathleen, Trade Data Show Importance of Capital Goods Wall Street Journal Blog, September 10, 2010

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Banking System And Global Imbalances

This is an interesting observation from the Economist,


``The finances of banks are a mirror of the economies where they are based. In emerging markets, the surplus of customer deposits over loans (ie, excess savings) at listed banks was about $1.6 trillion in 2008, compared with a deficit of about $1.9 trillion at rich-world banks. Banks in emerging markets, which have vast branch networks to suck in deposits from thrifty families and companies, park their surplus with the state, by buying government bonds or keeping it in central banks. The state in turn acts as the international recycling agent for those excess savings: it lends them to Western countries through its foreign reserves or through a sovereign-wealth fund. Meanwhile, overextended Western banks do the exact opposite: they borrow from capital markets to plug the hole created by having more loans than deposits. In 2009, the funding gap was smaller, reflecting the slow rebalancing of Western banks' finances." (all bold highlights mine)

My comment:

The above shows the following:


-trade imbalances are offset by capital account transfers [see
US-China Trade Imbalance? Where?]

-governments are shown here to be very inefficient intermediaries in the allocation of resources (finance or real). Allocations are fundamentally politically motivated, e.g. in the US, the homeownership bias in the 1990s to 2007 (ergo the bubble bust of 2008); today, the focus is on deficit spending.


-moral hazard from sustained subsidies to government (as recycling mechanism) has partly caused bubbles and will likely continue to do so.


-the overall problem basically seems due to the architecture of our monetary system, which have been premised on a cartelized banking system that revolves around central banking.


Friday, March 06, 2009

CDS market: Japan Ranks Highest In Credit Concerns

An updated ranking of Country Default Risk from Bespoke Invest...

According to Bespoke, ``As shown, Japan's default risk is up the most in 2009, although it remains on the low side when compared to other countries. The United States' default risk is up 41% year to date. All CDS prices, with the exception of the US, are priced in US dollars, while US CDS prices are quoted in Euros. Sovereign debt insurance makes you wonder, especially for the big countries that are probably "too big to fail."

It's kinda peculiar to see developed economies dominate the pecking order of concerns over the risks of credit default, led by Japan, Germany, France, UK and the US, while many EM economies appear as "less risky" (in terms of the growth clip of CDS prices and not based on nominal pricing)...and this includes the Philippines.

Another important point is that while everyone seems focused on the credit conditions of the US which has been splurging on government spending programs, it is Japan's credit ratings that have been taking a severe drubbing.


And this isn't merely reflected in the Credit Default Swap standings but likewise in the Japanese Yen (top window) and its equity benchmark, the Nikkei 225 (main chart).

The Yen rallied furiously at the onset of the unraveling of the global "deleveraging" process as many of the cross currency arbitrages or the "carry trade" had been reversed. However, as the deleveraging aged, it appears that concerns have now shifted over the country's credit worthiness.

Aside from being the largest debtor among developed economies, the horrid impact from a loss of global demand from the ongoing crisis recently collapsed its export oriented economy, which resulted to a reversal of its unbroken string of current account surplus trend since 1981. And this has also been compounded by the diminishing savings wrought by its aging society.

From the Economist

In addition, Japan has previously announced that it would be undertaking its own $250 billion of stimulus package and may conduct its version of "quantitative easing" by allocating $10 billion to purchase of corporate bonds maturing within the year and another $10 billion to acquire equity shares held by Japanese banks (Reuters). All these may have conspired to put investor concerns over Japan's credit eligibility.

Tom Dyson of Daily Wealth suggests that Japan may be in the path of bankruptcy ,``Of the major industrial economies in the world, Japan's government is the most indebted.


``Since its recession began 20 years ago, Japan has plowed trillions into its banking system via numerous bailout programs. Japan's mantra is growth without cost. As a result, the Japanese government has built up the world's most crippling debt load."

``The government of Japan owes $7.8 trillion. That's $157,000 per capita.

``We've been using government debt per capita to compare the government debts of Britain, the United States, and Japan. But government debt to GDP is the ratio economists use to compare the indebtedness of countries. The UK has a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 48%. The U.S. has a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 75%. Japan has a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 187%.

``If there's going to be a major sovereign bankruptcy, it's going to happen in Japan. Its economy is a shambles. For years, Japan has relied on exports... but even that's drying up now. In January, Japan's exports plunged 47%, producing a trade deficit. People talk about Japan as a "nation of savers." But that's not true anymore. Japan's personal savings rate has collapsed from 16% in the early 1990s to 2.2% last year."

With $15 trillion of estimated household assets, and less levered corporate and banking sector relative to its OECD peers, I doubt a Japan bankruptcy.

Monday, March 02, 2009

US Real Estate Bubble Bust: Chinese On A Shopping Spree!

Savings rich Chinese individuals are doing their own version of "stimulus financing" of Americans, by buying bargain priced houses.

From America is for sale Expo 2009

Video from NBC Los Angeles