France-Germany Plot a Politically Centralized Eurozone with More Financial Repression

The struggle to save the Euro has been giving windows of opportunities for Euro politicians to adapt the Emmanuel Rahm doctrine/creed—use the crisis to implement things that could not be done before.

From the thejournal.ie, (bold emphasis mine)

FRANCE AND GERMANY have agreed to introduce a joint corporate tax rate in their countries by 2016 – and have called on other Eurozone countries to establish a collective financial ‘government’ for the entire Eurozone.

Holding a press conference after a bilateral summit, German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicolas Sarkozy said their countries would also try to introduce a so-called ‘Tobin Tax’ on financial transactions as a matter of priority.

Those who believe that the success of the Euro will depend on ‘fiscal and political union’ will acclaim this move as a necessity. They would see this as an elixir. Again, they would be wrong.

As I pointed out earlier, the Soviet Union (or Yugoslavia) had them both, but this didn’t stop these unions from dissolution. Proponents of the political-fiscal union nostrum, only look at the US as THE model, without looking at others. This is called the focusing effect.

Yet everything boils down to fundamental economics, where spending more than one can finance would extrapolate to insolvency, bankruptcy and or eventual political dismemberment. No amount of fiscal or political union will stop this. Politics will never supersede economics.

Moreover, the plan to establish a ‘Tobin Tax’ on financial transactions has proven to be ineffective that would only likely result to a backlash.

Notes the Bloomberg/SF Gate, (bold highlights mine)

A 1996 report on financial transactions taxes for the Canadian government found that Sweden's 1984 levy of 1 percent on equity trades, doubled two years later, caused half of the country's trading to move to London by 1990, a year before the tax was abolished. Capital gains revenues decreased as volume sank, "almost entirely offsetting revenues from the equity transactions tax," the report said.

We are seeing a world enduring dramatic strains from a transition. Accrued stress from democratization of information, widening of social connections and commerce via (globalization) which has been operating in stark conflict with 20^th century welfare based governance system.

Politicians desire to preserve the status quo by proposing the same centralized vertical structured organizations that had been scuttled by the end of the 20^th century.

Yet even under the same structure, boom bust policies and welfare spending, which has been the cause of this continuing crisis, has still been viewed as a sine qua non path to political survival or success. This is path dependency.

That’s why there seems no way out as welfare political economies are bound for collapse, regardless of ‘unions’. It’s just a matter of time.

Notice how French and German politicos have been propounding to adapt measures that would forcibly rechannel resources from the private sector of the region to the foundering politically privileged banking sector.

Eventually people will see through this tomfoolery and revolt. The growing incidence of the riots in developed economies (as in UK) could be imputed to such dynamics.

Notice too how desperate these politicos are, such that they would take upon any measures regardless of the consequences. Taxes on financial transactions will force investors to look elsewhere.

All these for the sake of saving the banking system who feeds or funds the welfare government and who has been backstopped by central banks.

Now Europe’s self-inflicted losses can be Asia, ASEAN and the Philippines’ gains. All we need is to assume the opposite policies of what Europe or the US has been doing. This means we should decentralize, liberalize trade, decrease taxes and repeal cumbersome laws and regulations, and most importantly is to diminish dependence on politics by embracing economic freedom.

In short, let entrepreneurs determine the prosperity of the nation.

The Truth About Malacanang's Sin Taxes: Insatiable Government Spending

Sin Taxes needs to be raised for the purpose of imposing discipline on the Filipino citizenry. So says the Philippine President.

From the Inquirer.net

We proposed all of these measures because we really believe that they are needed to run this country better. I’m sure that in the conscientious fulfillment of their duties and obligations, they will expedite the passage of measures that they already agree with,” President Aquino said. “With the sin taxes, there’s no question about our ultimate aim, to decrease the consumption of sin products.”

Such moral statements are wonderful to hear. It seems to have a cathartic effect, especially to the gullible.

But in reality, prohibitions whether direct or indirect hardly ever achieves its declared goals. Simply look at the local war on drugs, where the Philippines despite the numerous drug laws have acquired the ranking of the 4th largest supplier in Asia. So we seem to be seeing a reverse phenomenon where more regulations have equaled greater drug problems. (I can't link to my old posts because my dsl is down and I'm operating from an internet cafe).

The same should apply to smoking bans or sin taxes. Economics always trumps politics.

However the real goal of Sin Taxes can be gleaned from the same article.

The government aims to generate P60 billion from a proposed bill restructuring the excise tax on alcohol and tobacco products.

President Aquino said the revenues from the modified excise tax would be earmarked for universal healthcare.

So like all paternalistic- nanny states, who pretend to know best for the society, the means will always be used to justify a questionable unattainable moral end.

Equivocation aside, the real intent, like all governments, is to raise money for political ends.

And governments operating on the welfare platform eventually end up bankrupt, as the problems of Greece and even the US has been revealing.

Apparently, politicians love to spend while ignoring long term consequences of their current actions, and at worst, never ever seem to learn from lessons of the past or of the present.

Quote of the Day: Agency Problem in the Mutual Fund Industry

From Investment guru David F. Swensen of Yale University

The companies that manage for-profit mutual funds face a fundamental conflict between producing profits for their owners and generating superior returns for their investors. In general, these companies spend lavishly on marketing campaigns, gather copious amounts of assets — and invest poorly. For decades, investors suffered below-market returns even as mutual fund management company owners enjoyed market-beating results. Profits trumped the duty to serve investors…

This churning of investor portfolios hurts investor returns. First, brokers and advisers use the pointless buying and selling to increase and to justify their all-too-rich compensation. Second, the mutual fund industry uses the star-rating system to encourage performance-chasing (selling funds that performed poorly and buying funds that performed well). In other words, investors sell low and buy high.

Read the rest here

This has been a dynamic which I have repeatedly been talking about, see here and here

I agree with Mr. Swensen that EDUCATION has to be in the forefront in the campaign to protect investors against such conflict of interests

But I strongly disagree with the suggestion that the SEC has to play a greater role in regulation and enforcement.

One of the reasons why investors have become vulnerable has been due to the complacency derived from the expectations that the nanny state will do the appropriate due diligence and provide protection in behalf of the investors.

Such smugness reduces individual responsibilities and increases the risk taking appetite. Yet for all the regulations and bureaucracy added over the years, why has Bernard Madoff been able to pull one off over Wall Street and the SEC?

Romanticizing the role of arbitrary regulations and bureaucrats won’t help.

Two, unquestionably putting clients ahead is an ideal goal. But this is more an abstraction in terms of implementation. The ultimate question is always how? The devil is always on the details. Has more regulations led to greater market efficiency or vice versa?

Or to be specific in terms of the industry's literature how should these be designed, should they encourage short term trades or long term investments? How does the regulators determine which is which?

Three, it would be wishful thinking to believe that regulators know better than the participants with regards to the latter’s interest. Yet giving too much power to regulators would translate to even market distortions, more conflict of interests, corruption, regulatory arbitrages and benefiting some sectors at the expense of the rest. For example, the shadow banking industry, which has played a crucial role in the 2008 crash, has been a collective byproduct of myriad regulatory arbitrages.

Lastly, since regulators are people too, conflict of interest with the regulated is also likely to occur. This means that the risk of the agency problem dynamic will not vanish but take shape in a different form; the difference is that conflict of interest will shift from the marketplace to the political realm. This is known as regulatory capture.

Video: Jon Stewart on the Media's Blackout of Ron Paul

(hat tip Bob Wenzel)

Notable Quote from Jon Stewart (6.43)

Libertarian Ron Paul becomes the 13th Floor in a hotel!

Just shows how the mainstream has been very afraid of Ron Paul, enough to act in cahoots to censor Ron Paul's 'existence' in media's reporting.

George Selgin on Nouriel Roubini’s Book and Nouriel Roubini the Insider

Economist George Selgin takes down Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm’s analysis of the US mortgage crisis of 2007-2008 (source: The Independent Institute)

(all bold emphasis mine)

Abstract

Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm rightly castigate the Federal Reserve and other central banks for policies that contributed to the recent worldwide housing boom and bust, but they seriously underestimate the role of the Community Reinvestment Act and the government-sponsored enterprises in facilitating the surge of subprime mortgage loans in the United States. In addition, their proposals to prevent future financial crises rest on errors about the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and other matters of economic history.

Article

It takes only three paragraphs for Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, the authors of Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance, to tell how Roubini stunned listeners at a September 2006 International Monetary Fund seminar by heralding a “once-in-a-lifetime” housing bust to be followed by a deep, long recession (Roubini and Mihm 2010, 1–2). Yet they may still deserve credit for modesty, for if one devoted Roubini watcher is to be believed, “Dr. Doom” actually predicted no fewer than “48 of the last 4 recessions” (comment on Elfenbein 2009). Some quick fact-checking lends credence to our informant’s otherwise incredible claim by showing that Roubini predicted a serious crash for 2004, then a severe slowdown for 2005, then a global reckoning for 2006, and finally a sharp recession for 2007. After the much-trumpeted crisis at last materialized (though not quite for the reasons Roubini had harped on), he declared that the S&P 500 would sink to 600, that oil would get stuck below $40 a barrel, and that a gold “bubble” was about to do what the housing one had done. To be sure, these things have not yet come to pass, but tomorrow is another day, and to succeed prophets need only mark when they hit and never mark when they miss.

If Roubini’s marksmanship impresses you, you are perhaps bound to hang on every word of Crisis Economics, no matter what any less-than-divine reviewer says about it. If, on the other hand, that marksmanship puts you in mind of the accuracy of a stopped clock, you may hearken to the warning that although the book’s assessment of the causes of the recent great housing boom and bust is for the most part sound and informative, some of its claims are highly misleading, if not simply false. Roubini and Mihm start well enough by dismissing as red herrings various popular diagnoses of the crisis, including the “tired” argument that it was caused by “greed,” with its far-fetched though implicit assumption “that the financiers of 2007 were greedier than the Gordon Gekko’s of a generation ago” (pp. 31–32). They draw attention instead to changes in the structure of incentives “that channeled greed in new and dangerous directions” (p. 32). These changes included government policies aimed at increasing poorer (and riskier) persons’ access to mortgages, the growing moral hazard connected with the “too big to fail” doctrine, and the Federal Reserve’s post-2001 easy-money policy.

Read the rest here

My additional comments on the celebrity guru:

It has been a long curiosity for me why many people seem to adore someone who has had a sordid string of utterly wrong predictions or maintains a poor batting average in predicting events (as Mr. Selgin points out).

Media seem to remember his ‘broken clock’ accurate prediction of 2007, but have been lenient or forgetful or forgiving of his blatant miscalls. As a saying goes, even the broken clock can be right twice a day.

A good example of this was the controversial debate with the legendary investor Jim Rogers where Mr. Roubini said that gold prices won't reach $1,500 to $2,000 which has obviously been proven wrong.

If Mr. Roubini had been a money manager he would have been a mediocre. Except that he isn’t. So wrong calls does not translate to any real or dollar value losses, so he can afford to keep talking.

One reason that makes Mr. Roubini a celebrity is that his themes sells to the consensus or that he provides the public a ‘confirmation bias’ or that his ideas seem to tailor fit with mainstream’s biases.

Recently Mr. Roubini commented

So Karl Marx, it seems, was partly right in arguing that globalization, financial intermediation run amok, and redistribution of income and wealth from labor to capital could lead capitalism to self-destruct (though his view that socialism would be better has proven wrong). Firms are cutting jobs because there is not enough final demand. But cutting jobs reduces labor income, increases inequality and reduces final demand.

Here Mr. Roubini passes the proverbial hot potato blame on the free markets which liberals would gladly rally to and cheer on.

Nevertheless what has sorely been missed in this commentary is that the main source of malignancy can be traced to mostly central banking boom bust policies and other interventionist-welfare-bailout programs, an aspect Mr. Roubini and his ilk chooses to ignore.

Economist Bob Wenzel is right; Mr. Roubini’s real value isn’t his economic expertise but his insider connection. Writes Mr. Wenzel,

The one point I do take away from Roubini's commentary is in the area that he has demonstrated expertise and that is not in the area of economic theory. He is an expert in knowing what insiders are plotting. In the vernacular of the day, he knows what is coming down.

Mr. Roubini seems part of the counsel which help shapes the ‘insider’ philosophy and who provides the ideological cover to promote the 'insider's' interests.

Why Warren Buffett Loves Taxes?

The sage of Omaha Warren Buffett has called for higher taxes on the “rich”.

As I have been pointing out, Mr. Buffett has morphed from a value investor to a political crony.

Maybe Mr. Buffett has gotten tired of studying markets and sees political entrepreneurship as an easy way out to wring short term profits.

Besides given that he is 80 years of age, his guiding dogma premised on a long term time preference may have just narrowed. And this has been incented to keep his fans in awe (as he lives). In short, like politicos he wants to prop up his image for egotistical concerns. This also means that once he is gone, so will Berkshire Hathaway’s string of record outperformance.

The other point is that maybe there has been decreased investment opportunities available in the US (perhaps due to his company’s heft or perhaps due to greater uncertainties from the predominant bailout climate that has haunted the US economy), which is why he embraces this new ‘short-term oriented’ business model.

Nevertheless, the stirring answer on why Warren Buffett loves more taxes has been best articulated by Washington Examiner’s Timothy Carney (hat tip Bob Wenzel)

Buffett Profits from Taxes He Supports

Buffett regularly lobbies for higher estate taxes. He also has repeatedly bought up family businesses forced to sell because the heirs’ death-tax bill exceeded the business’s liquid assets. He owns life insurance companies that rely on the death tax in order to sell their estate-planning businesses.

Buffett Profits from Government Spending

Buffett made about a billion dollars off of the Wall Street bailout by investing in Goldman Sachs on the assumption Uncle Sam would bail it out. He also is planning investments in ethanol giant ADM and government-contracting leviathan General Dynamics.

If your businesses’ revenue comes from the U.S. Treasury, of course you want more wealth.

To repeat, Mr. Buffets like taxes because he PROFITS from it.

Mr. Buffett could always generously volunteer to offer more of his earnings to the US government, but he doesn't.

Yet ironically, he wants to use institutional violence to forcibly extract taxes from his fellow Americans for his benefit. He wants to profit from the efforts of other Americans.

That’s why outside his former investing prowess of seeking 'value' investments, I have lost my respect for his new political philosophy (based on parasitism) which he applies as his new investing template.

The US Dollar Standard on its 40th Year

Known as the Nixon shock, the US dollar-Gold convertibility was closed in August 15, 1971, that’s 40 years ago.

How this came about, Cato’s Dan Griswold explains, (bold highlights mine)

In a surprise televised speech on Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, the president announced that he would immediately impose wage and price controls, slap a 10 percent duty on imports, and suspend the international convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold. All were to be temporary measures, of course, to promote jobs, dampen inflation, and combat “international money speculators” betting against the dollar. (You can read the entire speech here.)...

The centerpiece of the Nixon Shock was its controls on prices. In a market economy, freely fluctuating prices are the nervous system that coordinates supply and demand. Yet in one of the more chilling statements delivered by a U.S. president, Nixon told the nation that evening,

“I am today ordering a freeze on all prices and wages throughout the United States for a period of 90 days.

The price controls did tame inflation temporarily, but it came roaring back within three years to double-digit levels and persisted through the 1970s because of loose monetary policy. A tight lid on a boiling tea pot can only contain the steam for a time before it explodes.

The controls continued on gasoline, causing artificial shortages (as price controls usually do) symbolized by gas lines during the 1970s. Only when President Reagan finally lifted the controls on oil and gasoline in 1981 did the specter of short supplies finally disappear. (The 10 percent import surcharge did prove to be temporary, lasting only until the end of 1971.)

Closing the gold window was arguably inevitable given the lack of monetary discipline by the U.S. central bank. By 1976, the dollar and other major currencies were floating freely, which has turned out to work rather well, as Milton Friedman predicted it would. It also turned out that pressure on the dollar to depreciate was not driven by speculators after all but by the surplus of dollars that had been created to finance the Vietnam War and the Great Society.

The lessons:

One lesson of the Nixon shock is that if politicians are granted “emergency powers” they will tend to abuse them in situations that were never envisioned when the powers were originally granted. A second lesson is that “temporary” measures have a habit of becoming permanent. The big lesson is that the power of politicians over the economy should be limited. Any request for temporary emergency powers should be greeted with the deepest skepticism.

Of course there is another more important lesson: 40 years ago TODAY, ONE US dollar is now only worth 18 cents of buying power.

From the BLS

82 cents of every dollar accounts for how much worth of resources that has been surreptitiously and illicitly transferred from her citizenry to the US government and their cronies. This represents 40 years of mass deprivation, deception and delusion.

And to consider, the CPI inflation may have even been grossly underestimated as the method to compute this has changed over the years or as argued by John Williams of the Shadow Statistics via substitution, hedonic regression and etc… here

Henry Ford was right when he said

It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.

It’s been 40 years of infamy.

Confiscatory Deflation and Gold Prices

This is a reply to an objection

Gold’s rise represents:

1. fear of bank failure.

My reply

With all the money being sunk into the banking system of major economies, such observation omits the current evidences that abounds (from ECB’s $1 Trilion QE, Fed’s explicit guarantee and rollover of principal payments, SNB’s and Japan’s currency interventions and bans on short sales by 4 European nations plus Turkey and South Korea)

This of course doesn’t even include the money spent for the bailouts during the 2008 crisis where the Federal Reserve audit revealed $16 trillion issued to foreign banks and or previous estimates of $23.7 trillion exposure of US taxpayer money to save the systemically important or ‘too big to fail’ banks and other politically privileged companies.

As one would note, people stuck with an ideology will tend to dismiss evidences even if these have been blatantly “staring at their faces’.

2. concerns of the "Pesofication" of hard currency accounts

My reply

Assumptions that government’s may confiscate deposits or prevent withdrawals like the Argentina crisis (1999-2002) does not translate to an increase of demand for gold, for the simple reason that such government policies promote deflation.

Austrian Economist Joseph Salerno calls this ‘Confiscatory Deflation’

Mr. Salerno explains (bold emphasis mine)

As a result, Argentina's money supply (M1) increased at an average rate of 60 percent per year from 1991 through 1994. After declining to less than 5 percent for 1995, the growth rate of the money supply shot up to over 15 percent in 1996 and nearly 20 percent in 1997. In 1998, with the peso overvalued as a result of inflated domestic product prices and foreign investors rapidly losing confidence that the peso would not be devalued, the influx of dollars ceased and the inflationary boom came to a screeching halt as the money supply increased by about 1 percent and the economy went into recession. Money growth turned slightly negative in 1999, while in 2000, the money supply contracted by almost 20 percent.

The money supply continued to contract at a double-digit annual rate through June 2001. In 2001, domestic depositors began to lose confidence in the banking system, and a bank credit deflation began in earnest as the system lost 17 percent, or $14.5 billion worth, of deposits.

On Friday, November 30, alone, between $700 million and $2 billion of deposits--reports vary--were withdrawn from Argentine banks. Even before that Friday bank run, the central bank possessed only $5.5 billion of reserves ultimately backing $70 billion worth of dollar and convertible peso deposits. President Fernando de la Rua and his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, responded to this situation on Saturday, December 1, announcing a policy that amounted to confiscatory deflation to protect the financial system and maintain the fixed peg to the dollar.

Specifically, cash withdrawals from banks were to be limited to $250 per depositor per week for the next ninety days, and all overseas cash transfers exceeding $1,000 were to be strictly regulated. Anyone attempting to carry cash out of the country by ship or by plane was to be interdicted.

Finally, banks were no longer permitted to issue loans in pesos, only in dollars, which were exceedingly scarce. Depositors were still able to access their bank deposits by check or debit card in order to make payments. Still, this policy was a crushing blow to poorer Argentines, who do not possess debit or credit cards and who mainly hold bank deposits not accessible by check.

Predictably, Cavallo's cruel and malign confiscatory deflation dealt a severe blow to cash businesses and, according to one report, "brought retail trade to a standstill." This worsened the recession, and riots and looting soon broke out that ultimately cost 27 lives and millions of dollars in damage to private businesses. These events caused a state of siege to be declared and eventually forced President de la Rua to resign from his position two years early.

By January 6, the Argentine government, now under President Eduardo Duhalde and Economy Minister Jorge Remes Lenicov, conceded that it could no longer keep the inflated and overvalued peso pegged to the dollar at the rate of 1 to 1, and it devalued the peso by 30 percent, to a rate of 1.40 pesos per dollar. Even at this official rate of exchange, however, it appeared the peso was still overvalued because pesos were trading for dollars on the black market at far higher rates.

The Argentine government recognized this, and instead of permitting the exchange rate to depreciate to a realistic level reflecting the past inflation and current lack of confidence in the peso, it intensified the confiscatory deflation imposed on the economy earlier. It froze all savings accounts above $3,000 for a year, a measure that affected at least one-third of the $67 billion of deposits remaining in the banking system, $43.5 billion in dollars and the remainder in pesos.

Depositors who held dollar accounts not exceeding $5,000 would be able to withdraw their cash in twelve monthly installments starting one year from now, while those maintaining larger deposits would not be able to begin cashing out until September 2003, and then only in installments spread over two years. Peso deposits, which had already lost one-third of their dollar value since the first freeze had been mandated and faced possible further devaluation, would be treated more liberally. They would be paid out to their owners starting in two months, but this repayment would also proceed in installments. In the meantime, as one observer put it, "bank transactions as simple as cashing a paycheck or paying a credit card bill remained out of reach of ordinary Argentines."

Mr. Lenicov openly admitted that this latest round of confiscatory deflation was a device for protecting the inherently bankrupt fractional reserve system, declaring, "If the banks go bust nobody gets their deposits back. The money on hand is not enough to pay back all depositors." Unlike the bank credit deflation that Lenicov is so eager to prevent, which permits monetary exchange to proceed with a smaller number of more valuable pesos, confiscatory deflation tends to abolish monetary exchange and propel the economy back to grossly inefficient and primitive conditions of barter and self-sufficient production that undermine the social division of labor…

Unfortunately, things were to get even worse for hapless Argentine bank depositors. After solemnly pledging when he took office on January 1 that banks would be obliged to honor their contractual commitments to pay out dollars to those who held dollar-denominated deposits, President Duhalde announced in late January that the banks would be permitted to redeem all deposits in pesos. Since the peso had already depreciated by 40 percent against the dollar on the free market in the interim, this meant that about $16 billion of purchasing power had already been transferred from dollar depositors to the banks.

Prices of gold vis-à-vis the Argentinean Peso only surged after the Argentine government allowed the Peso to be devalued.

Chart from Nowandfutures.com

Devaluation had been the outcome of an explosion of money supply

Chart from Nowandfutures.com

As the bust cycle of the imploding bubble culminated (explained above by Dr. Salerno above) inflation fell (see red ellipse below).

Chart from tradingeconomics.com

More of the Argentine Crisis from Wikipedia,(bold emphasis mine)

After much deliberation, Duhalde abandoned in January 2002 the fixed 1-to-1 peso–dollar parity that had been in place for ten years. In a matter of days, the peso lost a large part of its value in the unregulated market. A provisional "official" exchange rate was set at 1.4 pesos per dollar.

In addition to the corralito, the Ministry of Economy dictated the pesificación ("peso-ification"), by which all bank accounts denominated in dollars would be converted to pesos at official rate. This measure angered most savings holders and appeals were made by many citizens to declare it unconstitutional.

After a few months, the exchange rate was left to float more or less freely. The peso suffered a huge depreciation, which in turn prompted inflation (since Argentina depended heavily on imports, and had no means to replace them locally at the time).

The economic situation became steadily worse with regards to inflation and unemployment during 2002. By that time the original 1-to-1 rate had skyrocketed to nearly 4 pesos per dollar, while the accumulated inflation since the devaluation was about 80%; these figures were considerably lower than those foretold by most orthodox economists at the time. The quality of life of the average Argentine was lowered proportionally; many businesses closed or went bankrupt, many imported products became virtually inaccessible, and salaries were left as they were before the crisis.

Since the volume of pesos did not fit the demand for cash (even after the devaluation) huge quantities of a wide spectrum of complementary currency kept circulating alongside them. Fears of hyperinflation as a consequence of devaluation quickly eroded the attractiveness of their associated revenue, originally stated in convertible pesos. Their acceptability now ultimately depended on the State's willingness to take them as payment of taxes and other charges, consequently becoming very irregular. Very often they were taken at less than their nominal value—while the Patacón was frequently accepted at the same value as peso, Entre Ríos's Federal was among the worst-faring, at an average 30% as the provincial government that had issued them was reluctant to take them back. There were also frequent rumors that the Government would simply banish complementary currency overnight (instead of redeeming them, even at disadvantageous rates), leaving their holders with useless printed paper.

Bottom line:

The above experience from Argentina’s crisis shows that when government adapts policies to confiscate private property through the banking system, demand for gold does NOT increase or gold prices don’t rise.

It is when the Argentine government decided to devalue and inflate the system where gold prices skyrocketed.

Both confiscatory deflation and the succeeding inflation lowered the standard of living of the Argentines. The antecedent to the above events had been a prior boom.

In short, policies that promote boom-bust or bubble cycles represent as net negative to a society and even promotes more interventionist policies that worsens the prevailing social predicaments.

Lastly record gold prices today points to inflationism NOT confiscatory deflation.

Cartoon of the Day: Different Types of Looting

This caricature below is almost an exact depiction of what’s been happening around the world today. (hat tip Mises Blog Jonathan Catalan and Salt Lake Tribune]

Global Equity Meltdown: Political Actions to Save Global Banks

“However, hanging onto money is highly risky in a time of monetary inflation. The security-seeker does not understand this. Keynesian economists do not understand this. Politicians do not understand this. The result of inflationary central bank policies is the production of uncertainty in excess of what the public wants to accept. But the public does not understand Mises' theory of the business cycle. Voters do not demand a halt to the increase in money. It would not matter if they did. Central bankers do not answer to voters. They also do not answer to politicians. "Monetary policy is too important to be left to politicians," the paid propagandists called economists assure us. The politicians believe this. Until the crisis of 2008, so did voters.” Professor Gary North

Local headlines blare “Global stocks gyrate wildly; sell-off resumes in markets”[1]

To chronicle this week’s action through the lens of the US Dow Jones Industrial Average (INDU), we see that on Monday August 8th, the major US bellwether fell 635 points or 5.5%. On Tuesday, the INDU rose 430 points or 4%. On Wednesday, it fell 520 points 4.6%. On Thursday, it rose 423 points or 3.9%. The week closed with the Dow Jones Industrials up by 126.71 points or 1.13% on Friday.

All these wild swings accrued to a weekly modest loss of 1.53% by the Dow Jones Industrials.

Some ideologically blinded commentators argue that these had been about aggregate demand. So logic tell us that aggregate demand collapsed on Monday, jumps higher on Tuesday, tanked again on Wednesday, then gets reinvigorated on Thursday and Friday? Makes sense no?

How about fear? Fear on Monday, greed on Tuesday, fear on Wednesday, and greed on Thursday and Friday? Do you find this train of logic convincing? I find this patently absurd.

Confidence doesn’t emerge out of random. Instead, people react to changes in the environment and the marketplace. Their actions are purposeful and seen in the context of incentives (beneficial for them).

And that’s why many who belong to the camp of econometrics based reality gets wildly confused about the current developments where they try in futility to fit only parts of reality into their rigid theories.

And part of the realities that go against their beliefs are jettisoned as unreal.

So by the close of the week, these people end up scratching their heads, to quip “weird markets”.

Weird for them, but definitely not for me.

Political Actions to Save the Global Banking System

Yet if there has been any one dynamic that has been proven to be the MAJOR driving force in the financial markets over the week, this has been about POLITICS, as I have been pointing out repeatedly since 2008[2].

I am sorry to say that this has not been about aggregate demand, fear premium, corporate profits, conventional economics or mechanical chart reading, but about human action in the context of global policymakers intending to save the cartelized system of the ‘too big to fail’ banks, central banks and the welfare state.

As I pointed out last week[3],

Important: The US has been downgraded by the major credit rating agency S&P after the market closed last Friday, so there could be an extended volatility on the global marketplace at the start of the week. This largely depends if such actions has already been discounted. The first thing on Monday is to watch Japan’s response.

The S&P’s downgrade tsunami reached the shores of global markets on Monday, where the US markets crashed by 5.5%.

It is very important to point out that the market backlash from the downgrade did NOT reflect on real downgrade fears, where US interest rates across the yield curve should have spiked, but to the contrary, interest rates fell to record lows[4]!

And as also correctly pointed out last week, the US Federal Reserve’s FOMC meeting, which was held last Tuesday, introduced new measures aimed at containing prevailing market distresses.

The FOMC pledged to:

-extend zero bound rates until mid-2013, amidst growing dissension among the governors,

-maintain balance sheets by reinvesting principal payments of maturing securities,

and importantly, keep an open option to reengage in asset purchases[5].

Some have argued that the Fed’s policies has essentially been a stealth QE, as the steep yield curve from these will incentivize mortgage holders to refinance. And this would spur the Fed to reinvest the proceeds.

According to David Schawel[6],

A surge of refinancing will reduce the size of the Fed’s MBS holdings and allow them to re-invest the proceeds further out the curve

The Fed’s announcement on Tuesday, basically coincided or may have been coordinated with the European Central Bank’s purchases of Italian and Spanish bonds or ECB’s version of Quantitative Easing. The combined actions resulted to an equally sharp 4% bounce by the Dow Jones Industrials.

Mr. Bernanke has essentially implemented the first, “explicit guidance” on Fed’s policy rates, among the 3 measures he indicated last July 12th[7].

The resumption of QE and a possible reduction of the quarter percentage of interest rates paid to bank reserves by the US Federal Reserve signify as the two options on the table.

My guess is that the gradualist pace of implementation has been highly dependent on the actions of the financial markets.

I would further suspect that given the huge ECB’s equivalent of Quantitative Easing or buying of distressed bonds of Italy and Spain, aside Ireland and Portugal, estimated at US $ 1.2 trillion[8], team Bernanke perhaps desires that financial markets digest on these before sinking in another set of QEs.

And to consider that US M2 money supply[9] has been exploding, which already represents a deluge of money circulating in the US economy, thus, the seeming tentativeness to proceed with more aggressive actions.

Wednesday saw market jitters rear its ugly head, as rumors circulated that France would follow the US as the next nation to be downgraded[10]. The US markets cratered by 4.6% anew.

On Thursday, following an earlier probe launched by the US Senate on the S&P for its downgrade on the US[11], the US SEC likewise opened an investigation to a possible insider trading charge against the S&P[12].

Obviously both actions had been meant to harass the politically embattled credit rating agency. The possible result of which was that the S&P joined Fitch and Moody’s to affirm France’s credit ratings[13].

To add, 4 Euro nations[14], namely Italy, Belgium, France and Spain has joined South Korea, Turkey and Greece[15] to ban short sales. A ban forces short sellers to cover their positions whose buying temporarily drives the markets higher.

These accrued interventions once again boosted global markets anew which saw the INDU or the Dow Industrials soar by 3.9%.

Friday’s gains in global markets may have been a continuation or the carryover effects of these measures.

Unless one has been totally blind to all these evidences, these amalgamated measures can be seen as putting a floor on global stock markets, which essentially upholds the Bernanke doctrine[16], which likewise underpins part of the assets held by the cartelized banking system and sector’s publicly listed equities exposed to the market’s jurisdiction.

Thus, like 2008, we are witnessing a second round of massive redistribution of resources from taxpayers to the politically endowed banking class.

Gold as the Main Refuge

AS financial markets experienced these temblors, gold prices skyrocketed to fresh record levels at over $1,800, but eventually fell back to close at $1,747 on Friday, for a gain of $83 over the week or nearly 5%.

From the astronomical highs, gold fell dramatically as implied interventions had been also extended to the gold futures markets. Similar to the recent wave of commodity interventions, the CME steeply raised the credit margins of gold futures[17].

We have to understand that gold (coins or bullions) have NOT been used for payments and settlements in everyday transactions. So gold cannot be seen as fungible to legal tender imposed fiat cash (for now), even if some banks now accept gold as collateral.[18]

In an environment of recession or deleveraging—where loans are called in and where there will be a surge of defaults and an onrush of asset liquidations to pay off liabilities or margin calls, fiduciary media (circulating credit) will contract, prices will adjust downwards to reflect on the new capital structure and people will seek to increase cash balances in the face of uncertainty—CASH and not gold is king. Such dynamic was highly evident in 2008 (before the preliminary QEs).

Thus, it would signify a ridiculous self-contradictory argument to suggest that record gold prices has been manifesting risks of ‘deflation’.

Instead, what has been happening, as shown by the recent spate of interventions, is that for every banking problem that surfaces, global central bankers apply bailouts by massive inflationism accompanied by sporadic price controls on specific markets.

Alternatively, this means that record gold prices do not suggest of a fear premium of a deflationary environment, but instead, a possible fear premium from the prospects of a highly inflationary, one given the current actions of central banks.

This panic-manic feedback loop or in the analogy of Dr. Jeckll and Mr. Hyde’s “split personality” which characterizes the global markets of last week has been materially different from the 2007-2008 US mortgage crises.

Not only has there been a divergence in market response across different financial markets geographically (e.g. like ASEAN-Phisix), the flight to safety mode has been starkly different.

The US dollar (USD) has failed to live up to its “safehaven” status, which apparently has shifted to not only gold but the Japanese Yen (XJY) and the gold backed Swiss Franc (XSF).

It’s important to point out that the franc’s most recent decline has been due to second wave of massive $55 billion of interventions by the SNB during the week. The SNB has exposed a total of SFr120 billion ($165 billion!) over the past two weeks[19]. The pivotal question is where will $165 billion dollars go to?

Bottom line:

This time is certainly different when compared to 2008 (but not to history where authorities had been predisposed to resort to inflation as a political solution). While there has been a significant revival of global market distress, market actions have varied in many aspects, as well as in the flight to safety assets.

This implies that in learning from the 2008 episode, global policymakers have assimilated a more activist stance which ultimately leads to different market outcomes. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

The current market environment can’t be explained by conventional thinking for the simple reason that markets are being weighed and propped up by the actions of political players for a political purpose, i.e. saving the Global Banks and the preservation of the status quo of the incumbent political system.

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[1] Inquirer.net Global stocks gyrate wildly; sell-off resumes in markets, August 12, 2011

[2] See Stock Market Investing: Will Reading Political Tea Leaves Be A Better Gauge?, November 30, 2008

[3] See Global Market Crash Points to QE 3.0, August 7, 2011

[4] See Has the S&P’s Downgrade been the cause of the US Stock Market’s Crash?, August 9, 2011

[5] See US Federal Reserve Goes For Subtle QE August 10,2011

[6] Schawel, David Stealth QE3 Is Upon Us, How Ben Did It, And What It Means Business Insider, August 9, 2011

[7] See Ben Bernanke Hints at QE 3.0, July 13, 2011

[8] Bloomberg, ECB Bond Buying May Reach $1.2 Trillion in Creeping Union Germany Opposes, August 8, 2011

[9] FRED, St. Louis Federal Reserve, M2 Money Stock (M2) M2 includes a broader set of financial assets held principally by households. M2 consists of M1 plus: (1) savings deposits (which include money market deposit accounts, or MMDAs); (2) small-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000); and (3) balances in retail money market mutual funds (MMMFs). Seasonally adjusted M2 is computed by summing savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits, and retail MMMFs, each seasonally adjusted separately, and adding this result to seasonally adjusted M1.

[10] The Hindu, Fears of France downgrade trigger massive sell-off in Europe, August 11, 2011

[11] Bloomberg.com U.S. Senate Panel Collecting Information for Possible S&P Probe, August 9, 2011

[12] Wall Street Journal Blog SEC Asking About Insider Trading at S&P: Report, August 12, 2011

[13] Bloomberg.com French AAA Rating Affirmed by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Amid Market Rout, August 11, 2011

[14] USA Today 4 European nations ban short-selling of stocks, August 11, 2011, see War against Short Selling: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium Ban Short Sales, August 12, 2011

[15] Business insider 2008 REPLAY: Europe Moves To Ban Short Selling As Crisis Spreads, August 11, 2011, also see War Against Market Prices: South Korea Imposes Ban on Short Sales, August 12, 2011

[16] See US Stock Markets and Animal Spirits Targeted Policies, July 10, 2010

[17] See War on Gold: CME Raises Credit Margins on Gold Futures, August 11, 2011

[18] See Two Ways to Interpret Gold’s Acceptance as Collateral to the Global Financial Community, May 27, 2011

[19] Swissinfo.ch Last ditch defence of franc intensifies, August 10, 2011

How Reliable is the S&P’s ‘Death Cross’ Pattern?

Mechanical chartists say that with the recent stock market collapse, the technical picture of the US S&P 500 have been irreparably deteriorated such that prospects of a decline is vastly greater (which has been rationalized on a forthcoming recession) than from a recovery. The basis of the forecast: the Death Cross or ‘A crossover resulting from a security's long-term moving average breaking above its short-term moving average or support level[1]’.

First of all, I’ve seen this picture and the same call before.

In July of last year, the S&P also experienced a similar death cross. Many articles emphasized on the imminence of a crash[2] that never materialized.

Secondly, I think applying statistics to past performances to generate “feasible” odds on a bet based on the ‘death cross’ represents as sloppy thinking

To wit, betting based on a ‘death cross’ signifies a gambler’s fallacy or fallacy committed when a person assumes that a departure from what occurs on average or in the long term will be corrected in the short term[3].

A coin toss will always have a 50-50 head-tail probability distribution. If the random coin toss exercise would initially result to string of ‘heads’ outcome, the eventual result of this repeated exercise would still result to a 50-50 outcome or a zero average, as shown by the chart below.

As the illustrious mathematician Benoit Mandelbroit wrote[4],

If you repeat a random experiment often enough, the average of the outcomes will converge towards an expected value. With a coin, heads and tails have equal odds. With a die, the side with one spot will come up about a sixth of the time

Applied to the death cross, we see the same probability 50-50, because each event from where the ‘death cross’ appears entails different conditions (finance, market, politics, social, cultural, even time and spatial differences and etc), as earlier argued[5]. It would signify a sheer folly to oversimplify the cause and effect order and speciously apply odds to it.

Proof?

One would hear proponents bluster over the success of the death cross in 2000 and 2007. Obviously the hindsight bias can be very alluring but deceptive. The causal relationship which made the ‘death cross’ seemingly effective in 2000 and 2007 for the US S&P 500 had been mostly due to the boom bust cycles which culminated to a full blown recession or a crisis during the stated periods.

The death cross was last seen in July of last year (green circle above window), but why didn’t it work? The answer, because the death cross had been pulverized by Bernanke’s QE 2.0 (see green circle chart below). When Mr. Bernanke announced QE 2.0, the ‘death cross’ transmogrified into a ‘golden’ cross!!! This shows how human action is greater than historical determinism or chart patterns.

Many mistakenly think that chart patterns has an inherently built in success formula which is magically infallible, as said above, they are not.

Third, not all market crashes has been due to recessions.

The above illustrates the crash of 1962 (upper window) and 1987 (lower window)[6]. This is obviously unrelated to the death cross, however the point is to illustrate that not every stock crash is related to economic activities. The recent crash may or may not overture a recession.

Bottom line: The prospective actions of US Federal Reserve’s Ben Bernanke and European Central Bank’s Jean-Claude Trichet represents as the major forces that determines the success or failure of the death cross (and not statistics nor the pattern in itself). If they force enough inflation, then markets will reverse regardless of what today’s chart patterns indicate. Otherwise, the death cross could confirm the pattern. Yet given the ideological leanings and path dependency of regulators or policymakers, the desire to seek the preservation of the status quo and the protection of the banking class, I think the former is likely the outcome than the latter.

And another thing, we humans are predisposed to look for patterns even when non-exist, that’s a result of our legacy or inheritance from hunter gatherer ancestors’ genes whom looked for patterns in the environment for survival or risked being eaten alive by predators. This behavioural tendency is called clustering illusion[7]. A cognitive bias which we should keep in mind and avoid in this modern world.

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[1] Investopedia.com Death Cross

[2] The Economic Collapse Blog, The Death Cross: Another Sign That We Are On The Verge Of A Recession?, July 5, 2010

[3] Nizkor.org Fallacy: Gambler's Fallacy

[4] Mandelbrot, Benoit B The (mis) Behaviour of Markets, Profile Books p.32

[5] See The Causal Realist Perspective to the Phsix-Peso Bullish Momentum, July 10, 2011

[6] About.com Stock Market History

[7] Wikipedia.org Clustering illusion