Sunday, December 18, 2022

The Philippine October Trade Deficit Plunged by 32% MoM! A Semiconductor-Powered Export Boom Amidst Declining Global Trade? Import Growth Decline on Oil Prices

Economic planners appear to be blind to the true origin of trade deficits. In a sound money environment, everyone is forced to pay their bills. If you buy something, whatever its origin, you will have earned or borrowed sound money from someone else to pay for the goods purchased. Therefore, trade deficits, other than those arising from self-correcting timing differences on settlements, cannot exist. Attempts to correct trade deficits by manipulating the exchange rate, while pursuing unsound monetary policies, are in consequence futile—Alasdair Macleod 

 

In this issue 

The Philippine October Trade Deficit Plunged by 32% MoM! A Semiconductor-Powered Export Boom Amidst Declining Global Trade? Import Growth Decline on Oil Prices  

I. Amidst a Global Trade Downturn, A Semiconductor Powered Export Boom in October? 

II. Imports Retreat on Oil Prices, October Trade Deficit Decreased by 32% MoM! 

III. Jawboning the Financial Markets via the Merchandise Trade Data? 

 

The Philippine October Trade Deficit Plunged by 32% MoM! A Semiconductor-Powered Export Boom Amidst Declining Global Trade? Import Growth Decline on Oil Prices  

 

As a result of a semiconductor export spike and a retreat in import growth, the Philippine October trade deficit plunged by 32% MoM! But has this data been used to influence market prices? 

 

I. Amidst a Global Trade Downturn, A Semiconductor Powered Export Boom in October? 

 

Inquirer.net, December 14: Exports hit a new monthly record in October, thus narrowing the Philippines’ trade deficit to a 14-month low, although the cumulative deficit for the year approached a new annual high. Preliminary data at the Philippine Statistics Authority show that in October, export receipts surged by 20 percent to $7.7 billion from $6.4 billion, 10 times as fast as the 2-percent growth recorded last year. 

 

Did exports really sizzle in October, as reported by authorities? 

 

Figure 1 

 

First, it would be misguided to attribute the record exports to the weak peso. (Figure 1, higher window) It was semiconductor exports that drove this growth rather than prime commodities.  (see explanation below) 

 

Second, since 2021, emerging market exports have powered global trade growth (data from Patrick Zweifel of Pictet Asset Management). (Figure 1, lower window)  

 

But with exports of advanced economies slowing sharply, this should drag emerging markets activities lower. And the slowdown signs are becoming apparent, which brings us to the next relevant but contradictory signal. 


Figure 2 


Third, the Philippines seems to be the "odd man out" among its ASEAN contemporaries, which predominantly exhibited export declines in October and the last few months. (Figure 2, higher window; charts from Tradingeconomics.com) 

 

Local exports boomed as everyone else in the region faltered! 

 

Fourth, according to the S&P Markit, new export orders have been contracting since March! (all bold highlights mine) 

 

Businessworld, November 3: Philippine manufacturing companies reported improved demand in October, driving growth in production and new orders for a second straight month, S&P Global said. “While overall factory orders increased, volumes of new work from abroad contracted at the sharpest pace since the recent sequence of decline began in March,” it said. 

 

S&P Markit, December 1: That said, export conditions remained weak during November, thereby extending the current sequence of contraction in new export orders observed since March. Weak foreign client demand weighed on total new order growth across the sector which was primarily driven by domestic demand. Nonetheless, the downturn in export sales softened from October's recent low. 

 

So, from the S&P Markit's perspective, instead of a boom, export orders have contracted since March.   And since export orders become actual transactions in a month or the next, exports should have posted declines than a growth spike.  

 

But, of course, the unaudited government data tells a different story. 

 

And to recall, the prospects of weak exports prompted firms located in the Mactan Economic Zone to retrench about 4,000 factory workers last September. 

 

Fifth, there are material discrepancies in the trade data of counterparties or bilateral partners. 

 

For instance, after Hong Kong, the US was the second-largest export market of the Philippines in October, which accounted for a 15.3% share, and the largest export market in 2022 with a 15.7% pie. 

 

According to the PSA, Philippine exports to the US jumped 22.6% in October, which pulled the YTD export growth to 5.6%. 

 

Yet, US imports from the Philippines registered a paltry 4.07% over the same period, according to UStradenumbers.com. (Figure 2, lowest pane) 

 

So which represents the accurate data, the US or domestic official numbers? 

 


Figure 3 

 

Also, semiconductors constituted most of the domestic export growth.  And as a result of its spike, its % export share of the total ballooned to 66%! (Figure 3, middle window) 

  

So again, the gist of the fantastic export growth data was from computer chips!   

 

Paradoxically, global revenues of semiconductors fell by 5% in October, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association!  (Figure 3, topmost pane) 

 

And oddly, the fabulous growth spike came amidst the erection of trade barriers by the US government against Chinese chip exporters allegedly for "national security" reasons in October.   The governments of Japan and the Netherlands recently joined the US to establish chip curbs against Chinese producers/exporters.  

 

To counter this, the Chinese government raised this trade dispute with the WTO a few days ago.  

 

On this note, China's semiconductor output fell in November anew, but less than the record low before the trade dispute. 

 

Also, the price of the US-listed benchmark PHLX Semiconductor Sector Index (SOX), a capitalization-weighted index composed of 30 semiconductor companies, has been declining since the advent of 2022, even before the trade restrictions.  

 

The SOX posted a 33% deficit YTD. (Figure 3, lowest pane) Developing softness in demand has likely brought about the bear market in the SOX. 

 

The crux is, while demand for semiconductors has been decreasing globally, worsened by trade disputes, Philippine exports defied the global trend!  Wonderful! 

 

As a side note, ironically, weakened domestic demand caused PC shipments here to plummet by 19.8% in Q3, according to the International Data Corporation 

 

Amazing contradictions! 

 

II. Imports Retreat on Oil Prices, October Trade Deficit Decreased by 32% MoM! 

  

Figure 4 


Meanwhile, import growth slackened to only 7.5% last October. (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

 

But instead of "growth," imports represented another story of "imported" inflation. 

 

The deceleration in oil prices (+4.25% YoY) mirrored the cutback in the growth rate of fuel imports (+29.7%).  The fuel share of imports dropped sharply to 17.1% from 19.3% a month ago. (Figure 4, second to the highest window) 

 

And though capital imports grew by 3.5% YoY, October nominal values fell to February lows.  Its % share of the total inched higher to 26.2%.  (Figure 4, second to the lowest pane) 

 

A credit-financed consumer boom should be happening.  But the growth of consumer goods imports slowed to 22.5%.  In USD, consumer goods imports dropped to a five-month low.  Nonetheless, its share of the total soared to 17.2%. (Figure 4, lowest window) 

 

Yet, here is the puzzle.   

 

Public spending has drifted proximate to its record level in October.  Bank consumer borrowing cruised at an unprecedented level in October. 

 

So, why did imports of capital and consumer goods slow? 

 

By deduction, local producers have taken over the role of imports. 

 

But given the slowing growth momentum in domestic manufacturing, has there been significant overstocking at the producer, wholesaler/distributor, and retailer levels?  

 

Is the Philippine economy experiencing the "bullwhip effect?"  The bullwhip effect represents "end-to-end" supply chain disruptions caused by fluctuations at the retail level. 

 

How are these contradictory signals (slowdown in investments and consumer goods imports) indications of growth? 

 

Figure 5 

 

In the end, the export spike and the slowdown in imports resulted in a 32% MoM, and a 13.5% YoY reduction in the merchandise trade deficit! (Figure 5, topmost window)  

 

III. Jawboning the Financial Markets via the Merchandise Trade Data? 

 

What benefits accrue from the narrowed merchandise deficit? 

 

First, a reduced trade deficit will be reflected in net exports (total exports minus total imports), which helps boost the statistical economy, the GDP. 

 

Second, a decline in the trade deficit helps diminish the balance of payment (BOP) gap through the current account, which should reduce pressures to acquire savings in foreign exchange or the USD for funding.  (Figure 5, middle window) 

 

So there you have it.  The shaving of trade deficits, real or not, is likely to support the GDP and the Philippine peso.   Or, have authorities been using embellished statistics to jawbone or condition the public to influence market prices indirectly? 

 

Or, maybe the October export spike was about one enormous transaction, like a multi-billion special block sale at the PSE. 

 

Yet, the forthcoming public external borrowings may confirm or invalidate this data.  (Figure 5, lowest pane) 

 

But, of course, there can always be off-balance sheet transactions that conceal other liabilities. 

And as noted elsewhere, along with Other Reserve Assets (ORA), external borrowings have played a principal role in the BSP's Gross International Reserves (GIR).   But borrowed reserves signify "USD shorts."   

 

Instead of strength, a substantial drain of USD liquidity globally exposes domestic FX fragilities from "USD shorts," as shown by recent events. 

 

And given the degree of entrenched imbalances, global and domestic financial and economic instabilities won't be going away anytime soon. 

 


Monday, December 12, 2022

Diminishing Returns Have Plagued the PSEi 30 Since 2009!

Led by orchestrated pumps on a few heavyweights, the PSEi registered an incredible 10.2% MoM return in November.     

Figure 1 

Combined with the 7.2% gains in October, the two-month returns represent the largest since Sept-October 2010, the onset of a bull market.   

 

Many financial pundits have called for a "turnaround from the bear market." 

 

But are they looking at the right pictures?  

 

In contrast to popular opinion, diminishing returns have haunted the PSEi 30 since 2009.    


The YoY % change in November remained in a deficit, reinforcing its secular downtrend since 2009. 

 

The question is, what brought about such conditions?   Only from knowing the causation can we get a clue on its reversal.  

 

The BSP's zero-bound rates have led to the benchmark's lower returns.   

 

Figure 2 


It has fueled a surge in systemic debt (public and bank credit expansion) which also resonates with the decline in the yield of the PSEi 30.


As leveraging expanded, it eventually sapped out liquidity from the financial system through malinvestments, and so did the returns of the PSEi 30. 

Figure 3 

The liquidity classification for the above is the money supply growth (M3), representing the economy and bank liquidity via the cash-to-deposits ratio.  

 

Figure 4 

Finally, the slowdown in the CPI coincided with the peak in returns of the PSEi 30 in 2009.   

However, the comeback of the CPI in 2015 has also been accompanied by the slowing of the yield rate. 

Let us be clear.  The (statistical) inflation has always been present, except for the September and October deflation in 2015.   

What changed is the trend of the rate of change or its asymmetric distribution.   

But (monetary) inflation turned up in different areas at different times. Or, the process appeared as stages.  

First, the asset markets absorbed the liquidity.  

Later, liquidity percolated into the real economy as “inflation.” 

The PSEi 30 rode the 'genuine' bull market from 2009 to 2013 from its deluge.   The bull market was not just stocks but also seen in the peso and the fixed-income markets. 

But as the equity benchmark sprinted higher, returns declined.  

 

Next, the spillover of excess liquidity into the real economy magnified economic imbalances.  

 

Subsequently, this eroding bank liquidity spread into the financial system and the economy.   

Figure 5 

Such imbalances became evident in the downtrend in turnover of the PSE. 

 

Consequently, it reverberated in the returns of the equity market. 

 

BSP policies have plagued the PSEi and the PSE through the law of diminishing returns.


With all the accumulated maladjustments, how do you think the BSP can undo or overturn this?