Monetary pumping and government spending cannot remove the dependence of demand on the production of goods. On the contrary, loose fiscal and monetary policies impoverish real wealth generators and reduce their ability to produce goods and services, thus weakening effective demand for other goods—Dr. Frank Shostak
In this issue
January 2025 Surplus Masks Rising Fiscal Fragility: Slowing Revenues, Soaring Debt Burden
I. The Mirage of Fiscal Prudence: A Closer Look at January’s Surplus
II. January’s Surplus: A Closer Look, Changes in VAT Reporting
Effective 2023
III. Diminishing Returns? Slowing Revenue Growth Amid Record
Bank Credit Expansion
IV. The VAT Effect, Public Spending Trends and Breaching
the Budget: A Shift in Political Power
V. Fiscal Challenges Deepen as Interest Payments Soar and
Crowds Out Public Allocation
VI. January’s Record Cash Spike
VII. Rising Public Debt, Increasing FX Financing and Mounting
Pressure on the Philippine Peso
VIII. Banks and the BSP as Fiscal Lifelines
IX. Symptoms of Crowding Out: Weak Demand and Slowing GDP
X. Conclusion: Mounting Fragility Beneath Sanguine Statistical Benchmarks
January Surplus Masks Rising Fiscal Fragility: Slowing Revenues, Soaring Debt Burden
VAT reporting changes drove January 2025’s surplus, despite slowing revenue growth, record-high interest payments, and ballooning public debt—exposing growing fiscal vulnerabilities.
I. The Mirage of Fiscal Prudence: A Closer Look at January’s Surplus
Businessworld, March 21, 2025: "FINANCE Secretary Ralph G. Recto said the budget surplus recorded in January is unlikely to continue in the following months. Asked if the surplus will be sustained in the runup to the elections, Mr. Recto told BusinessWorld: “No. Our deficit target this year is 5.3% of the GDP (gross domestic product).”"
It’s remarkable how media portrays government fiscal management as though it’s a model of efficiency and foresight.
This supposedly impartial business outlet echoes the optimism with little scrutiny, displaying a certain undue enthusiasm in their narrative.
-The “manageable” budget? Public outlays continue to grow, often exceeding the allocations set by Congress.
-Revenues? These are presented as if they align seamlessly with the government’s projections—reality, it seems, is expected to comply.
-Changes to VAT reporting? The January surplus was largely a result of this adjustment that took effect in 2023. As a media outlet, they should have recognized this. Instead, the omission conveniently aligns with their theme of unquestioning deference.
-And the political context of deficit spending? It’s treated as a non-issue, as though public resources are always managed with the utmost prudence and altruism. Yet, this framing sidesteps how deficit spending often fuels projects with short-term appeal but long-term consequences.
Underlying all this is the assumption that the government is all-knowing, omnipotent, and in perfect command of the economy—a notion more fictional than factual.
II. January’s Surplus: A Closer Look, Changes in VAT Reporting Effective 2023
Let us dive into the details.
Back in September, we noted: "So, there you have it: The rescheduling of VAT declarations from monthly to quarterly has magnified revenues and "narrowed" deficits at the "close" of each taxable quarter." (Prudent Investor, 2024)
The changes in VAT reporting took effect on January 1, 2023.
Though expenditures grew by 19.45%, outpacing revenues’ 10.75% increase, in peso terms, January 2025 revenues exceeded outlays, leading to the month’s surplus.
Revenues of Php 467.15 billion marked the third-largest monthly total in pesos, following April and October 2024.
Figure 1Meanwhile, expenditures were the smallest monthly amount since February 2024. Nevertheless, the long-term spending and revenue trends remain intact so far. (Figure 1, upper window)
III. Diminishing Returns? Slowing Revenue Growth Amid Record Bank Credit Expansion
However, despite the revenue outperformance—driven by tax collections—growth rates materially declined in January 2025. Total tax and Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) collection growth slowed from 25.03% and 31.35% in 2024 to 13.6% and 15.13% in 2025, respectively. (Figure 1, lower graph)
On the other hand, Bureau of Customs (BoC) collections jumped from 3.98% to 7.98% in 2025. Since BIR accounted for 81.2% of the total, tax revenues largely reflected its growth rate.
Figure 2
And this slowdown in revenue growth is occurring alongside record-breaking bank credit expansion! Universal commercial banks reported a 13.3% surge in bank lending growth—the highest rate since December 2020—reaching Php 12.7 trillion in January, slightly below December 2024's record. (Figure 2, upper image)
In a nutshell, the decelerating revenue growth reflects the diminishing returns of the Marcos-nomics fiscal stimulus.
IV. The VAT Effect, Public Spending Trends and Breaching the Budget: A Shift in Political Power
The quarterly shift in VAT reporting resulted in a Php 68.4 billion surplus, the third largest after January 2024 and April 2019. (Figure 2, lower chart)
Although public spending may have appeared subdued in January, the government has an enacted 2025 budget of Php 6.326 trillion, averaging Php 527.2 billion monthly.
Figure 3
Yet, the Executive branch has hardly been frugal—it has consistently outspent legislated allocations since 2016! (Figure 3, upper visual)
If spending, which they have the power to control, cannot be managed, then revenues—being dependent on spontaneous economic and financial interactions—are even less controllable.
This persistent spending overreach signals an implicit yet pivotal shift in the distribution of political power. As we noted earlier: "More importantly, this repeated breach of the "enacted budget" signals a growing shift of fiscal power from Congress to the executive branch." (Prudent Investor, March 2025)
This suggests that the monthly average of Php 527 billion represents a floor! We are likely to see months with Php 600-700 billion spending.
V. Fiscal Challenges Deepen as Interest Payments Soar and Crowds Out Public Allocation
January 2025 interest payments (IP) soared to a record Php 104.4 billion, pushing their share of total expenditures to 26.2%—a peak last seen in 2009! (Figure 3, lower diagram)
Authorities attributed this to a "shift in coupon payment timing due to the issuance strategy of multiple re-offerings of treasury bonds," as well as "an earlier servicing of a Global Bond with a February 1 coupon date falling on a weekend."
Nonetheless, the programmed budget for interest payments in 2025 is Php 848 billion. January’s interest payment equates to 12% of this total 2025 allocation for interest payments, while 26.2% represents its share of January’s total expenditures.
Interest payments and overall debt servicing data in the coming months will shed light on the true conditions.
Once again, as we noted earlier: "Government spending will increasingly be diverted toward debt payments or rising debt service costs constrain fiscal flexibility, leaving fewer resources for essential public investments" (Prudent Investor, March 2025)
VI. January’s Record Cash Spike
Figure 4
Another striking figure in the government’s cash operations report was the January cash balance surplus, which soared to an all-time high of Php 1.23 trillion, despite reported financing of only Php 211 billion. (Figure 4, topmost pane)
The Bureau of Treasury (BoTr) reported cash flow deficits of Php 104 billion, Php 261 billion, and Php 370.04 billion in the last three months of 2024, totaling Php 735 billion. The BoTr offered no explanation for this discrepancy. One plausible reason could be the USD 3.3 billion ROP Global bond issuance.
VII. Rising Public Debt, Increasing FX Financing and Mounting Pressure on the Philippine Peso
During the same period, public debt rose by Php 261.5 billion month-on-month (MoM) or Php 1.134 trillion year-on-year (YoY) to a record Php 16.313 trillion in January. (Figure 4, middle graph)
Authorities are programmed to borrow Php 2.545 trillion in 2025, slightly down from Php 2.57 trillion in 2024.
Yet, outpacing domestic debt growth of 10.3%, external borrowings rose 13% in January, with their share of the total reaching 32.05%—nearly matching November’s 32.13% and reverting to 2020 levels. (Figure 4, lower image)
Since 2020, reliance on foreign exchange (FX) borrowings has steadily increased.
Greater dependence on FX financing raises internal pressure for the Philippine peso to devalue. As we have previously explained, the widening credit-financed savings-investment gap (SIG)—a key element of the structural economic model pursued by authorities—has resulted in persistent 'twin deficits,' which has been magnified by the pandemic era.
Consequently, it is unsurprising that the upper limit of the USD-PHP ‘soft peg’ continues to be tested by mounting liabilities. The government is increasingly resorting to Hyman Minsky’s "Ponzi Finance"—as organic fund flows decline, reliance on debt refinancing to manage the balance sheet deepens.
VIII. Banks and the BSP
as Fiscal Lifelines
Figure 5
Banks remain a primary source of government financing, with Net Claims on Central Government (NCoCG) up 7.42% YoY to Php 5.409 trillion, though slightly down from December’s all-time high of Php 5.541 trillion. (Figure 5, upper window)
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is another source. January’s spending decline mirrored the BSP’s NCoCG, which rose 14.54% YoY to Php 390.3 billion but fell 34% MoM from December’s Php 590 billion. The fluctuations in BSP’s NCoCG have closely tracked public spending, with correlations tightening since its historic rescue of the banking system. (Figure 5, lower graph)
IX. Symptoms of Crowding Out: Weak Demand and Slowing GDP
Figure 6
Weak demand, potentially exacerbated by lower public spending in January, contributed to the decline in Core CPI, with non-food and energy inflation falling from 2.6% in January to 2.4% in February 2025. (Figure 6, upper diagram)
It is worth reiterating that record public spending in Q4 2024 accompanied just 5.2% GDP growth—evidence of the crowding-out syndrome in action. (Figure 6, lower chart)
X. Conclusion: Mounting Fragility Beneath Sanguine Statistical Benchmarks
The January 2025 surplus is a fleeting anomaly rather than a sign of sustainable fiscal health. The underlying trends—slowing revenue growth, surging debt servicing costs, and increasing reliance on external borrowings—paint a concerning picture of fiscal vulnerabilities, with long-term consequences for economic stability and growth.
Given that politics often relies on path-dependent economic policies, meaningful reforms are unlikely to occur until they are forced upon the government by market pressures.
The BSP’s easing cycle, characterized by cuts in interest rates and the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR), further underscores this dynamic. These measures effectively accommodate the government’s borrowing-and-spending cycle, exacerbating fiscal imbalances and delaying necessary structural reforms.
Or, the establishment may continue to tout the supposed capabilities of the government, but ultimately, the law of diminishing returns will expose the inherent fragility of the political economy. This will likely culminate in a blowout of the twin deficits, a surge in public debt, a sharp devaluation of the Philippine peso, and a spike in inflation, reinforcing the third wave of this cycle—heightening risks of a financial crisis.
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References
Prudent Investor Newsletters, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing, September 1, 2024
Prudent Investor Newsletters, 2024’s Savings-Investment
Gap Reaches Second-Widest Level as Fiscal Deficit Shrinks on Non-Tax Windfalls,
March 9, 2025