Behind the Furious Rally of the Philippine Peso

Last weekend I wrote, 

Yet we cannot discount any temporal relief rallies in both the peso and the treasury markets mainly due to interventions and secondarily from the interim RISK ON mode.

Remember Philippine treasury markets have not only been an illiquid market but have been tightly controlled by the government and their cohorts, the banking sector. I also expect the BSP to deploy some of their forex reserves rather than use the interest rate tool to keep the financial repression stimulus for the government ongoing.

The Philippine Peso mounted a fantastic (+1.33%) comeback the during the past 4 days.

This has been pillared by today’s whopping almost one percent (+.95%) run. The USD-peso chart above reveals of a seeming breakdown.

Mainstream media tell us that today’s export data and foreign flows has been the catalyst for the surge in the Peso

From the Bloomberg:

The Philippine peso strengthened to a one-month high as a report showed exports increased the most since 2010.

Overseas shipments in February rose 24.4 percent from a year earlier, the government reported today, compared with a revised 9.2 percent increase in January and the 16.6 percent gain forecast in a Bloomberg survey. Overseas investors have pumped $100 million into local stocks this month, taking inflows this year to $494 million, according to exchange data.

The peso advanced 0.5 percent to 44.533 per dollar as of 10:49 a.m. in Manila, according to Tullett Prebon Plc. The currency touched 44.475 earlier, the strongest level since March 11. One-month implied volatility, a measure of expected moves in the exchange rate used to price options, fell 15 basis points to 4.77 percent.

It has not been stated why a surge in exports should boost the peso. It was just rationalized or assumed in a post hoc manner that today’s export data from the Philippine government equates to the strength in the peso.

The above chart from the Philippine Statistics Authority reveals of the February jump in exports which has been led by electronic products which accounted for 40.6% of total exports.

Now if we look in the context of nominal US dollar trade where February’s huge jump accounts for $4.654.15 billion (preliminary), the 2014 data would look very less than impressive.

Why? For one, the level of February exports have not reached any new milestone highs. In fact, the February data has been lower than the level of exports during the third quarter of 2013 (red rectangle as superimposed by me on the chart of tradingeconomics).

What has really punctuated the supposed growth in exports has been the depressed export data of February 2013 (red arrow). This has made the February 2014 look outstanding. 

Thus, all the buzz on February exports has all been about the contrast principle—what you see depends on where you stand or what you compare with.

The Philippine government have not yet disclosed on the figures for February imports. So it is a curiosity to see why a supposed strong export growth (based on an statistical outlier) would influence the peso positively.

Yet if the growth of imports exceed exports then a trade deficit is in the order. Ceteris paribus, this isn’t peso bullish.

Nonetheless the recent ballooning of trade deficits have been offset by remittances and BPO proceeds—and as noted in the above report—the influx of money to chase extremely overpriced Philippine equities. The Phisix broke the 6,600 level to gain .64% today. Mania at its finest.

Yet since the peso’s meltdown during the third week of March, aside from last week’s raising of reserve requirements, the Philippine government seem to have been using the signaling channel to massage the Peso’s direction. Last week, the BSP reported “slower” statistical price inflation. Today aside from “strong” export data, the BSP reported positive FDI inflows. And as I previously noted above, the RISK ON environment has helped in the peso rebound.

But what has been largely ignored is that the BSP has been intervening to firm up the Peso. 

Two weeks back I wrote

Aside from the raising the reserve requirements ratio, given the wild intraday movements of the peso during the week, I deeply suspect that the BSP may have used anew forex reserves to defend the peso. 

My suspicion has been confirmed the Philippine forex reserve in March has indeed dropped, although by a margin.  

From the BSP:

This level was lower by US$0.7 billion than the end-February 2014 GIR of US$80.5 billion…The decline in reserves was due mainly to outflows arising from payments by the National Government (NG) of its maturing foreign exchange obligations, foreign exchange operations of the BSP, and revaluation adjustments on the BSP’s gold holdings and foreign-currency denominated reserves.

This simply proves my point that any improvement in the peso will have the BSP’s fingerprints on them.

Ironically, to my surprise, yields of local 10 year treasuries have yet to get caught up with the mania—surge in the peso and in the Philippine stocks, they should be declining along with the USD-peso. 

The BSP and the Philippine government has been applying direct interventions as well as indirect measures (via the Talisman effect) to influence the "managed" domestic financial markets. Unfortunately, unless they address the 30++% growth in the domestic money supply, the effects from the above will be evanescent.

Oh by the way, the Chinese government today reported a substantial decline in her merchandise trade for March 2014, specifically for y-o-y exports fell 6.6% and imports 11.3% (Guardian)! This is significant. China has been the Philippines second largest export market after Japan with a 14.7 share of overall exports.

And going to Japan, the largest export market for the Philippines (with a 25.4% share in February), the Japanese government raised sales taxes from 5% to 8% this April. Unfortunately the Japanese consumers have hardly used the prospects of the coming higher taxes to stack up on daily necessities, but instead they drove a binge on big ticket items. 

From Reuters: (bold mine)

Japanese consumers spent more aggressively on higher-priced items like art works in the run-up to the tax than Takashimaya had expected, based on its experience in 1997, President and Chief Executive Shigeru Kimoto told a news conference. 

For April, the retailer forecasts a 14 percent drop in sales, followed by a nearly 6 percent decline in May and then an almost 4 percent drop in the three months to August. 

If the said forecasts becomes a reality, then Asian exports will suffer huge declines. So with Philippine exports. 

Good luck to the bubble worshipers.

Sri Lanka Joins Global Money Printing Contest

I have been saying that global central banks have embraced Bernanke’s approach as a newfound doctrine (here and here) such that ALL central banks have practically been engaged in money printing in one form or another.

Sri Lanka reportedly joins the money printing bandwagon via forex intervention.

From Lanka Business online 

Sri Lanka's central bank has sterilized a foreign exchange sale injecting 8.0 billion rupees in one-month money into the banking system, ending several weeks of monetary policy that has been favourable of a stronger exchange rate.

On Friday the central bank printed 8.0 billion rupees for one month at 9.81 percent, slightly above the 9.75 percent reverse repo rate at which overnight liquidity is injected into the banking system for 31 days.

Until Thursday the monetary authority was injecting cash overnight in to the banking system, following a large liquidity shortage that occurred in late September. In a pegged exchange rate system, a large liquidity shortage occurs through an unsterilized foreign exchange sale.

While overnight rupee injections also generate demand in the economy, it can be less damaging than longer term cash injections, since bank managers will not try to grow the loan book while funding the balance sheet with overnight liquidity.

Instead they will try to cover the positions by curbing loan growth or raising more deposits or both.

But central bank liquidity injections through term Treasury bill purchases allow banks to focus on loans again, preventing the adjustment of the economy to the outflow of money through the central bank foreign exchange sales and triggering balance of payments trouble.

Here is the 6 month chart of Sri Lanka’s Colombo Stock Exchange

Central banks worldwide have been blowing bubbles.

Brazil and China Governments Slam the FED’s QE Forever

The US Federal Reserve’s QE ‘forever’ hasn’t been welcomed by some of the major emerging market central banking peers.

Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega, according to a Nasdaq/ Dow Jones report, accuses the Fed’s third-round of quantitative easing as "stimulating currency wars”.  Mr. Mantega, thus, will “continue to take whatever action is necessary to prevent speculative flows from flooding into the country” through currency interventions that will prevent Brazil’s currency, the real, from appreciating.

Brazil’s central bank, according to Mr. Mantega, “is going to buy more reserves” through the “use of the so-called reverse swap auctions that remove U.S. dollar-hedging contracts from the futures market”

Mr. Mantega will also adopt other measures including higher taxes on investment inflows.

China’s head of the Central Bank also rebuked the Fed's quantitative easing policies.

According to Sydney Morning Herald 

THE head of China's central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, says quantitative easing is not working and more targeted measures are required to channel credit into areas where they are needed the most.

Mr Zhou made the call in a speech delivered in April but not published on the website of the People's Bank of China until this week, as the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, announced a new round of quantitative easing - an injection of cheap credit into the financial sector - aimed at resuscitating the sluggish US economy.

Mr Zhou criticised the flood of cheap money as an inflexible and orthodox approach, although he stopped short of naming the Fed. Chinese authorities have long expressed their displeasure at US quantitative easing policy measures, which have eroded the value of the Chinese holding of US dollar-denominated assets such as Treasury bonds. Beijing is the largest holder of US government debts.

In reality all these signify as the proverbial pot calling the kettle black.

Both Chinese Central Bank and Brazil’s central bank have engaged in the same policies of waging war against interest rates although through more subtle means.

For instance I pointed out last week of the leakage from the sterilization measures by Brazil central bank’s foreign reserve accumulation have led to a bank credit boom which a Financial Times analyst sees as credit (QE) driven economic boom.

Chart from Mao Money, Mao Problems

And given the huge foreign reserves of $3.3 trillion during the first quarter held by China, the same policy dynamic may have been implemented by the People's Bank of China (PBoC). Evidence says that the PBoC's balance sheet continues to swell.

The world of politics is like a game of the hot potato, where some entity would have to take the blame to cover for one’s malfeasance.

Swiss National Bank’s Currency Interventions Spawns Property Bubble

The unintended consequences from massive currency interventions conducted by the Swiss National bank, designed to curb huge inflows from a capital diaspora in the Eurozone by putting a ceiling on the euro, has apparently spawned a monster property bubble.

From Bloomberg,

Thomas Jordan’s fight to protect the Swiss economy is set to widen beyond currency markets and too- big-to fail risks as the central bank chairman considers how to curb the biggest real-estate boom in two decades.

The Swiss National Bank may act to stem what it called risks from “excessive credit growth,” economists from Bank Sarasin to UniCredit Group said. An option available to the central bank would be to force lenders to hold additional capital of as much as 2.5 percent of their domestic risk- weighted assets to help buffer against losses.

The SNB has already put a cap on the franc to counter the currency’s ascent and protect the economy. After leading efforts to boost capital requirements for UBS AG (UBSN) and Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN), the country’s two largest banks, Jordan is now turning his focus to smaller lenders as the risk of a significant drop in property prices increases.

“The SNB has been warning for quite a while of a real- estate bubble and it wants to see a cooling,” said Andreas Venditti, a senior analyst at Zuercher Kantonalbank in Zurich. “It’s very possible that the buffer will be implemented before the end of the year.”

In the SNB’s June Financial Stability Report, which also called on Credit Suisse, Switzerland’s second-largest bank, to boost its capital, the central bank said the mortgage market poses a significant risk to Swiss lenders. Home loans have increased by almost 300 billion francs ($307 billion) in a decade and gained 5.2 percent last year to 797.8 billion francs. That’s about 140 percent of Swiss gross domestic product.

Surging Prices

The cost of owner-occupied apartments with as many as five rooms has risen the most over the past 10 years, with prices jumping 40 percent, SNB data shows. Prices of rental apartments have increased 29 percent.

UBS and Credit Suisse had combined outstanding mortgages of 240.6 billion francs at the end of 2011, up 2.8 percent from the previous year. Cantonal banks, which are largely owned by the regions, had a 6 percent increase, while the cooperative-based Raiffeisen banks saw mortgages surge 7.4 percent.

UBS said on July 31 that if property values fell by 20 percent, 99.7 percent of its exposure to Swiss real estate would remain covered by collateral. While prices are still climbing in some regions, “at this time, we don’t believe this could destabilize the Swiss economy or cause major losses for UBS,” Chief Financial Officer Tom Naratil said.

Chart courtesy of La Chronique de Crottaz Finance

To what extent has the SNB expanded their balance sheet?

Here’s the Financial Times,

Foreign exchange reserves rose to SFr406bn ($419.7bn) last month, up from SFr365bn in June, marking the third consecutive month that the Swiss National Bank has been forced to add tens of billions to its balance sheet in its efforts to weaken the Swiss currency.

The SNB has had a policy of keeping the franc at a ceiling against the euro of SFr1.20 since September and has vowed to buy as many euros as necessary to prevent the franc from strengthening beyond that level.

Recent interventions in the forex market have seen the SNB’s balance sheet expand to record levels. Forex reserves have risen 71 per cent since April, the latest figures show.

The credit boom seems to have percolated into the stock market too.

As of yesterday the Swiss Market Index has returned 9% and about 29% from the trough last August or about a year ago.

And considering that the growth of SNB’s balance sheet has vastly outpaced the the US Federal Reserve and other major central banks, the Swiss franc has even weakened substantially against the US dollar.

Taking cue from the Great Depression, the distinguished dean of Austrian economics Murray N. Rothbard wrote,

The trouble did not lie with particular credit on particular markets (such as stock or real estate); the boom in the stock and real estate markets reflected Mises's trade cycle: a disproportionate boom in the prices of titles to capital goods, caused by the increase in money supply attendant upon bank credit expansion

Yet if the SNB succeeds to restrain the banking system’s unsustainable credit expansion then a bust should be expected.

The boom-bust (Austrian Business) cycle as explained by the great Professor Ludwig von Mises,

But the boom cannot continue indefinitely. There are two alternatives. Either the banks continue the credit expansion without restriction and thus cause constantly mounting price increases and an ever-growing orgy of speculation, which, as in all other cases of unlimited inflation, ends in a “crack-up boom” and in a collapse of the money and credit system. Or the banks stop before this point is reached, voluntarily renounce further credit expansion and thus bring about the crisis. The depression follows in both instances.

In a fiat money central banking standard, boom bust cycles have been the dominant landscape.

Cracks in South Korea’s Mercantilists Policymaking Mindset?

Mercantilist policymaking in South Korea may be exhibiting some signs of fissures.

Michael Han at Matthews Asia writes,

South Korea has long been an export-oriented economy; more than half its economy is still dependent on export-heavy industries such as shipbuilding, automotives and information technology. The government’s supportive political sentiment toward exports is understandable since these industries have been South Korea’s “bread and butter” ever since it began its transformation in the 1960s from one of Asia’s poorest countries. But Korea now needs to take a deeper look domestically, particularly in terms of its social welfare system.

Recently, the government’s ruling party members, including its president, have lost major elections and seen their approval ratings plummet to all-time lows as issues surrounding currency movements, inflation and overall monetary policy have plagued the country. Many domestic consumer companies and consumers feel policies primarily benefit exporters at their expense. And while the general sentiment, “What is good for Korea’s major global corporations is also good for the country,” was once widely held, that mentality is shifting.

If true, then reality must be sinking into the public’s outlook.

Over the years, Korea’s exports have reached 50% of the GDP, but at what price? (chart from Google Public Data explorer)

Foreign currency reserve of South Korea has been exploding.(chart from Bloomberg)

The acquisition of US dollars by the Bank of Korea, by printing and issuing won, have been reflected on inflation rates (chart from tradingeconomics.com).

Each policy that politically promotes certain industries always comes at the expense of another. The imbalances of which, especially in manipulating or suppressing currencies for export promotion, will eventually get ventilated on the economy via inflation.

And such imbalances has supposedly begun to permeate into the political realm.

The won has been higher since 2009, but would be a lot higher if not for repeated interventions.

The other proposed solution of welfare spending will simply add to the predicament as resources will be transferred from productive to non-productive uses (politicos and welfare parasites).

Nevertheless, the Korea’s Kospi has been showing similar trend manifestations or seeming tight correlations as with all of the above (won, inflation rate, foreign currency reserves and even mortgage growth-as shown below).

While there maybe some signs of a seminal property bubble brewing, the Korean cycle has yet to culminate. So far annual change has not risen to alarming levels (charts from global property guide)

Bottom line: Interventionists policies end up spawning bubble or boom bust cycles which eventually percolates into the political sphere. And South Korea has not been exempted from such process.

Competitive Devaluations: Japan Intervenes to Curb Yen gains for the Third Time this year

Japan intervened in the currency market today, to allegedly halt a rising yen. Today’s action is the third intervention this year.

From Bloomberg

The yen dropped by the most in three years against the dollar as Japan stepped into foreign-exchange markets to weaken the currency for the third time this year after its gains to a postwar record threatened exporters.

“I’ve repeatedly said that we’ll take bold action against speculative moves in the market,” Japanese Finance Minister Jun Azumi told reporters today in Tokyo after the government acted unilaterally. “I’ll continue to intervene until I am satisfied.”

The yen weakened against the more than 150 currencies that Bloomberg tracks as Azumi said that he ordered the intervention at 10:25 a.m. local time because “speculative moves” in the currency failed to reflect Japan’s economic fundamentals. Today’s drop reversed this month’s previous gain by the yen against the greenback, which came amid speculation the Federal Reserve may add to stimulus measures as the U.S. economic recovery stagnates.

Statements like this “I’ll continue to intervene until I am satisfied’” might mislead people to think that political authorities really have the power to control the markets.

It is true enough that their actions may have a momentary or short term impact.

That’s the yen headed lower following today’s intervention.

But from a one year perspective, the first two interventions eventually resulted to a HIGHER and NOT a lower yen (blue uptrend)! The initial intervention was in March 18 where the BoJ bought $1 billion and the second was in August 4, both interventions are marked by green ellipse.

Talk about hubris.

Nevertheless, the inflationism or competitive devaluations being undertaken by Japan has hardly been about exports—why prop up exporters when this sector account for only less than 15% of Japan’s GDP?

Instead, like her contemporaries, the devaluation has been meant to prop up Japan’s rapidly decaying debt laden political institutions of the welfare state-banking system-central banking.

Japan’s government has the largest share and has the biggest growth of Japan’s overall debt (McKinsey Quarterly)

And as the great Ludwig von Mises wrote

The devaluation, say its champions, reduces the burden of debts. This is certainly true. It favors debtors at the expense of creditors. In the eyes of those who still have not learned that under modern conditions the creditors must not be identified with the rich not the debtors with the poor, this is beneficial. The actual effect is that the indebted owners of real estate and farm land and the shareholders of indebted corporations reap gains at the expense of the majority of people whose savings are invested in bonds, debentures, savings-bank deposits, and insurance policies.

It is sad know how politicians misrepresent what they stand for and use class warfare or supposed underprivileged sectors to rationalize the imposition of what are truly designed as self preservation measures.

Put another way, the BoJ’s serial devaluations has actually been meant to illicitly transfer the resources of the average Japanese citizens to the political class and her banking system. Incidentally, the latter, like the Euro counterparts, has been under strain.

From Bloomberg (Topix Banks index)

Share prices of Japan's banks have slumped since 2007.

So much for blabbering about public interest. Devaluations are all about political greed.

Hot: Swiss National Bank to Embrace Zimbabwe’s Gideon Gono model

The Swiss National Bank has impliedly adapted Zimbabwe’s Central Bank Governor Gideon Gono’s hyperinflationary model.

From Reuters, (bold emphasis mine)

The Swiss National Bank said on Tuesday it would set a minimum exchange rate target of 1.20 francs to the euro and would enforce it by buying foreign currency in unlimited quantities.

The Fiat money standard’s race to perdition via competitive devaluation seems to be accelerating.

All these for saving the banking system. As I recently wrote,

Late last week, the US Federal Reserve has extended a $200 million loan facility via currency swap lines to the Swiss National Bank (SNB), as an unidentified European bank reportedly secured a $500 million emergency loan. This essentially validates my suspicion that the so-called currency intervention by the SNB camouflaged its true purpose, i.e. the extension of liquidity to distressed banks, whose woes have been ventilated on the equity markets.

G-7: More QEs Coming

From Bloomberg, (bold highlights mine)

Group of Seven nations sought to head off a collapse in global investor confidence after the U.S. sovereign-rating downgrade and a sell-off in Italian and Spanish debt intensified threats to the world economic recovery.

The G-7 will take “all necessary measures to support financial stability and growth,” the nations’ finance ministers and central bankers said in a statement today. Members will inject liquidity and act against disorderly currency moves as needed, they said.

QE 3.0 looks like a dead giveaway.

Global Market Crash Points to QE 3.0

I can already smell QE3. Now we'll see if Mr. Bernanke is a true money printer or an amateur money printer. If he is a true money printer, he's going to start printing soon, markets will rally but not to new highs-Dr. Marc Faber

Important: The US has been downgraded by the major credit rating agency S&P after the market closed last Friday[1], so there could be an extended volatility on the global marketplace at the start of the week. This largely depends if such actions has already been discounted. The first thing on Monday is to watch Japan’s response.

Nevertheless given the actions of the US markets last Friday, where rumors of the downgrade had already circulated[2], there hardly has been any noteworthy action which presages more trouble ahead.

At the start of the week, the mainstream attributed the weakness in the US markets as a function of the risk of a debt default. This, according to them, should arise if a debt ceiling deal would not be reached.

I argued that this hasn’t been so[3], for the simple reason that market signals has been saying otherwise.

A credit rating downgrade means higher costs of financing or securing loans and a possible rebalancing of the balance sheets of the banking system to comply with capital adequacy regulations.

The chart above shows that short term yields initially spiked (1 year note light blue and 3 month bill-light green) during the 11^th hour of the negotiations. But once the debt ceiling deal was reached and the bill was passed, interest rates across the yield curve converged as they fell along with prices of Credit Default Swap.

Instead I pointed to the deteriorating events in Europe as a possible aggravating factor on US markets.

Impact of Downgrades

There are two basic ways to measure credit risks. One is the interest rate, the other is through credit default swaps (CDS) which fundamentally acts as a form of insurance against a default.

It is misleading to think that downgrades drive the marketplace as some popular personalities as my former icon Warren Buffett recently asserted[4]

Financial markets create their own dynamics, but I don’t think we’re facing a double dip recession…Clearly what stock markets do have is an effect on confidence, and this selloff can create a lack of confidence.

Mr. Buffett has gotten the causality in reverse. Downgrades happen when market forces—popularly known as the bond vigilantes[5] or bond market investors protest current fiscal or monetary policies respond by selling bonds—has already been articulating them.

US CDS prices have steadily been creeping upwards[6], this has been indicative of marketplace’s perception of the festering credit conditions by the US. The problem isn’t that “selloff can create a lack of confidence”, but rather too much debt, which is the reason for the downgrade, has been fostering an atmosphere of heightened uncertainty.

Downgrades signify as a time lagged acknowledgement by social institutions of an extant underlying ailment being vented on the markets.

The fact is that 3 credit rating agencies have already downgraded the US[7].

Also downgrades as said above affect financial institutions more, not only because of higher costs of funds but also because of the compliance to capital adequacy regulations.

A fundamental picture of an ongoing market based downside rerating is the unraveling crisis in the Eurozone.

The escalating PIIGS crisis has been causing a panic on Spain and Italian bonds, whose interest yields have been spiking[8] and where European investors can be seen stampeding into Germany’s debt or the Swiss franc.

So how has Europe responded? In mechanical fashion, by inflationism.

Supposedly wrangling politicians/bureaucrats found a common cause or conciliatory ground to work on. The European Central Bank (ECB) commenced with its version of Quantitative Easing (asset purchases) initially buying Irish and Portuguese bonds[9], which the equity markets apparently ignored and continued to tumble.

The ECB now has promised to extend buying Italian and Spanish bonds, this coming week, in order to calm the markets[10].

The Swiss National Bank[11] has gotten into the act ahead of the ECB, by surprising the currency markets with an intervention allegedly meant to control a surging franc. I think that they were flooding liquidity for the benefit banks, with the currency as an excuse for such action.

The Swiss intervention, which has been estimated at CHF 30 billion ($39 billion) to CHF 80 billion[12], by expanding the monetary base, appears as having fallen short of achieving its declared currency goal (see right window). The franc trades at the levels where the SNB initiated the intervention. The result seems as $39 billion down the sink hole.

Japan has likewise followed the Central Bank money printing shindig by engaging in her own currency intervention, allegedly aimed at curbing the rise of the Yen. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reportedly intervened with a record high amount in the range of $56.6 to $59.26 billion[13]

Total cumulative size of Japan’s QE has now reached 46 trillion yen[14] (US $627 billion)

Hence, the European debt crisis partly explains the recent global market crash.

And importantly the above dynamic demonstrates how central banks respond to a market distress or a mark down in credit standings.

As an aside, one would further note that since central banks of Japan, Eurozone and the Switzerland has now been funneling enormous liquidity into the system, all these funds will have to flow somewhere.

The same dynamics should be expected with the US, where a credit rerating would not only impair US government debt risk profile and the attendant higher costs of financing, but also debt of government sponsored agencies, municipal liabilities and corporate bonds who thrive on subsidies, guarantees, bailouts or other form of parasitical relationship to the US government.

Since many of these securities comprise asset holdings major financial institutions, a US downgrade also means downgrades for US banks, insurance companies and credit unions.

Martin Weiss of Weiss Ratings estimates that a staggering $6.3 trillion of securities constituting of government agency securities $2.2 trillion, $725 billion in municipal bonds and $2.9 trillion in corporate and foreign bonds are subject to immediate or future downgrades in the wake of a U.S. government debt downgrade[15]. This represents one-third of all the financial assets of all US financial institutions

So given the operating manual or basic procedure of central banks in treating downgrades, the S&P action essentially paves way for the next US Federal Reserve’s asset purchasing moves.

Thus, a downgrade on the US is essentially a downgrade on the US dollar.

[Funny how local investors continue to believe in the US dollar as safehaven, when the fundamental problem has been the US dollar!]

Current Environment Seems Ripe for QE 3.0

It’s been a long time theme for me in saying that part of the process to set up interventions has been through what central bankers call as the signaling channel[16].

The fundamental aim is to manipulate the public’s expectations in order to justify prospective policies, usually meant for inflation expectations management.

Over the May-June window, there had been extensive interventions in the commodity markets (raised credit restrictions sharply on various commodity markets, IEA’s release of strategic oil reserves[17] and the ban on OTC trades[18]) and in the debt and equity markets (via restrictions of short selling[19] and proscriptions on US asset sales by US residents through overseas markets[20]) which appears to have been designed as price controls.

This came amidst a spike in academic and research papers which tried to dissociate the Fed’s previous QEs with surges in commodity prices.

The process of interventions as I previously wrote[21],

First is to apply the necessary interventions on the market to create a scenario that would justify further interventions.

Second is to produce papers to help convince the public of the necessity of interventions.

Then lastly, when the 'dire' scenario happens, apply the next intervention tools.

As one can see, signaling channel has also been used to in the political context.

Similar to last week’s haggling for the US debt ceiling deal by two supposedly ‘opposing’ political parties, negotiations appears to have been leveraged or anchored on an Armageddon scenario from a debt default, if a deal had not been reached at the nick of time.

Channeling Mencken’s hobgoblins, fear had essentially been used as lever to reach an 11^th hour deal which means ramming down the throats of the Americans. The debt ceiling bill was predicated on what I called as legal skulduggery or prestidigitation[22] as government spending cuts were all based on promises (baseline projections rather than actual cuts)

Now that the debt ceiling bill has been passed, such jawboning appears to have morphed into a self-fulfilling prophesy. Markets went into a spasm.

This brings us to the core of what I think has been the epicenter of last week’s crisis.

The US equity market, represented by the S&P has been mostly buttressed by the money printing by the US Federal Reserve as shown from the chart from Casey Research[23].

One would note that in the above chart, an almost comparable decline occurred during the five month window since the Fed completed its QE 1.0 on March 2010.

The timeline for QE 1.0 is officially from March 2009 to March 2010, and QE 2.0 from November 2010 to June 2011.[24]

The difference between the actions of the US equities in post-QE 1.0 and post-QE 2.0 has been one of scale and speed.

Global equities functioned in the same manner too.

The closure of QE 1.0 (blue horizontal lines) saw an across the board decline and consolidation phase by global equity markets represented by world (FTSE All World FAW), Europe (STOX50), Asia (P1DOW) and Emerging Markets (EEM)—all marked by red ellipses. These had been reversed once the QE 2.0 was announced and implemented.

Importantly, during that post-QE 1.0 lull window (QE 1.0 blue horizontal lines; QE 2.0 green horizontal line) marked again by the red ellipses, the US dollar surged (USD), gold consolidated, US treasury yields (TNX) had been on a decline while commodities (CCI) likewise had been rangebound.

Today, post-QE 2.0, we see some important difference and similarities. Similar to the post-QE 1.0 environment, global-US equity markets have been under selling pressure as US treasury yields have been on a decline along with the commodity markets.

The difference is that the US dollar remains WEAK and has NOT generally functioned as the previous shock absorber during market stresses or during the post-QE 1.0.

Importantly gold continues to surge!

My point is: this episode of market turbulence seems like a contraption to the next asset purchasing measures by the US Federal Reserve or QE 3.0 (or in whatever name the Fed wishes to call it).

In other words, like the debt ceiling deal of last week, a crisis scenario has been put in place meant to justify the next round of interventions. And this reminds me of the shocking and revolting comment by Emmanuel Rahm, US President Obama’s former chief of staff which seem to resonate strongly today[25],

You never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.

With the US debt ceiling bill in place, the unraveling debt crisis in the Eurozone, an “alleged” risk of a sharp world economic growth slowdown or recession (I say alleged because I am not a believer), global equity market in turmoil, plus coordinated interventions by the central banks of Swiss, Japan and the ECB, pieces of the puzzles have been falling into place, as I have previously argued[26], which seem to pave way for Ben Bernanke and the US Federal Reserve to reengage in the next asset purchasing program.

And coincidentally the US Federal Reserve’s FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) has been slated to meet on August 9^th Tuesday (Wednesday Philippine Time)[27]. And given the current turn of events, we should expect announcements that should reinforce a stronger policy response.

Public Choice and Possible Incentives Guiding Team Ben Bernanke

It’s fundamentally nonsensical to say that team Bernanke won’t engage in QE simply because of the futility or of the inefficacies of the previous QEs programs.

People who say this either fictionalize the role of individuals working for the governments or naively think that political operators operate on the basis of collective interests.

Public choice theory tells us that bureaucrats, like Ben Berrnanke, are equally self interested individuals. This means that since they are not driven by the incentives of profit and losses, the guiding principles of their actions are usually based on the need to preserve or expand their political careers (tenureship) by serving their political masters or by making populists decisions.

Besides, who would like to see a market crash with them on the helm, and not be seen as “doing something”? Today’s politics, embodied by the Emmanuel Rahm doctrine has mostly been about the need to be seen “doing something” even if such actions entail having adverse long term consequences. Actions by the ECB, SNB and BoJ have all revealed and exemplified such tendencies. Even the debt ceiling bill was forged from the need to do something to avert an Armageddon charade.

Moreover, political operators are also most likely to desire acquiring prestige and social clout by virtue of having expanded political control over the economy under the guise of social weal. That’s why more and more regulations are being imposed on the belief that a command and control economy would be more effective than one of free markets. Never mind the experience of Mao’s China and the USSR. Socialist champion billionaire and philanthropist George Soros got a taste of his own medicine when the Dodd Frank law compelled him to close his 40-year hedge fund[28].

Public choice also tells us that the political operators have beholden to vested interest groups such as the banking sector. The US Federal Reserve has thrown tens of trillions of dollars to save both US[29] and foreign[30] based banks. This accounts for as demonstrated preference or deciphering priorities from action over words.

Moreover, since their careers have been erected on the incumbent institutions, why should they enforce radical reforms that would only jeopardize their career or the institution’s existence, whom their allegiance have been impliedly sworn to?

To add, some policymakers operate on the ideological principles such as the theory of wealth effect, where increases in spending that accompanies an increase in perceived wealth[31]. From such pedagogical belief emanates the trend of ‘demand management’ based policy actions.

Take for instance, Ben Bernanke’s chief dogma “Crash course for central bankers” which he wrote as a Princeton Professor[32].

There’s no denying that a collapse in stock prices today would pose serious macroeconomic challenges for the United States. Consumer spending would slow, and the U.S. economy would become less of a magnet for foreign investors. Economic growth, which in any case has recently been at unsustainable levels, would decline somewhat. History proves, however, that a smart central bank can protect the economy and the financial sector from the nastier side effects of a stock market collapse.

Today, most of the central bankers seem to adhere to such principles.

So even if previous QEs didn’t work as planned, what will stop Mr. Bernanke from pursuing the same policies and expecting different results? All he has to do is to assume the academic stance of saying the past policies didn’t work because they have not been enough.

So while I don’t know what’s going on in Team Bernanke’s mind, personal incentives, path dependency and dogmatism all point to QE 3.0 pretty soon.

Political Actions over Economic Data and Technical Picture

Lastly the US economic picture can be seen positively or negatively depending on one’s bias, but in my view, I hardly see the imminence of recession.

In the US, ISM Manufacturing index[33] has fallen steeply but this has not yet gone beyond the 50 threshold which could be an indicator of a recession. Offsetting this view is that recession probability from the yield curve has been very low[34].

Of course looking at economic figures are based on the past (ex post) activities. Since today’s markets have been driven by political actions such as QEs, then past data wouldn’t weigh so much compared to the anticipatory (ex ante) policy directives by central bankers.

Yet the problem with today’s conventional mindset has been that of the chronic addiction to rising prices of anything, be it economic data or asset prices. Anything that falls translates to the necessity or call to action for government intervention.

So false signals can be used as basis to demand political actions.

Nevertheless I also think that technical factors did play a secondary role in last week’s US market crash.

The S&P has been on a bearish head and shoulder pattern.

Given the current market milieu, technically based market participants jumped into the bearish momentum from which this pattern became another self-fulfilled reality.

The pattern basically aggravated the current environment rather than having caused it.

Bottom line:

If the US Federal announces a major policy stimulus anytime soon, then this should be seen as a strong signal to buy both commodities or on ASEAN equity markets and the Phisix.

Otherwise, we should expect more downside market volatility and probably take some money off the table.

Again, profit from political folly.

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[1] See NO Such Thing as Risk Free: S&P Downgrades US August 6, 2011

[2] Telegraph.co.uk Debt crisis: as it happened, August 5, 2011

[3] See Today’s Market Slump Has NOT Been About US Downgrades, August 3, 2011

[4] Bloomberg.com S&P Erred in Cutting U.S. Rating: Buffett, August 7, 2011

[5] Wikipedia.org Bond Vigilante

[6] See Graphic: US Default Risk—Short and Long Term, August 2, 2011

[7] See How the US Debt Ceiling Crisis Affects Global Financial Markets, July 31, 2011

[8] Danske Bank Mr. Trichet will ECB buy Italy? ECB Preview August 4, 2011

[9] See ECB Intervenes in Bond Markets, More to Follow, August 5, 2011

[10] See ECB Expands QE: Will Buy Italian and Spanish Bonds, August 6, 2011

[11] See Hot: Swiss National Bank Intervenes to Halt a Surging Franc August 3, 2011

[12] Marketwatch.com Swiss central bank battles to halt franc’s rise August 3, 2011

[13] CNBC.com Japan Sells Record $58 Billion in FX Intervention, August 5, 2011

[14] Danske Bank Japan: BoJ tries to draw a line in the sand, August 4, 2011

[15] Weiss Martin, Day of Reckoning! TOMORROW!, August 1, 2011, Moneyandmarkets.com

[16] See War on Precious Metals: The Rationalization Process For QE 3.0, May 7, 2011

[17] See War on Commodities: IEA Intervenes by Releasing Oil Reserves, June 24, 2011

[18] See War on Gold and Commodities: Ban of OTC Trades and ‘Conflict Gold’, June 18, 2011

[19] See War on Speculators: Restricting Short Sales on Sovereign Debt and Equities, May 18, 2011

[20] See US Government’s War on US Expats and American Investments Overseas, June 21, 2011

[21] See War on Precious Metals Continues: Silver Margins Raised 5 times in 2 weeks!, May 5, 2011

[22] See Debt Ceiling Bill: Where are the Spending Cuts?, August 2, 2011

[23] Casey Research Too Much of a Good Thing

[24] Ricketts Lowell R. Quantitative Easing Explained Liber 8 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 2011

[25] Wall Street Journal In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, November 21, 2008

[26] See Poker Bluff: No Quantitative Easing 3.0?, June 5, 2011

[27] Mam.Econoday.com FOMC Meeting Announcement 2011 Economic Calendar

[28] See George Soros on Closing Hedge Fund: Do As I Say, Not What I Do, July 27, 2011

[29] See US Taxpayers Could Be On The Hook For $23.7 Trillion!, July 21, 2009

[30] See Fed Audit Reveals US Federal Reserves’ $16 Trillion Bailouts of Foreign Banks, July 26, 2011

[31] Wikipedia.org Wealth effect

[32] See The US Stock Markets As Target of US Federal Reserve Policies, May 11, 2011

[33] Harding Jeff, Destruction of Capital Resulting in Global Manufacturing Slowdown, Minyanville.com August 2, 2011

[34] Moneyshow.com A Red Flag for Emerging Markets... and the US, Minyanville.com August 4, 2011