Sunday, November 17, 2024

PSE Craters as Financials’ Share of the PSEi 30 Hits All-Time Highs; A Growing Mismatch Between Financial Index Performance and Bank Fundamentals

 

History will not be kind to central bankers fixated on financial economy and who created serial speculative booms to sustain the illusion of prosperity. It will also be critical of governments unwilling to address weaknesses, who deflected shifting hard policymaking to independent, unelected and largely unaccountable central banks—Satyajit Das 

In this issue 

PSE Craters as Financials’ Share of the PSEi 30 Hits All-Time Highs; A Growing Mismatch Between Financial Index Performance and Bank Fundamentals

I. PSEi 30 Craters on Signs of Re-Tightening Amid Rising Dollar and Higher UST Yields

II. Despite the Market Carnage: Financials Share of the PSEi 30 Zoom to All-time High!

III. Financialization: The Expanding Role of Banks in Achieving Political Goals

IV. "National Team?" In Q2, Other Financials Corporations Sold, the PSEi 30 Plunged

V. In Q3, Mismatch Between Financial Index-Bank Fundamentals Reached a Blow-off Phase!

VI. Worsening Bank Liquidity Conditions as Cash-to-Deposits Hit Milestone Low

VII. Liquidity and Collateral Crunch? Bank Borrowings, Focused on Bills, Zoomed to Record Highs in September, as Repos also Hit All-time Highs!

VIII. Despite Lower Rates Held to Maturity Assets Near All-time Highs, Record Bank QE

IX. A Snapshot of Q3 and 9-Month Performance of PSE Listed Banks

X. Highlights, Summary and Conclusion

PSE Craters as Financials’ Share of the PSEi 30 Hits All-Time Highs; A Growing Mismatch Between Financial Index Performance and Bank Fundamentals

Even as the PSEi plummeted due to signs of global and local re-tightening, the Financials outperformed, widening the mismatch between share prices and fundamentals. Will a reckoning come soon?

I. PSEi 30 Craters on Signs of Re-Tightening Amid Rising Dollar and Higher UST Yields"


Figure 1

The Sage of Omaha, Warren Buffett, once said, "Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked."

Have the signs of tightening upended the dream of easy money’s "goldilocks" economy, or have they exposed those who have been "swimming naked?"

The surging US dollar index, coupled with rising 10-year Treasury yields—both largely attributed to Trump's policies— has sent global risk assets tumbling. Yet, these developments took shape two months before the US elections. (Figure 1, topmost graph)

This includes the Philippine PSEi 30, which plunged by 4.31%, marking its largest weekly decline in 2024 and the steepest drop since the week of September 30, 2022, when it fell by 8.3%.

As of Thursday, November 14, the headline index broke below the 6,600 level, closing at 6,557.09.

A notable oversold rebound in industrials, led by Meralco (up by 7.78%) and Monde (up by 7.52%), along with financials from BPI (up by 3.7%) and CBC (up by 4.58%), contributed to a low-volume rally of 1.82% on Friday.

Year-to-date, the PSEi 30 is struggling to maintain its narrowing return of 3.5%.

II. Despite the Market Carnage: Financials Share of the PSEi 30 Zoom to All-time High!

The Financial Index, down by only 1.86%, was the least affected in this week’s market carnage. BPI was the only member of the PSEi 30 component to withstand the foreign-driven selloff, while Jollibee ended the week unchanged. (Figure 1, middle pane)

Interestingly, this outperformance has propelled the aggregate free-float market capitalization weighting of the three major banks of the headline index to an all-time high. (Figure 1, lowest chart)

Figure 2

Furthermore, financials accounted for 41.7% of the mainboard's volume on Friday—the third-highest share since October. (Figure 2, topmost diagram)

Meanwhile, October’s cumulative 29.92% accounts for the sector’s highest share since July 2023, which also translates to a 2017 high.

In a related note, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has suspended its free publication of non-BSP-generated data, including PSE data on monthly price-earnings ratios (PER), market capitalization by sector, index data, and volume distribution by sector. This suspension hampers our ability to track critical developments in market internals. (Yes, I wrote them)

The point being, the increasing share of mainboard volume by the financial sector has pillared the rising share of the sector’s market cap share of the PSEi 30.

However, this dynamic also implies growing concentration risk in the stock market.

III. Financialization: The Expanding Role of Banks in Achieving Political Goals

Businessworld, November 13: THE PHILIPPINE banking system’s net profit jumped by 6.4% at end-September as both net interest and non-interest income grew, data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed. The combined net income of the banking industry rose to P290 billion in the first nine months of 2024 from P272.6 billion in the same period a year ago.

The PHP 290 billion profit and a 6.4% growth rate represent the Q3 figures year-over-year (YoY).

Continuing from last week’s discussion, the diverging dynamics in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) have also been reflected in the GDP figures. 

Although the financial sector has been on an upward trajectory since the new millennium, its share of the real GDP has rapidly deepened during the BSP’s historic rescue of the sector. 

This was notably influenced by the BSP historic intervention to rescue the sector, which included an unprecedented PHP 2.3 trillion quantitative easing package, historic cuts in official and reserve ratios, as well as unparalleled subsidies and relief measures. 

In line with the rising share of money supply-to-GDP, the financial sector's share of GDP reached its third highest level at 10.8% in Q3. (Figure 2, middle image) 

It even hit an all-time high of 10.9% when considering the 9-month real GDP data. 

While this evolution may be labeled as "financialization," the essential message is clear: BSP policies have led to an economy increasingly immersed (or heavily reliant) in credit and liquidity, primarily channeled through an elite-owned and controlled banking system. 

This deepening dependence comes at the expense of the development of other competing financial conduits, such as capital markets. 

The underlying reason for this is political: the bank-led financial sector serves as the primary non-BSP financier of the government’s deficit spending. 

As a result, the government's calls for improvements in the capital markets appear to be mere lip service. 

However, judging by their "demonstrated preference" in policy choices, it appears that inflating bank shares may serve to camouflage the adverse consequences of this deepening and complex political-economic arrangement. 

IV. "National Team?" In Q2, Other Financials Corporations Sold, the PSEi 30 Plunged

The developments in Other Financial Corporations (OFCs) provide valuable insights. 

In Q2, OFCs eased their holdings of equities.  According to the BSP, "The other financial corporations’ claims on the other sectors dropped as their holdings of equity shares issued by other nonfinancial corporations fell." 

The Non-bank financial institutions and OFCs "includes the private and public insurance companies, other financial institutions that are either affiliates or subsidiaries of the banks that are supervised by the BSP (i.e., investment houses, financing companies, credit card companies, securities dealer/broker and trust institutions), pawnshops, government financial institutions and the rest of private other financial institutions (not regulated by the BSP) that are supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)" (Armas, 2014) 

In the same quarter, OFC claims on the private sector decreased by 0.5% quarter-over-quarter (QoQ), while the PSEi 30 index plunged by 7.1%. (Figure 2, lowest visual) 

My guess is that some of these OFCs are part of what could be considered the Philippine version of the "national team." 

V. In Q3, Mismatch Between Financial Index-Bank Fundamentals Reached a Blow-off Phase!

Nevertheless, the deviation between the fundamentals of banks and their share prices has reached "blow-off" proportions!


Figure 3
 

In Q3, the banking system reported a modest growth of 6.4%, slightly higher than Q2’s 4.1%. However, the financial index skyrocketed by 19.4% quarter-over-quarter (QoQ). 

From another angle, 9-month profit growth was up by 5.07%, even as the financial index surged by a stunning 23.4% year-on-year in Q3.

Worst of all, profit trends and the financial index have moved in opposite directions

Since profit growth peaked in Q3 2022 and subsequently eased, shares of the seven-member bank stocks (excluding the eighth member: PSE) within the financial index have continued to accelerate. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

Meanwhile, given that universal and commercial banks account for 93.9% of total bank assets, their profit growth largely mirrors the entire banking system. In Q3, profit growth was 7.03%, and on a 9-month basis, it stood at 6%. 

These figures underscore the increasing monopolization of the financial industry by banks validated by the BSP’s Total Financial Resources (TFR) data. 

Total financial resources grew by 10.07% to a record PHP 33.08 trillion. 

The banking sector’s share surged to an all-time high of 83.3%, driven mainly by universal and commercial banks, whose contribution reached a record 78.1%. (Figure 3, middle image) 

So let us get this straight: banks have increased their share of trading activities in the PSE, as well as their slice of both the PSEi 30 and the GDP pie. They now command 83.3% of total financial resources and are continuing to rise. 

This dominance doesn’t even account for their substantial role in the local bond markets, where they act as issuers, intermediaries, and holders. 

Even without the BSP acknowledging this, what we are witnessing is the intensifying risks within the Philippine financial-economic system. 

VI. Worsening Bank Liquidity Conditions as Cash-to-Deposits Hit Milestone Low

Have you ever seen any experts or establishment analysts address the developing contradiction between the banks' reported profits and their liquidity conditions? 

Cash and due from banks, or bank cash reserves, plummeted by 13.6% in September 2024, following a brief 4% rebound in August. This decline brought cash reserves to their lowest level since 2019. (Figure 3, lowest graph) 

To address the emerging liquidity shortfall, the BSP previously reduced the bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR) from 19% to 14%, implemented in seven installments from March 2018 to December 2019. 

Cash reserves saw a temporary spike in 2020 when the BSP injected Php 2.3 trillion into the system, accompanied by an RRR cut from 14% to 12% in April 2020. 

However, facing diminishing returns, cash reserves resumed their downward trend. 

Once again, doing the same thing and expecting different results, the BSP reduced the RRR by a larger margin than in 2020, lowering it from 12% to 9.5% in June 2023. 

Despite these efforts, the challenges within the banking system's cash reserve position have persisted.


Figure 4

Moreover, while the growth in peso deposit rates increased from 6.9% in August to 7.07% in September—the slowest growth rate since July 2023—the BSP’s cash-to-deposit ratio plummeted to 12.44%, its lowest ratio since at least 2013! (Figure 4, topmost and second to the highest graphs) 

Yet, with the record bank credit expansion, why the sluggish growth in deposits? Where did the money flow into? 

Even with the recent decline in inflation rates, have a minority of "banked" households continue to draw from their savings? 

Furthermore, the banks' liquid asset-to-deposit ratio, which includes both cash reserves and financial assets, fell to 50.34%, reverting to levels seen during the BSP's rescue efforts in July 2020. 

Incredible. 

And this is just one facet of the mounting liquidity challenges that banks seem to be facing. 

VII. Liquidity and Collateral Crunch? Bank Borrowings, Focused on Bills, Zoomed to Record Highs in September, as Repos also Hit All-time Highs! 

More eye-catching data emerged last September. 

Bank borrowings—primarily in short-term bills—skyrocketed to an all-time high! Borrowings surged by 49.7%, reaching a record PHP 1.7 trillion, with their share of total liabilities climbing to 7.3%, the highest since 2021. (Figure 4, second to the lowest and lowest charts) 

The liquidity shortfall is most pronounced over the short-term, this is why bank’s bills payable zoomed to unscaled heights.


Figure 5

Not only that, bank short-term repo (repurchase agreements) or RRP (reverse repurchase) operations with the BSP and other banks have also launched into the stratosphere!

With record repo operations, the RRP’s 3.72% share of the bank’s total assets surged to the highest level since at least 2015! (Figure 5, upper image) 

Could this rampant use of repurchase agreements (repos) be underlying growing collateral issues in the financial system? As banks increasingly depend on repos for short-term liquidity, are we witnessing a decline in the quality of collateral or a shortage of high-quality assets available for these transactions? 

These developments likely explain the BSP's abrupt announcement of the latest series of RRR cuts, which took effect last October

However, such actions resemble a Hail Mary pass, with RRR ratios now headed toward zero. 

VIII. Despite Lower Rates Held to Maturity Assets Near All-time Highs, Record Bank QE

Another paradox: banks reported that credit delinquencies—across the board—marginally declined in September. (Figure 5, lower diagram) 

If this is true, then higher profits combined with lower non-performing loans (NPLs) should result in more, not less liquidity 


Figure 6

Additionally, the easing of interest rates, as indicated by declining treasury yields, should have reduced banks' held-to-maturity (HTM) assets. As noted repeatedly, HTM assets drain liquidity because they lock up funds. (Figure 6, topmost graph)

Yet, there hasn’t been significant improvement in this area. 

Moreover, since authorities aim to meet year-end spending targets, boost GDP, and finance the upcoming elections, it is expected that the government will ramp up its deficit spending in Q4. 

This increase in public spending will likely lead to a rise in banks' and the financial sector’s net claims on central government (NCoCG), which may translate to higher HTM assets. (Figure 6, middle chart) 

Furthermore, if the current trend of declining inflation reverses, or we experience a third wave of rising inflation, banks might resort to accounting maneuvers to shield themselves from potential mark-to-market losses by shifting these assets into HTMs. 

That is to say, increases in debt-financed government spending and rising inflation rates could therefore result in higher levels of HTM assets.

Above all, banks are not standalone institutions; they have deep exposure to counterparties. As noted last week, 

Led by banks, the financial sector is the most interconnected with the local economy.  Its health is contingent or dependent upon the activities of its non-

financial counterparties. 

Alternatively, the sector’s outgrowth relies on political subsidies and is subject to diminishing returns. 

Yet ultimately, this should reflect on its core operational fundamentals of lending and investing. (Prudent Investor, October 2024) 

The transformational shift in the banking system’s business model—from production and consumption—could be ominous. Part of this shift has been motivated by pandemic-era subsidies and relief measures, as well as a move away from unproductive industry loans. 

As a result, the consumer share of total bank loans (excluding real estate) reached an all-time high of 14.9% in September 2024, while the share of production loans declined to 82.7%. The remaining 2.4% comes from non-resident loans. (Figure 6, lowest image) 

Banks have embraced the government’s belief that spending drives the economy, neglecting the balance sheet health of individuals, as well as the potential misallocations as a result of artificially low rates. 

But what happens to the consumer economy once their balance sheets have been tapped out? 

This should not surprise to our readers, given that the "inverted belly" of the Treasury yield curve has already been signaling these concerns.

IX. A Snapshot of Q3 and 9-Month Performance of PSE Listed Banks

Finally, here is a snapshot of the micro aspects of the financials.


Table 7

The performance of PSE-listed banks indicates that while all-bank profits grew by 14% to Php 226 billion in the first nine months of 2024, bills payable jumped by 79%, or Php 579 billion, reaching Php 1.31 trillion. This increase in bills payable signifies more than double the net profits generated over the same period. The data excludes the small-scale Citystate Savings Bank [PSE: CSB]. [Table 7]

PSEi banks accounted for 84% of the nine-month increase in bills, relative to their 73% share of net income growth. Metrobank [PSE: MBT] represented the most aggressive borrower, with a 61% share. 

We have yet to reconcile the stark divergence between the reported BSP bank performance and the aggregate activities of listed firms. 

Nonetheless, through aggressive lending, banks boosted their top and bottom lines in Q3, positively impacting the nine-month performance. 

Fueled by a 29.7% growth in non-PSEi banks, the net income growth of all banks soared by 22%. 

X. Highlights, Summary and Conclusion 

In the end, we can summarize the banking sector as having the following attributes: (as of September or Q3) 

1. all-time highs in:

-Financial Index

-market cap share of the PSEi 30 (3 biggest banks)

-turnover of financial sector to mainboard volume (near)

-nominal or Philippine peso and % share of total financial resources

-nominal net claims on central government

-nominal Held-to-Maturity assets

-total bank lending in Philippine pesos

-percentage share of consumer bank lending

-nominal bank borrowing (mainly Bills)

-nominal repo operations

- nominal net financial assets

2. Historical lows in:

-cash-to-deposits

-production pie of total bank lending

-reserve requirement ratio

3. Declining trend in:

-cash reserves

-profit growth

-deposit growth

-liquid asset-to-deposit ratio

How is it that the supposedly "profitable" financial institutions, supported by the recent slowdown in non-performing loans, have been accompanied by sustained declines in deposit and savings rates, as well as a massive hemorrhage in liquidity that compelled them to rapidly access short-term financing via bills and repos?

Have profits been overstated? Have NPLs been understated?

To what extent have the BSP’s relief measures and subsidies caused distortions in banks’ reporting of their health conditions?

Why the flagrant disconnect between stock prices and the actual conditions of the banks?

Could the "national team" have been tasked with camouflaging recent developments through a panicked pumping of the sector’s shares?

Does the ongoing shortfall in liquidity portend higher rates ahead?

Given all these factors, what could possibly go wrong?

As we recently pointed out,

To be clear, we aren’t suggesting that CBC and other record-setting bank shares, such as BPI, are a simulacrum of Lehman; rather, we are pointing to the distortive behavior of speculative derbies that may hide impending problems in the sector. (Prudent Investor, October 2024)

____

References 

Satyajit Das, Central banks: The legacy of monetary mandarins, New Indian Express, November 15, 2024 

Jean Christine A. Armas, Other Financial Corporations Survey (OFCS): Framework, Policy Implications and Preliminary Groundwork, BSP-Economic Newsletter, July-August 2014, bsp.gov.ph 

Prudent Investor, Q3 2024 5.2% GDP: Consumers Struggle Amid Financial Loosening, PSEi 30 Deviates from the GDP’s Trajectory, November 10, 2024 

Prudent Investor, Important Insights from the Philippine PSEi 30’s Melt-Up! October 7, 2024

  


Sunday, November 10, 2024

Q3 2024 5.2% GDP: Consumers Struggle Amid Financial Loosening, PSEi 30 Deviates from the GDP’s Trajectory

 

it is important to recognize that real GDP is an analytic concept. Despite the name, real GDP is not “real” in the sense that it can, even in principle, be observed or collected directly, in the same sense that current-dollar GDP cannot in principle be observed or collected as the sum of actual spending on final goods and services in the economy. Quantities of apples and oranges can in principle be collected, but they cannot be added to obtain the total quantity of ‘fruit’ output in the economy—Steven Landefeld and Robert P. Parker, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1995

In this issue 

Q3 2024 5.2% GDP: Consumers Struggle Amid Financial Loosening, PSEi 30 Deviates from the GDP’s Trajectory

I. The PSEi 30 Deviated from GDP’s Trajectory

II. The Treasury Markets as a Harbinger of the Economic Slowdown

III. Lessons from the 2024 US Elections: Markets Overwhelm Surveys

IV. GDP: A Tool for Political Narrative

V. The GDP Trend Line in Context: Insights from SWS Self-Poverty and Hunger Surveys

VI. Q3’s GDP Story: Consumer Spending Rebounds on Declining Inflation and Lower Rates

VII. Consumers Struggle Amid Rising Employment and Vigorous Bank Credit Expansion

VIII. Lethargic Q3 2024 Sales of Wilcon and Robinsons Retail Challenge the Consumer Rebound Narrative

IX. Public Spending Segment of the Marcos-nomics Stimulus: Are Authorities Pulling Back?

Q3 2024 5.2% GDP: Consumers Struggle Amid Financial Loosening, PSEi 30 Deviates from the GDP’s Trajectory

Despite declining inflation rates and lower interest rates, Philippine consumers face tremendous obstacles, as shown by the 5.2% Q3 GDP growth. The PSEi 30 has mispriced the GDP's trajectory 

Reuters, November 7, 2024: The Philippine economy grew in the third quarter at its slowest annual pace in more than a year as severe weather disrupted government spending and dampened farm output, to strengthen the case for further policy easing. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 5.2% in the July-September on the year, government data showed on Thursday, below a Reuters poll forecast of 5.7%, for the most tepid rise since expansion of 4.3% in the second quarter of 2023.

I. The PSEi 30 Deviated from GDP’s Trajectory 

Stock markets are often considered discounting mechanisms for future economic activity. But are they? 

The PSEi 30’s impressive 13.4% return in Q3 2024—the best since 2010—was largely based on expectations that low interest rates would stimulate economic activity. 

However, despite the BSP’s rate cut in August 2024 and the tacit Marcos-nomics stimulus, Q3 GDP fell to its lowest level since the 4.3% recorded in Q2 2023.


Figure 1

Viewed in the context of the 15% year-over-year returns at the end of last Q3, the PSEi 30 has moved in the opposite direction to the GDP. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

Faced with this inconvenient reality, the PSEi plunged 2.32% this week, marking its third consecutive weekly decline and dipping below the 7,000 level—a 7.6% drop from the October 7th peak of 7,554.7. 

Interestingly, a local media outlet, still grappling with "Trump Derangement Syndrome," attributed this decline to Trump's electoral victory, suggesting that local stocks "price in the risks of a second Donald Trump presidency and an economic slowdown."  

If the "Trump trade" holds any truth, not only did US stocks soar to new records, but Asian equities also saw significant boosts this week. Among the region's 19 national benchmarks, 14 recorded positive returns with an average gain of 1.33%!

The exceptions were Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Sri Lanka. How does this fit into the narrative of the "Trump trade"?

Moreover, it's not just the PSEi 30 that should raise our concerns. Given that the financial sector has been a market leader, the financial index also warrants close attention.

The financial index posted a remarkable 23.4% year-on-year return at the end of Q3 2024, despite a notable deceleration in the sector's GDP since its peak in Q4 2023. The sector recorded an 8.8% real GDP growth in Q3, up from 8% in Q2, but lower than the 12% and 10.3% growth in Q4 2023 and Q1 2024, respectively. Bank-led financials have been a critical source of gains, as evidenced by their increasing share of the sector's GDP, despite the 2022-2023 rate hikes. (Figure 1, middle and lowest images)

Led by banks, the financial sector is the most interconnected with the local economy.  Its health is contingent or dependent upon the activities of its non-financial counterparties.

Alternatively, the sector’s outgrowth relies on political subsidies and is subject to diminishing returns.

Yet ultimately, this should reflect on its core operational fundamentals of lending and investing.

This week, the financial index fell by 2.9%.  As previously mentioned, trading activities in the PSE have been heavily skewed toward this sector.

In essence, the divergence between the PSEi 30 and GDP illustrates the significant market dislocations caused by the allure and regime of easy money—a quest for something for nothing.

II. The Treasury Markets as a Harbinger of the Economic Slowdown

Figure 2

As we have repeatedly pointed out, the Philippine Treasury markets have long been signaling an economic slowdown. The steep slope observed in Q1 has shifted to a bearish flattening and, subsequently, an inversion of the "belly," suggesting a further deceleration in inflation and a downshift in economic activity. (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

Experts have rarely discussed how the declining inflation reflects a downturn in demand. However, this scenario was evident across the entire Treasury curve in 2024, which explains the sharp plunge in T-bill rates and increased expectations that the BSP would cut rates. The BSP responded by implementing cuts in both August and October. 

III. Lessons from the 2024 US Elections: Markets Overwhelm Surveys

The 2024 U.S. elections provided a striking illustration of the comparative efficiency between markets and surveys. 

As pointed out above, markets are imperfect, but most of their vulnerabilities stem from underlying interventions that enhance them. However, when people place bets to prove their beliefs or convictions, they demonstrate "skin in the game""—a vested interest in success through real-world actions or "having a shared risk when taking a major decision."

In contrast, individuals can express opinions they do not genuinely believe. Numerous factors—such as assumptions, coverage, inputs, delivery, and measurement—contribute to errors in surveys. Worse still, surveys can be designed to achieve specific outcomes rather than accurately estimate reality.

Using the last week’s elections, the average betting odds from several prediction markets, led by the largest platform, Polymarket, indicated that Trump would win by a landslide going into the election. (Figure 2, lowest chart)

This was contrary to the average polls, which showed a razor-thin edge for Democratic candidate Kamala Harris.  Interestingly, similar to the 2016 elections, these polling discrepancies were exposed only after Trump’s victory. (Figure 2, middle table)

By sweeping all the battleground or swing states, Trump secured an electoral landslide winning 301 to 226 (according to The New York Times) and also became the first Republican to win the popular vote since George W. Bush in 2004.

This experience reaffirmed that markets have proven to be more reliable than surveys. And this reliability extends beyond elections to broader economic metrics, exposing vulnerabilities even in government data (such as inflation, labor statistics, and GDP).

Although designed to be objective and systematic—where hard and verifiable transactional records form part of the government’s comprehensive data—a significant portion still relies on self-reported or opinion-based data.

These components introduce the potential for bias and inaccuracies.

More importantly, as a political institution, government data is not only susceptible to errors but can also be engineered to advance the agenda of the incumbent government.

One way to countercheck the reliability of these data points is through the logic of entwined data—the idea that when multiple, independent data sets or sources are connected, discrepancies or patterns can be identified. By cross-referencing market data, surveys, and government statistics, we can better assess the accuracy of any single dataset. The entwinement of data from diverse sources can serve as a powerful validation tool, especially when inconsistencies or contradictions emerge. 

Thus, comprehensiveness, large scale, and systematic nature of government data collection do not make it foolproof from errors caused by either interventions or design. 

IV. GDP: A Tool for Political Narrative 

The establishment has promoted GDP as an estimation of economic well-being, but that’s only a segment of the entire spectrum.  

Unknown to the public, GDP is primarily a political tool.

In the 1660s, William Petty conceived GDP as a means to estimate war financing during the Second Anglo-Dutch War.

Under the influence of John Maynard Keynes, it was further used to promote wartime planning during World War II, which eventually evolved into—or became the foundation of—modern macroeconomic policy (Coyle, 2014).

Simon Kuznets, a pivotal figure in the development of modern GDP, famously cautioned that "economic welfare cannot be adequately measured unless the personal distribution of income is known… The welfare of a nation can, therefore, scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income as defined above." (bold added) [Wikipedia, GDP]

This statement underscores the limitations of GDP as a comprehensive measure of economic well-being.

In 1962, Kuznets further emphasized the need for clarity in economic growth metrics, stating: "Distinctions must be kept in mind between quantity and quality of growth, between costs and returns, and between the short and long run. Goals for more growth should specify more growth of what and for what."

This highlights his belief that economic indicators should reflect not just output but also the broader implications of growth on society.

Applied to the current developments…

The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), citing the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs as the source for their adaptation of the System of National Accounts (SNA), noted that "GDP is used to evaluate the overall performance of the economy and, hence, to judge the relative success or failure of economic policies pursued by governments." (bold added) [unstats, 2009]

The embedded assumption is that a factory GDP—or a top-down model—drives the economy.

But if that’s the case, then some questions arise: 

-Why doesn’t the Soviet Union still exist? 

-Why do black markets or informal economies emerge or thrive in heavily regulated economies? 

-Does the government dictate to Jollibee or SM who they should sell to? 

Yet, aside from gaining popular approval for election purposes, the contemporaneous implicit goal of GDP growth could be related to ease of accessing public savings to fund government expenditures.

V. The GDP Trend Line in Context: Insights from SWS Self-Poverty and Hunger Surveys

Still, there are many ways to "skin"—or analyze—the GDP "cat."

Although GDP is presented as a year-over-year (YoY) change predicated on a base effect, a very significant but largely ignored fact is its trendline. 

Figure 3

Fundamentally, despite all the media and establishment cheerleading—particularly with the emphasis on achieving an upper-middle-income economy—both nominal and real GDP have been performing below their pre-pandemic trendlines. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)

Worse, the Q3 GDP growth of 5.2% is sitting precariously on the support level of a subsidiary trendline, suggesting it may be testing this support. What happens if it breaks?

Additionally, what about the recent SWS Q3 2024 surveys exhibiting self-poverty ratings at 2008 highs, and hunger incidence reaching its second highest level since September 2020, during the pandemic recession? (see our previous discussion here)

Has the SWS survey been validated?

As a side note, the left-leaning OCTA Research group's Q3 survey results were starkly different from those of the SWS.

Have the authorities made a partial concession to the SWS findings by revising down the GDP growth estimates?

As a reminder, polls or surveys—whether conducted by the private sector or the government—are opinion-based or self-reported data and are inherently prone to errors. 

VI. Q3’s GDP Story: Consumer Spending Rebounds on Declining Inflation and Lower Rates 

GDP is not just about the numbers; it has been crafted to tell a story. 

Essentially, it follows the mainstream’s logic: slowing inflation and lower interest rates would boost consumption and, consequently, GDP. 

Well, that is how the Q3 5.2% GDP played out.  

From the expenditure side of GDP, real household consumption increased from 4.7% in Q2 to 5.1% in Q3, thereby boosting its share from 67.7% to 72.8%. (Figure 3, middle image) 

In contrast, government spending on GDP dropped significantly, from 11.9% in Q2 to 5% in Q3, reducing its share from 17% to 14.7% during the same period. 

Meanwhile, due a slump in government activities, construction GDP growth nearly halved from 16.2% to 8.9%, diminishing its share from 19.4% to 14.1%. Government construction GDP tumbled from 21.7% to 3.7%. 

Thanks to increases in machinery, transport, and miscellaneous equipment, durable equipment GDP surged from a contraction of 4.5% in Q2 to growth of 8.1% in Q3. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Nevertheless, exports plummeted from 4.2% in Q2 to a shrinkage of 1% in Q3, while imports increased from 5.3% to 6.4%. The widened gap in favor of imports—net exports—contributed to the slowdown of GDP. 

This summarizes the expenditure-based GDP analysis.

VII. Consumers Struggle Amid Rising Employment and Vigorous Bank Credit Expansion

Circling back to consumers: considering that the Philippine economy has allegedly reached near-record employment levels (close to full employment), why does consumer per capita growth continue to struggle?


Figure 4
 

The employment rate hit 96.3% in September, yet Q3 household per capita growth increased only slightly, from 3.8% to 4.2%—the third lowest growth rate since Q2 2021. (Figure 4, topmost window)

Additionally, what explains the consumers' ongoing challenges in light of Universal-commercial bank lending, which reached a record high in nominal terms and grew by 11.33% in Q3—the highest rate since Q4 2022? This growth was notably powered by household credit, which also surged by 23.44%, although it was down from its peak of 25.4% in Q1 2024. (Figure 4, middle graph)

On a related note, even though the money supply (M3) hit a record of Php 17.58 trillion in Q3, its growth rate of 5.4% was the lowest since Q3 2022.

Despite the crescendoing systemic leverage (public debt plus bank credit expansion), which grew by 11.4%—the highest since Q4 2024—to a record Php 27.97 trillion, why has the money supply been trending downward?

Moreover, as evidence of the redistribution effects of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) policies favoring banks amidst the thrust towards financialization, various money supply metrics (M1, M2, and M3) relative to GDP remain at pre-pandemic levels in Q3 2024, despite having clawed back some gains from the 2021 milestone. (Figure 4, lowest chart)

Despite all this, the persistent challenges of consumers continue.

Yet, this raises a crucial point: the GDP appears increasingly dependent on money supply growth and credit expansion.

VIII. Lethargic Q3 2024 Sales of Wilcon and Robinsons Retail Challenge the Consumer Rebound Narrative

There’s more.

Figure 5

In the face of a slow recovery in consumption, retail GDP dropped from 5.8% in Q2 to 5.2% in Q3 2024. (Figure 5, topmost image)

Oddly, bank lending to the sector has been soaring; it was up 12% in September from 9.3% last June.

Where is the money being borrowed by the sector being spent?

Meanwhile, Household GDP figures might be inflated.

Two major retail chains operating in different sectors have reported stagnation in topline performance.

Despite expanding its stores by 12% year-over-year (YoY), the largest downstream real estate consumer chain, Wilcon Depot [PSE: WLCON], experienced a 3.35% YoY contraction in sales and a 4.35% decline quarter-over-quarter (QoQ). (Figure 5, middle graph)

The company's worsening sales conditions have partially reflected the plunge in the sector’s Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Similarly, Robinsons Retail [PSE: RRHI], one of the largest multi-format retailers, reported another lethargic topline performance. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

In Q3, the firm’s sales increased by 3.13%, primarily driven by its food segment (supermarkets and convenience stores), which grew by 4.8%, along with drug stores, which increased by 9%. 

However, three of its other five segments—including department stores, DIY, and specialty—suffered sales contractions. 

Taking into account that the sales from these two retail chains constitute a portion of nominal GDP, applying the GDP deflator would indicate a deeper decline in WLCON's sales and flat sales growth for RRHI. 

Despite the slowdown in inflation and the rapid growth in consumer bank borrowings, consumer spending has gravitated toward essentials (food and drugs) while reducing purchases of non-essentials. 

This observation lends credence to the recent Social Weather Stations (SWS) self-poverty ratings. 

So far, despite loose financial conditions, the performance of these two retail chains contradicts the notion embedded in GDP that consumers have partly opened their wallets in Q3. 

For a clearer picture of consumer health, we await the financial reports of the largest retail chain, SM, and other major goods and food retail chains. 

Imagine the potential impact of real tightening conditions on consumer spending and GDP! 

IX. Public Spending Segment of the Marcos-nomics Stimulus: Are Authorities Pulling Back? 

Recent GDP data suggests a slowdown in public spending, but a closer look reveals a different narrative. 

While overall public spending growth has declined, sectors heavily influenced by the government are seeing gains. 

Specifically, public administration and defense GDP rose from 1.8% in Q2 to 3.7% in Q3. Similarly, sectors with significant government involvement, such as education and health, reported growths from 1.9% to 2.6% and 9.4% to 11.9%, respectively. 

Despite the appearance of a slowdown, the bureaucracy and government-exposed sectors continued to show growth. 

That’s not all.


Figure 6

According to the Bureau of Treasury’s cash operations report, the Q3 expenditure-to-GDP ratio remains at a pandemic-level rate of 24%. 

Additionally, although tax revenues improved, the Q3 deficit-to-GDP increased from 5.3% to 5.7%, again reflecting pandemic-level deficits. 

It’s essential to note that the treasury data and the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) GDP figures—which include their calculation of public spending—represent an apples-to-oranges comparison. 

However, we can still glean insights from a historical perspective of the Treasury’s activities. 

So, why do current data sets indicate sustained increases despite the perceived temperance in government spending? 

While authorities may embellish their deficit data, the consequences are likely to manifest elsewhere. 

Aside from the counterparties that provide financing via debt, it will manifest in the trade balance and eventually impact the private economy—via consumers: the crowding-out effect. 

Q3 Public debt stands at 61.3% of the sum of the last 4 quarters (Q4 2023 to Q3 2024) 

Thus, it’s not surprising that Q3’s fiscal deficit coincided with a notable spike in the trade deficit, which ranks as the fourth highest on record. 

The existence of "twin deficits" points to excessive spending and reveals a historic savings-investment gap that necessitates record borrowing through debt issuance and central bank interventions. 

Adding to this context, the massive RRR cut and BSP’s second round cut of 25 basis points all took effect this October or in the fourth quarter.

We can also expect the government to aim to accomplish its end-of-year spending targets in December, adding to this period’s fiscal activity.

This implies that the full impact of the 2024 "Marcos-nomics" stimulus implemented in Q4 could result in a short-term GDP boost but at a substantial cost to the private sector economy. 

___

references

Steven Landefeld and Robert P. Parker, Preview of the Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts: BEA’s New Featured Measures of Output and Prices, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1995

Diana Coyle, Warfare and the Invention of GDP, the Globalist, April 6, 2014 

Wikipedia, Gross Domestic Product, Limitations at introduction 

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, System of National Accounts 2008, 2009, p. 4-5 https://unstats.un.org/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sunday, November 03, 2024

Fear the ‟Trump Trade‟ or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us


An election is a moral horror, as bad as a battle except for blood; a mud bath for every soul concerned in it—George Bernard Shaw

In this issue

Fear the ‟Trump Trade‟ or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us

I. US Election Narrative: Fear the Trump Trade!

II. Market Chaos Erupts after Fed’s September Rate Cut

III. Global Economic War and the Inflation Scorecard: Trump versus Biden-Harris; Trump’s Tariffs as Negotiation Card

IV. Emerging Market and ASEAN Stocks, the PSEi 30 Hit a Record High in Trump’s Term, Philippine Peso Flourished Under Trump!

V. The Biden-Harris Legacy of "Proxy Wars"

VI. Trends in Motion Tend to Stay in Motion: World War III’s Multifaceted Aspects

VII. Global Kinetic Warfare and the Cold War as Products of the Fed’s and Global Central Bank’s Easy Money Regime

VIII. Conclusion: Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon Us 

Fear the Trump Trade or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us 

Is the "Trump Trade" responsible for recent market convulsions, or does this represent a pushback against the Fed’s actions? Why political-economic trends in motion tend to stay in motion. 

I. US Election Narrative: Fear the Trump Trade!

Trump's Rising Election Odds Sends Emerging Markets Into Tailspin, Causes Biggest Stock Drop In 10 Months (Yahoo, October 27) 

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) might have to do more to support the Philippine economy if former US President Donald Trump returns to power and starts a global trade war, which can hurt the entire world and, in turn, dim local growth prospects. (Inquirer.net, October 28, 2024) 

THE RETURN of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency could cause Asian currencies such as the Philippine peso to weaken, analysts said. (Businessworld, October 29, 2024) 

At first glance, it may seem that the following headlines or excerpts were conveyed for Halloween. 

Then, I realized that the U.S. elections are coming up this week. 

Mainstream media has painted an impression that the recent setbacks in the marketplace mean that a Trump win/presidency, or the "Trump Trade," could be detrimental to the markets. 

Let us examine what led to this perspective. 

In October, the Bloomberg spot U.S. dollar index surged by nearly 3% compared to the previous month. The S&P 500 slipped by 0.99%, the iShares MSCI Emerging Market ETF (EEM) dived by 3.07%, and the Global X FTSE ASEAN ETF (ASEA) tanked by 3.9%. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield surged by 48 basis points (12.7%). 

Meanwhile, at home, the Philippine peso plunged by 3.6%, and the PSEi 30 plummeted by 1.78%. 

The prevailing sentiment in the speculative marketplace has shifted from excessive optimism to risk aversion.

Who else to blame but the leading contender in the prediction markets, Trump!

II. Market Chaos Erupts after Fed’s September Rate Cut 

But does this widely accepted perception accurately reflect causation, or is it intended to shift the Overton Window in favor of the opposing contender, Kamala Harris?

Figure 1 

The rising 10-year yield actually started just after the US Federal Reserve initiated its 50-basis-point rate cut on September 18th. (Figure 1, topmost chart)

It is rare to witness such a combination of powerful forces ripple through other market indicators.

Figure 2

Rising Treasury yields have been accompanied by an appreciating U.S. dollar index, which has also contributed to increased volatility in the bond market (MOVE Index) and volatility premiums across asset markets—including equities, oil, and foreign exchange—as well as a spike in U.S. Credit Default Swaps (CDS). (Figure 1, middle and lower graphs, Figure 2 topmost and lower images)

Figure 3

This dynamic coincided with a spike in the Economic Surprise Index and gold's widening outperformance against the TLT iShares 20-Year U.S. Treasury bond prices. (Figure 3, middle topmost and middle visuals) 

Incredible. 

The most striking indicator of the impact of the Fed's rate-cutting cycle that began in September is that it occurred under the loosest financial conditions since at least December 2022. (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

In other words, global financial markets have significantly pushed back against the Fed’s easing policy by effectively re-tightening conditions! 

Of course, one could interpret this as "buy the rumor, sell the news." 

Still, other factors are at play—such as unrestrained public spending, surging debt levels, escalating debt servicing costs, geopolitics and more!

Nevertheless, resonating with the "Overton Window" during the pandemic in support of lockdowns and vaccines, the Gramsci-cult elite-controlled media shifted the rhetoric to blame Trump’s predilection for tariffs.

III. Global Economic War and the Inflation Scorecard: Trump versus Biden-Harris; Trump’s Tariffs as Negotiation Card 

First and foremost, yes, while it is true that global trade restrictions did rise in during Trump 1.0 (2017-2021) regime, his successors, the Biden-Harris tandem, pushed for MORE trade barriers, which hit a record high in at least 2022! 

Figure 4

As the IMF chart reveals, the global economic conflict spans both parties, with both candidates appearing inclined toward de-globalization. 

(Note this shouldn’t be seen in a simplistic lens but related to geopolitical developments) 

Second, financial easing amidst the loosest monetary conditions translates to a potential comeback of inflation, which aligns with the perspective that Trump’s trade war results in higher inflation. 

However, that shouldn’t hold water; inflation under Trump’s administration was milder than the inflation epidemic during the Biden-Harris administration. 

Consequently, with higher inflation came higher interest rates as well. 

Third, Trump’s push for tariffs represents a carryover from his 2016 campaign trail. 

He used tariffs as leverage for negotiation but eased up on strict currency regulations, as noted in this Yahoo article. 

Trump has likened his tariff plan to a new "ring around the collar" of the US, with tariffs often described not as part of negotiations but with those high duties as an end goal in themselves to protect US industry… 

He promised during that campaign to impose tariffsrenegotiate NAFTA, and withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. "Promise kept," PolitiFact said of all three. 

Trump also took action on a fourth promise to declare China a currency manipulator but ended up compromising, according to the group. 

IV. Emerging Market and ASEAN Stocks, the PSEi 30 Hit a Record High in Trump’s Term, Philippine Peso Flourished Under Trump!

Figure 5

Fourth, stock markets haven’t been exactly hostile to Trump.

The ASEAN ETF (ASEA) reached an all-time high in 2018 or during the early phase of his administration, and the Emerging Markets ETF (EEM) also hit a milestone that year and also surged to a fresh record toward the close of Trump’s term. Both markets, however, eventually succumbed to the pandemic recession.

Similarly, the Philippine PSEi 30 hit a significant peak in January 2018, also coinciding with Trump’s administration.

On the currency front, the Philippine peso rallied from October 2018 to the end of 2021.

In fact, contrary to contemporary analysis, the USDPHP fell by 3.7% from January 20, 2017, to January 20, 2021 (Trump’s tenure).

In contrast, under the Biden-Harris administration, the USDPHP has increased by an astounding 21% from January 20, 2021, to the present (October 31, 2024)!

While past performance does not guarantee future outcomes, the scorecard between the contending parties shows a stark difference in the accuracy of the current predominating narratives. 

In a word, propaganda. 

Nota Bene: Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Our purpose is to highlight inaccuracies in media claims. We don’t endorse any candidates. 

V. The Biden-Harris Legacy of "Proxy Wars"

Fifth, the world is on the brink of, or already embroiled in, a form of World War III, fought across multiple spheres. 

The U.S. suffered a humiliating defeat in the 20-year Afghanistan War, ultimately withdrawing in the face of a relentless war of attrition led by the Taliban’s guerilla tactics. Both the Trump and Biden administrations negotiated withdrawal terms, but the Biden-Harris administration oversaw a controversial chaotic exit in August 2021. 

That aside, a series of conflicts has marked the Biden-Harris administration’s legacy. 

The kinetic conflict began with the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, spread to the Israel-Palestine/Hamas war in 2023, and has since escalated to include confrontations involving Israel-Hezbollah or the "Third Lebanon War," and even the precursory phase of Israel-Iran Conflict in 2024. 

Simultaneously, following Obama’s failed "Pivot to Asia," geopolitical tensions have been mounting in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, Central Asia, and other parts of the world. 

Notably, these ongoing and emerging conflicts are interconnected.

For example, the U.S. has been supplying not only aid but also arms to its allies to counter hegemonic rivals.


Figure 6

Aside from supplying 70% of conventional weapons, U.S. military aid/grants to Israel soared to all-time highs in 2024! (Figure 6, topmost chart)

That is to say, the current conflicts represent "proxy wars" where the U.S. led NATO forces engage indirectly to pursue hegemonic objectives.

VI. Trends in Motion Tend to Stay in Motion: World War III’s Multifaceted Aspects

The Global Warfare has also entered the economic and financial spheres—seen in the weaponization of the U.S. dollar through asset confiscations targeting so-called "axis of evil" nations, and in the reinforcement of a modern-day "Iron Curtain" marked by significant restrictions on trade, investments, capital flows, and social mobility.

Mounting trade imbalances, which helped fuel the rise in trade barriers from the Trump administration to Biden-Harris, have also laid the groundwork for today’s outbreak of kinetic conflicts.

Geopolitical tensions have surfaced as a growing cold war in other regions as well.

This hegemonic competition to expand sphere of influences has percolated to Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific, and the Global South (BRICs), some of which channeled through mercenary or gang wars and local civil wars. (Dr. Malmgren, 2024)

Ironically, four of the five ASEAN majors, specifically, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam recently signed up for the BRICs membership.

The implicit cold war has also extended into previously uncharted areas: underwater territories, space, the Arctic, the Pacific, mineral resources (like rare earth elements), and technological domains such as DNA research, cyberspace, and microchips (Malmgren, 2023).

The point is that these evolving conflicts underscore the interconnectedness of U.S. foreign and domestic policy.

Given the powerful forces behind this trajectory or the "deep state"—including the Military-Industrial Complex, the National Security State, Straussian neoconservatives promoting the "Wolfowitz Doctrine," the energy industrial complex, Big Tech, and Wall Street—it is unlikely these developments will cease, whether under a Trump 2.0 administration or (Biden carryover through) a Harris regime.

Put simply, while media narratives may further lobotomize or impair the public’s critical thinking, potentially deepening societal division, a meaningful change in the U.S. and global sociopolitical and economic landscape remains unlikely if elections continue to focus on what I call as "personality-based politics."

As investor-philosopher Doug Casey rightly observed, "Trends in motion tend to stay in motion until they reach a crisis."

VII. Global Kinetic Warfare and the Cold War as Products of the Fed’s and Global Central Bank’s Easy Money Regime

Lastly, the public tends to overlook that current trends are merely symptoms of deeper issues or mounting disorders stemming from the decadent U.S. dollar standard.

As investor Doug Noland astutely wrote 

Bubbles are mechanisms of wealth redistribution and destruction – with detrimental consequences for social and geopolitical stability. Boom periods engender perceptions of an expanding global pie. Cooperation, integration, and alliances are viewed as mutually beneficial. But late in the cycle, perceptions shift. Many see the pie stagnant or shrinking. A zero-sum game mentality dominates. Insecurity, animosity, disintegration, fraught alliances, and conflict take hold. It bears repeating: Things turn crazy at the end of cycles. (bold mine) [Noland, 2024] 

Easy money has long fueled, or been instrumental in financing, the global war machine, leading to today's bellicose conditions.

Easy money has also powered the growth of big government and contributed to economic bubbles and their eventual backlash, as evidenced by China’s unparalleled panicked bailout policies to prevent a confidence crisis from imploding. 

The push for easy money is likely to persist, whether under a Trump 2.0 or a Harris administration. 

As Professor William Anderson noted, 

The unhappy truth is that both platforms will need the Federal Reserve System to expand its easy money policies, despite the massive damage the Fed has already done by bringing back inflation. While Harris claims to defer to the “experts” at the Fed, Trump wants the president to have more power to set interest rates. Obviously, neither candidate is acknowledging the economically perilous situation in which the government ramps up spending, which distorts the markets, and then depends upon the Fed to monetize the resulting federal deficits. As the debt grows and the economy becomes progressively less responsive to financial stimulus, the threat of stagflation grows. The present path of government borrowing and spending all but guarantees this outcome, and the candidates have neither the political will nor the economic understanding to do what needs to be done. (Anderson, 2024) 

U.S. debt is fast approaching $36 trillion, while global debt reached $315 trillion in Q2 2024 and counting. (Figure 6, middle and lower charts) 

"Trends in motion tend to stay in motion until they reach a crisis."

VIII. Conclusion: Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon Us 

While the "Trump trade" provides a convenient pretext for the current tremors in the global financial market, this narrative relies on inaccurate premises and misleading speculative claims that are unsupported by empirical evidence. Instead, these assertions aim to sway the voting audience ahead of this week’s elections. 

In contrast, the current financial market convulsions reflect a significant pushback against the Fed’s and global central banks’ prolonged easy-money policies. As investor Louis Gave of Gavekal recently noted, "Zero rates were a historical aberration that need not be repeated." 

Needless to say, regardless of who wins the U.S. presidency, political agendas will continue to advocate for easy money and various forms of social entropy and conflict. 

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as free lunch forever. 

Although trends in motion tend to stay in motion, the era of the bond vigilantes is upon us 

Things have been turning a whole lot crazy. 

___

References 

Yahoo Finance, What Trump promised in 2016 on tariffs. And what he delivered (a lot). October 28, 2024, 

Dr. Pippa Malmgren The Cold War in Hot Places, March 12, 2024 

Dr. Pippa Malmgren WWIII: Winning the Peace, October 28, 2023 drpippa.substack.com 

Doug Noland, Vigilantes Mobilizing, Credit Bubble Bulletin, November 1,2024 

William L. Anderson  The Great Retreat: How Trump and Harris Are Looking Backward, August 30, 2024 Mises.org 

Louis-Vincent Gave, Behind The Bond Sell-Off, Evergreen Gavekal October 31, 2024