Showing posts with label Triffin Dilemma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Triffin Dilemma. Show all posts

Monday, February 10, 2014

Phisix: Global Financial Volatility Intensifies

Fourth Touchdown into the Bear Market Zone

The Philippine equity benchmark, the Phisix touched the bear market zone for the FOURTH time since June 2013 this week. This comes amidst two successive weeks of heavy foreign selling where net foreign sales accounted for about 11.18% (Php 6.475 billion) of the two week volume of Php 57.9 billion. 

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However, in contrast to previous week, the Phisix resonated on the steep volatility of the US stock markets.

Monday’s over 2% slump by US stock markets rippled through Asian stock markets the following day. Japan’s Nikkei 225 suffered a quasi-collapse of 4.18% (-11.23% year-to-date), Hong Kong’s Hang Seng tumbled 2.98% (-7.16% ytd) while the Phisix tanked by 2.15%[1] (+2.06% ytd).

By the end of the week as US markets pole-vaulted to recover all of Monday’s losses to even close the week higher, e.g. S&P 500 +.81% (-2.78% ytd), where risk OFF abruptly morphed into risk ON.

Asian markets rallied sharply to shave off Monday’s losses. For instance the Nikkei posted a weekly 3.03% loss, the Hang Seng -1.81% and the Phisix -.5%. Indonesia and Thailand’s equity benchmarks the JKSE and the SETI even registered sharp gains 1.08% and 1.74% respectively.

Amazingly, even Singapore’s stock market broke below the September 2013 lows early this week, but like the Phisix, the STI rallied furiously by the week’s close.

The purpose of my reference to Singapore has been to demonstrate that financial stress hasn’t been limited to emerging markets but has begun to impact even developed economies.

This seems part of the periphery-to core transmission mechanism in motion.

And this also validates my repeated observations on the predominating character of stock market activities[2].
We should expect sharp volatility in the global financial markets (stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies) in the coming sessions. The volatility may likely be in both directions but with a downside bias.
Such volatility has hardly been manifestations of a bullish backdrop. Instead they seem like a varied strain of the 1994-1997 episode, which are reflections of a “toppish” or increasingly high risks financial markets.

Yet today’s degree of volatility has been muted relative to pre-Asian crisis landscape where then the Phisix endured a series of vertiginous rollercoaster swings marked by four sharp sell offs (3 of which had been bear market strikes) that had been accompanied by very ferocious denial rallies for two years (1994-1995). 

The rollercoaster eventually transitioned into a bull trap. In 1996 to early 1997 the Phisix went on to recover the highs of 1994 (56% gain). But like all bull traps, the Phisix eventually succumbed to a full bear market cycle where the local benchmark hemorrhaged nearly 70% from the 1997 highs[3]

The fourth attempt by the Phisix last week to reach the bear market territory is a reminder of how treacherous today’s markets operate on.

Phisix and US Treasuries: the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Yet for many of those afflicted by the Aldous Huxley “facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored” syndrome they cling on to spurious logic in support of the bullish backdrop whose foundations are presently being eroded by signs of sustained rise in interest rates.

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For instance many fail to see of the relationship between yields of 10 US treasury notes with the actions of the Phisix. The overlapped charts of the Phisix (PSEC) and 10 year UST yields (TNX) have shown of emerging correlations since May 2013.

Notice that each of the Phisix ‘lower’ peaks (blue ellipses) comes in the face of either low or bottom in UST yields. And that for each time the UST yield reach an interim apex (red ellipses) the Phisix bottoms. Put differently when UST yields begin to rise, this puts selling pressure on the Phisix and vice versa.

Yet if the current correlations persist then this implies that for the Phisix to have a sustainable upside move, US bonds should continue to rally or that yields should be in a falling streak. This should be conditional to US stocks trading either sideways or to the upside and NOT on the downside.

The fantastic two day rally in the US stock markets (of more than 2%) last Thursday and Friday provides us some clues.

Excess volatility has pervaded into the US bond markets too. Monday’s US stock market selloff incited a fierce rally in US bonds (where yields collapsed). US bonds fell (yields rose) from Tuesday until Thursday, in response to Monday’s sharp rally (falling yields). The yield spike in Wednesday was followed thru in Thursday. By Friday, much of Thursday’s yield gains had been reduced. 10 year USTs ended the week very little change despite the wild pendulum swings over the week.

What activities influenced both the actions of the stock and bond markets? The gains of US stocks and rising UST yields came amidst anticipation of a strong jobs report for Friday.

At the same time, ECB’s Mario Draghi floated a “teaser” for the Wall Streets spanning the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The ECB reportedly would act by March “to counter low inflation”, this partly by suspending sterilization or “ending the absorption of crisis-era bond purchases” in order to flood Europe’s system with more liquidity[4].

Also the US government reported that trade deficit widened as exports fell[5].

[As a side note, I have been saying[6] the reason why the Fed has resorted reluctantly to the “taper” has been because of the looming shortages of debt papers issued by the US government due to improving twin deficits in both budget and trade. Wider trade deficit means more leeway for the Fed to cease with “tapering”]

So while the anticipation of good news in the job markets resulted to higher yields, the gains appear to have been capped by the signalling of monetary easing from the proposed unsterilized injections by the ECB and from a wider US trade deficit.

Thus the scent of monetary heroin sent stocks into a Risk ON “high” mood.

Friday confirmed Wall Street’s addiction to monetary heroin. Aside from increases in earnings of several companies, the disappointing job report heightened the speculations for monetary easing, as this news report implies, the Fed has been “scrutinizing employment data to determine the timing and pace of cuts to stimulus”[7] So the “bad news is good news” has sent stocks into another overdrive session as bond yields fell.

But there is a big hole with the concept of a sustained decline of yields of USTs considering the record borrowing in the bond market which has now spilled over to banking system.

For instance fund withdrawal from emerging markets, has reportedly further fuelled a “doubling down” of Wall Street’s buying in junk bonds[8]

As the Bond King PIMCO’s William Gross rightly explains[9] (bold original)
Asset prices are dependent on credit expansion or in some cases credit contraction, and as credit goes, so go the markets, one might legitimately say, and I do most emphatically say that!
A sustained inflationary boom in the US would mean higher bond yields due to greater demand for credit and/or due to rising pressures on price inflation mostly on the input prices in support of the bubble sectors.

In other words, for as long as the US stock market bubble inflates, there will pressure on yields of USTs to rise. On the other hand, if US stock markets convulses, this will likely be accompanied by a slowdown in credit thus rallying bonds.

The proof of the latter has been a record outflow from stocks to bonds in the US (US $24 billion) and the world (US $28 billion) in the week through February 5[10].

This bring to fore a devil and the deep blue sea paradox for Emerging Markets including the Phisix. The era of rising stocks amidst low interest rates have increasingly become outmoded. Rising stocks in the US or developed economies will most likely be backed by higher UST yields. This means pressure on emerging markets financial markets.

On the other hand, falling stocks in US and developed economies accompanied by rallying bonds would signal ‘asset deflation’ which will likewise put a lid on any rally for emerging markets.

So the escalating volatility in US treasuries have hardly provides for a bullish backdrop on Emerging Markets and the Phisix.

Direction of US Treasuries as Prognosticator of Emerging Market Money Policies

It’s not just in the correlations in the financial context, rising yields of USTs will soon be revealed in monetary policies of the world. The Emerging Market turmoil represents a symptom of such unfolding progression.

Relative yield spreads in EM will have to adjust in accordance to the directional path of the yields of USTs.

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Remember the US dollar remains as the world’s primary reserve currency as shown in the above chart[11]. 86% of the world’s transaction has been facilitated by the US dollar. 64% of the international currency reserves are in US dollar. 46% of debt securities have been priced and issued in US dollar. 65% of the banknotes held overseas are denominated in US dollars and so with cross boarder deposits and banking loans, 59% and 52% respectively.

In short, global trade and finance have been deeply anchored on the US dollar which have been partly reflective of the conditions provided by the monetary policies of the US Federal Reserve. Thus actions of US dollar assets will have material influence in shaping EM policies.

So if yields of UST climb, the rest of the world will follow suit. But this will follow a time consuming process and won’t happen overnight.

Since EM economies took excessive debt in order to generate statistical growth when USTs were low, the coming adjustments would naturally expose on these unsustainable growth models

And symptoms of such adjustments, which so far have been disorderly and violent, have been substantially weaker currencies, higher inflation, foreign outflows and subsequently rising rates (e.g. Turkey, India, Indonesia).

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Such adjustments will be seen in the Philippine arena. This has not only been via a falling peso, the pressures are now being felt by the tightly controlled (by government and their allied private sector banks) and less liquid domestic bond markets.

As a side note, for the first time in 2014 or in 5 successive weeks, the Philippine peso rallied to 44.985 vis-à-vis the US dollar this week. This is likely a dead cat’s bounce.

From the short end (1 month) to the mid curve 5 year to the benchmark rate (10 year), the latter usually has been used as basis for the lending rates, to even the long curve the 20 year (not in the above chart), yields across the curve have all reached June 2013 levels. 5 and 20 year yields have even surpassed the June highs. Remember, the crash in domestic bonds which saw a spike of yields in June has been in consonance with the first bear market encroachment by the Phisix over the same period.

Some questions for the bulls: how will rising rates influence the financial positions of over indebted or overleveraged companies? How will rising rates impact credit quality? What will be the ramifications of rising rates to the real and statistical growth aspects of the demand side and the supply side? How will rising rates impact demand and supply of credit? How will higher interest rates amidst high debt levels be bullish for the stock markets? How will high interest rates in the face of relatively higher debt levels today be bullish for foreigners? 

An even more important question is why has the Phisix been sensitive to the movements in the 10 year UST notes, if indeed “fundamentals” have been indeed sound as alleged?

Pardon my appeal to authority, but one of the former major defenders of the status quo, Emerging Market guru Franklin Templeton’s Mark Mobius, who earlier predicted that foreign flows will revive in 2014 due to “fast economic growth, low debt relative to gross domestic product and high foreign-exchange reserves” apparently made a volte face in declaring just the other day, that EM outflows will “deepen” or intensify[12].

Whatever happened to the standard mantra of “fast economic growth, low debt relative to gross domestic product and high foreign-exchange reserves”?

We don’t even look far ahead to see how confused policymakers have been in wavering from one stance to another.

Take for instance the Wall Street Journal notes of a dithering BSP governor Amando Tetangco, who allegedly said a few days back that policy interest rates is “not necessarily the most appropriate response at this time”. But in the face of rising statistical inflation the same article quotes the BSP governor, “We still have room to keep rates steady, but given how these factors play out, that room may be narrowing,” Mr. Tetangco said in a text message to reporters after the data release. “We will see if any adjustments to the stance of policy are warranted based on the balance of these risks to the inflation outlook over our policy horizon”[13]

First BSP officials have been hesitant to use the interest rate channel but updated inflation data[14] seem to have painted the BSP into the corner. Has the BSP been revealing increasing signs of desperation?

For the BSP, who have been blindsided by the adverse effects of soaring M3 (add to this soaring deposit levels), has the inflation chickens come home to roost?

It’s important to add that the BSP data for December[15] shows a still stunning 32.7% jump in M3 growth year on year where claims on the private sector and on other financial corporations constitute 67.83% of December M3. (no credit bubble?)

Not only has soaring M3 been a major symptom of the unsustainable credit boom underpinning the artificial statistical growth, the falling peso has been another transmission channel for higher consumer prices since the Philippines buys more than she produces as evident by her sustained balance of trade deficits.

If rising bond yields have been signs of upcoming consumer price inflation which means a reduction of purchasing power by consumers or a reduction in disposable income, how will this be bullish for the economy and the stock market?

Essentially the BSP’s concerns could be a validation of the results of the recent surveys depicting a serious deterioration of the outlook of the general populace over the quality of life as noted last week[16]

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And whatever happened to the much hyped foreign currency reserves? The BSP data reveals that forex reserves[17] stumbled by 5.17% last month and 7.42% from a year ago due purportedly to “foreign exchange operations of the BSP and payments by the National Government (NG) for its maturing foreign exchange obligations”.

Has the BSP been massively selling US dollars to shore up the Peso in January? Yet despite the about $4 billion in interventions the peso lost 2.07% over the month.

Will forex currency reserves fail to work as “elixir” as so-claimed by worshippers of the bubble? Will this prove my thesis that forex reserves are symptoms of bubbles rather than signs of strength[18]?

And why the state of confusion by BSP officials?

Because of the resistance to realize that domestic yield spreads would need to be adjusted to reflect on the changes in interest rates of the US. Since the BSP mimicked on the FED’s zero bound rate policies, naturally any aftereffects of the latter will most likely be reflected on the former’s operating environment as presently expressed through the unfolding developments in the financial markets and in the real economy. See the M3 example and the January losses in forex reserves.

The major flaw of the mainstream economic experts, who really are statisticians masquerading as economists, has been to project the past as operating in a linear motion into the future. Yet there have been little incentives for them to understand of the causal realist link or the entwined cause and effect relationships between markets and policies. Besides, incumbent bureaucrats are naturally expected to be salespeople of any administration everywhere, so everything will look rosy until it isn’t.

Remember late last year I noted how the interest rate spread between the US and Philippine 10 bonds have narrowed to a record 78 basis points which I called the convergence trade[19]?

Presently this spread has widened to 168 bps (as of Friday) which has unfortunately been accompanied by market distress. Yet I expect a reversion to the mean in yields of UST and Philippine treasuries to occur sometime and I doubt if this will be in an orderly manner.

And if interest rate levels, for the mainstream, serve as a reflection of creditworthiness of a nation, then what justifies such record interest rate convergence? Statistical economic growth predicated on the actions of mostly the less than 20% of the households whom have access to the formal banking and capital markets? And statistical growth founded on a credit boom which distributes the risks and the benefits to a concentrated few?

And how can a nation with a nominal per capita GDP of US $2,611 (IMF 2012) with a relative underdeveloped banking and financial system, implying the paucity of intermediation channels of savings into investments and equally indicative of high costs of, and limited access, to capital, as well as, high transaction costs and inefficient facilities for capital accumulation, establish a position as being more creditworthy, than say, compared to New Zealand with a nominal per capita GDP of US $38,225? (IMF 2012)

Yield of New Zealand 10 year treasuries have been priced at 4.59% as of Friday which still remains higher than the Philippines.

As reminder yield spreads are based on domestic currencies which even accentuate the grotesqueness of domestic bond market mispricing. Lower rates for the peso postulates to less currency risk for the peso relative to the New Zealand dollar, for instance. All these premised on the less than 20% of households!

Yet it would seem that in a milieu where investors have been conditioned like Pavlov’s dogs through central bank policies to chase yields, running a façade of anti-corruption theatrics combined with a puffery in statistical growth data has been enough to pull the proverbial wool over the eyes of the indiscriminate money allocators.

Well economic reality seems as knocking on the door.

Waking up to the fact that the Philippine Economy has been in a Bubble

Speaking of credit driven statistical economic boom, the BSP finally released their yearend data for 2013[20]. This gives me the opportunity to combine both BSP and NSCB data and see whether the highly acclaimed Philippine economy have been founded on sound principle or from a bubble.

As I noted last week, I find it unusual for timing of the Philippine government’s early release of the NSCB’s statistical growth data when the BSP publishes loans data a month ahead of the latter. 

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BSP data reveals that based on nominal peso, loans to the construction sector (right) as well as the real estate sector (left window, green line) has gone parabolic since 2010.

Meanwhile banking loans issued to the trade (wholesale and retail, blue line left window) and financial (red line; left window) industries has likewise accelerated over the same period.

A better perspective can be seen in year on year % change window, where the country’s credit boom can be seen accelerating from 2010, particularly for the real estate, financial, trade and construction sectors, as well as the banking system’s overall loans. For the trade and financials sectors, the boom peaked in 2012, where the loan growth astoundingly ballooned by 43% and 31.75% respectively. Yet despite the slowdown, trade and financial loans remain at 13.82% and 11% in 2013 respectively. The average growth for the past 6 years has been at 20.21% for trade and 13.3% for financials.

Loans to the real estate sector marginally slowed in 2013 but remains at 23.24% after a high of 25.64% in 2012. The average growth over the past 6 years has been at 20.34%.

Meanwhile the construction sector continues to sizzle where loan growth for 2013 skyrocketed by 51.36%. The average loan growth in the past 6 years has been at 19%

Such fabulous growth rates, which have been vastly above general statistical growth, divulge of the extent of leverage being amassed by the underdeveloped banking and financial system to (as I suspect) a few but big players of the abovementioned industries.

The mainstream defense says “low debt levels”. True, if we apply this to the general formal economy. False if this is seen in the prism of credit growth rates of specific industries. Yet the more the concentrated the credit exposure has been, the bigger the risks of a Black Swan.

As a side note, not every firm from the industries registering significant credit growth rates share the same degree of loan exposures or credit risks. Either a majority of the firms in the industry has significant credit exposure or that the issuance of large credit volumes has been tilted towards a few big firms. I suspect the latter than the former.

Now for the juicier aspect.

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In the above table, NSCB’s growth data[21] has been shown side by side with BSP banking loan data in terms of % share and growth rates.

On the left section of the table is the % share of the industries, which I suspect, as having been plagued by a massive credit bubble.

Total contribution of these bubble sectors—specifically in trade (wholesale and retail or the shopping mall bubble), financial (bond and stock market bubble), real estate and construction, and hotel (casino bubble) industries to the Philippine gdp in 2013—accounts for 44.84% of the statistical economy. This compares with the 49.61% share of banking loans issued to these sectors.

If we add to the non-bubble manufacturing, share of gdp growth of the above mentioned sectors have been at 65.2% for gdp and 68% for banking loans.

The point of the above exercise is to show the size and scale of banking exposure on a significant critical segment of the statistical economy. In short, a bubble bust will tend to have a major direct impact on the statistical economy, aside from the potential contagion.

As reminder, bubbles are hardly about generalized credit exposure but on the malinvestments or misdirected investments towards the heavy capital goods industries such as construction, and titles to these capital goods, such as the stock market and real estate[22]. This is also the reason why I included the manufacturing sector which so far has shown little signs of credit boom.

The right side of the table has a very illuminating picture of how banking loans extrapolated to statistical growth.

I should be jumping in joy to say that growth in the loans to the financial sector at 11% produced 15.7% of statistical economic growth. This means that 70 cents credit produced 1 peso growth for the financial sector in 2013. The 30 cents should translate to productivity growth. But I would suspect that the numbers may not reveal its true dynamics considering that the financial intermediaries consist mostly of banks and non bank financials and to the lesser extent insurance.

The loan growth by the manufacturing sector at 7.6% relative to the supposed output at 8.6% explains why I don’t consider the domestic manufacturing a bubble. The manufacturing sector has been producing more than they have been borrowing.

Yet what appear as quite disturbing have been in the growth figures of the construction, real estate and hotel industries. For every 1.9 pesos of loans acquired by the real estate sector generated only 1 peso of additional growth. More staggering has been the proportionality of each peso growth for the construction and the hotel industry that has been financed by borrowings of 3.25 pesos and 2.7 pesos respectively.

Why such large discrepancies? Has costs of these projects ballooned faster than expected for developers to seek more financing? Or are the large gaps symptoms of deep inefficiencies of these industries? Or has politics played a role in the additional costs incurred by these sectors? Also have the money borrowed by these sectors been diverted into other ventures?

The figures indicate that growth in these industries have hardly been enough to finance current projects thus the recourse to more loans. This also means some companies may have resorted to ‘debt-in debt-out’ as a way to go around their routine activities. This also points to the increasing sensitivity by these sectors to the fluctuations in interest rates or particularly the deepening dependence on the perpetuation of zero bound rates.

Such developments reveal why the BSP officials have been hesitant to tighten monetary policies or why inflation data has caught them off guard.

In a latest interview with the CNBC[23], the good BSP governor declares a ‘this time is different’ dynamic which allegedly will bring about renewed interest in the Philippine economy. He says that investors will “wake up to the fact that the Philippines is different” and that “investors will focus on the fundamentals again and come back to countries like the Philippines”

I believe he is correct in a sharply contrasting sense. When investors focus on the real fundamentals, and not just ‘shouting’ statistics, they will “wake up to the fact” that the Philippine economy, like most of the economies in the world today, has been in operating in an unsustainable bubble backed by a severely maladjusted economy (weighted heavily to those with access to the banking sector), vastly mispriced assets and the obstinate refusal by policymakers to calibrate their policies to reflect on the current developments in the hope to perpetuate a quasi-permanent boom.

Conclusion and recommendations

-Expect wild gyrations in the global and local financial markets (be it in stocks, bonds and or currencies). The outsized volatility will come in both direction but eventually the downside bias will reassert dominance.

-The extent of volatility is a manifestation of a toppish process and underscores amplified risks which hardly is a bullish environment

-Technically and factually, the Phisix is in a bear market. Therefore until proven wrong, the path of least resistance should be on the downside.

-Emerging markets and the Phisix are all tied to the actions of US monetary policies or bond markets. The nasty side effects of both US and domestic policies are being felt in the local arena.

-Domestic officials will continue to resist adjustments in policies in the hope that boom days will return. The substantial fall in January's forex reserves is an example of such resistance to change. However the more officials resist, the more volatility will occur.

-Price inflation seems now a real concern. Deteriorating sentiment on the quality of life, sinking peso, rising bond yields across the curve and the BSP has been caught in a bind appear to be reinforcing this.

-Price inflation means redistribution of spending patterns. Considering that the Philippine consumer are highly sensitive to food, transportation and energy inflation a rise in inflation translates to diminished disposable income. This means consumer spending will be hobbled. This also means a slowdown on real economic growth.

-Use any rebound to decrease exposure on popular themed stocks, particularly those exposed to shopping malls, real estate, so-called consumer spending stocks and financials (banks and non-banks). Today’s high risk environment will hardly be an issue of return ON investment this will be an issue of return OF investment

-On the urge for stock market exposure. Again avoid popular issues. Choose issues with little or no debt. Choose issues eschewed by the public or by mainstream analysts. Or choose non-popular stocks that have been sold down heavily (more than 50% off the highs) or has flat lined through the boom. Should a black swan occur these stocks are likely to have limited downside. Avoid aggressive positioning.

-There is one reason to be in stocks. Should a global black swan occur in 2014 or 2015, I expect some if not many governments to use Cyprus bail-in or deposit haircut policy paradigm as a way out of the mess. It is not clear though which government/s will resort to them. The stock market can serve as safehaven from such bank deposit confiscation. But timing will be necessary here.











[9] William Gross Most Medieval


[11] Zero Hedge Triffin's Dilemma: The 2014 Edition February 5, 2014


[13] Wall Street Journal Real Times Economic Blog As Prices Rise, Philippine Banker Fires Warning Shot on Rates February 5, 2014

[14] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas January Inflation Slightly Higher at 4.2 Percent January 30, 2014

[15] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Domestic Liquidity Growth Slows Down in December January 30, 2014


[17] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas End-January 2014 GIR Stands at US$78.9 Billion February 7, 2014



[20] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Continues to Expand in December January 30, 2014

[21] National Statistical Coordination Board. Philippine Economy Grew by 7.2 percent in 2013; 6.5 percent in Q4 2013 January 30, 2014

[22] Murray N. Rothbard, 15. Business Fluctuations Chapter 11—Money and Its Purchasing Power (continued) Man, Economy and State

Monday, August 26, 2013

Phisix: Will the ASEAN Meltdown Worsen?

Last week I wrote[1]:
While so far, Asia and other Emerging Markets appear to be the most vulnerable, should bond yields continue to soar, which implies of amplified volatility on the bond markets and eventually interest rate markets, the impact from such lethal one-two punch will spread and intensify.

This makes global risks assets increasingly vulnerable to black swans (low probability-high impact events) accidents.
Bond Vigilantes Mortally Wounds the ASEAN Financial Markets

Twice within the last three months the Philippine equity benchmark the Phisix endured a one day 6% meltdown. Contra the consensus expectations, this only underscores my point[2] that last June’s crash wasn’t just out of ‘irrational’ market sentiment, instead this signaled an upcoming radical change in the financial and economic environment. 
Unlike populist notions that bear markets have been devoid of “fundamentals”, bear market signals are symptoms of underlying pressures from maladjusted markets and economies or even strains from politics. The former two symptoms are more representative of today’s conventional markets here and abroad, while the political factor was largely behind the 1987 and 1989 bear market cycle.
In a week where trading sessions had been abbreviated by 2 days due to massive monsoon generated floods and by a public holiday, the selling pressures which tormented the region had been ventilated when the Philippine markets opened last Thursday where the Phisix dived by 5.96%.

For the week, the Phisix closed sharply down by 5.59%. The peso too had been bludgeoned by 1.42% to 44.26 US-PHP from last week’s 43.64

And this has not just been a Philippine affair. 

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Financial markets of major ASEAN nations have been whacked.

Indonesia’s equity benchmark the JCI crashed into bear market territory as the nation’s 10 year bonds and her currency, the rupiah, has equally been smashed.

With only less than 2% away, Thailand’s SET is at the verge of joining Indonesia into the bear market as both the currency, the baht and the Thai bonds has been equally under selling pressure.

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Thailand has reportedly fallen into a recession during the 2nd quarter of the year[3].

If rising bond yields amplify on Thailand’s slowing economic growth, then this will magnify the fragility of Thailand’s heavily leveraged system which has financed a huge domestic bubble[4], thereby increasing the risks of a regional debt crisis.

A significant share (56%) of Thailand’s external debt has been based on short term debt[5] (as of 2011), the risk of which the Bank of Thailand’s dismissed as “limited” since this has supposedly been related to international trade and foreign asset acquisition[6]. Such bureaucratic presumptuousness in risk assessment has been undergoing a severe test.

Incidentally, Thailand’s external debt, since 2008 through the 1st quarter of 2013[7], has ballooned by about 75% or a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14.07%. With slowing growth, debt levels will be enlarged as real funding cost increases.

The bond market contagion has even spread to Malaysia who earlier looked resilient. Malaysian bonds and the ringgit have also been under the pressure cooker. The KLCI fell by 3.76% this week, which broke its uptrend.

Mainstream media has been desperately looking to rationalize the current market actions using deteriorating current account, swelling debt and a large exposure by foreigners on Malaysia’s bond markets as factors shaping the current selloff[8]. In reality, what media sees as ‘causes’ are really symptoms of a much deeper force: Malaysia’s credit fueled bubbles[9].

The bond vigilante inflicted contagion appears to be spreading throughout the rest of the ASEAN region.

Incidentally, while the previous market collapse was featured on the headlines, this week’s equivalent has been relegated to the business pages. Why? Has it been because of the wear and tear of defending today’s phony economic boom in the face of unresponsive markets? And second and the other most likely factor have been due to more pressing sensational Pork Barrel scam[10] which has captured the public’s attention. Perhaps a combination of both of these?

If the public only understood how financial repression (negative real rates) works, the pork barrel scam represents just a walk in the park

US Federal Reserve Dilemma: Taper Talk versus Credibility

Various sorts of myths have emerged and have been disseminated in media on the supposed causes of the current meltdown.

A high official of the banking industry was recently quoted by media who blamed the recent market carnage on the US Federal Reserve’s supposed tapering: “It’s not an issue of if. It’s an issue of when[11]”.

The common perception sold by media and the mainstream experts on the public is one of a post hoc fallacy relationship: Fed tapers, foreigners sell market and return to the homeland, thus crashing domestic markets.

There appears to be hardly any attempt to explain the mechanics of such relationship except to imply of the ridiculous idea that foreigners are unthinking entities whom are merely driven by market sentiment and by the perceived FED actions. Thus foreigners are painted as wrong for ignoring “strong macro fundamentals”[12].

But will the FED really voluntarily taper?

I pointed out that when the first bout of market stress emerged from the perceived tapering by FED in May, many central bankers immediately backpedalled.

For instance, the Bank of England’s Mark Carney announced a new forward guidance program meant to contain interest rates. The European Central Bank’s Mario Draghi seconded and reversed his earlier non-committal position by declaring that interest rates will remain at low levels for an “extended period of time[13].

Meanwhile the US Fed Chair Dr. Bernanke’s told the public that low interest rates will remain: “highly accommodative monetary policy for the foreseeable future”.

Barely a week after, in a question and answer forum Dr. Bernanke furthered his dovish tone saying that “If we were to tighten policy, the economy would tank”[14]

The following is from the minutes of the FED’s Open Market Committee’s July 30-31 gathering released last week[15]: (bold mine)
Almost all committee members agreed that a change in the purchase program was not yet appropriate,” and a few said “it might soon be time to slow somewhat the pace of purchases as outlined in that plan”
Does this sound like the Fed’s tapering is an “if and when” issue?

My point is that FED officials have increasingly become more opaque in their statements and have increasingly been throwing data driven targets (unemployment and inflation) or might I suggest obstacles in attempts to move the goal posts on policy actions. Such muddled communications signify as resistance or reluctance to taper. 

Let me analogize. Government X declares price control on apples by putting a ceiling on them say Php 10 per apple. But because of a huge demand on apples, apples sales has vanished from the formal sector and instead moved to the informal sector, where prices of rise first to Php 12, then to Php 14… Government X, thus, responds by announcing a crackdown on apple sales. But instead of lowering prices, prices continue to ascend…Php 16, Php 18 then Php 20 per apple. Failing to admit of their failed policies, Government X announces that due to shortages of apples, they will increase price ceiling to Php 15 per apple.

Just replace government X with Venezuela and Argentina, and apples with their respective currencies the bolivar[16] and the Argentine dollar and we see the forex conditions of both countries. The growing gap between black market and official rates has been forcing both governments to adjust official rates higher.

As shown above, governments recalibrate their policies to realign with the markets, rather than the opposite. This has been designed to reduce the negative publicity impact of failed policies which simultaneously has been meant to maintain “credibility”.

The same mechanics applies to the US Federal Reserve and the US bond markets.

The FED in effect manipulates the yield curve specifically using ZIRP[17] (Zero bound Interest Rate Policies) through Fed Fund rates on short term yields, and Quantitative Easing or asset purchasing program through UST of longer maturities to affect long term yields.

As pointed out last week, the FED now holds 31.47% of the total outstanding ten year equivalents. While the FED tries to influence the public’s risk appetite and portfolio holdings in the way they want them via the Portfolio balance theory, the unintended consequence has been to reduce the supply of US treasuries in the system leaving banks with diminished availability of “safe assets” for collateral thereby increasing risks of the banking sector. This is aside from amplifying the risks of a bond selloff as a result of diminished liquidity.

And one thing which the mainstream doesn’t seem to realize is of the guiding philosophical ideology driving the actions of a majority of central bankers, particularly the belief in the “euthanasia of the rentier” or the eradication of the “cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital”[18].

In other words, the dogma of interventionism holds that by driving rates to interest rates to zero or by its abolition, mankind will be spared of scarcity.

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises warned[19]:
Public opinion is prone to see in interest nothing but a merely institutional obstacle to the expansion of production. It does not realize that the discount of future goods as against present goods is a necessary and eternal category of human action and cannot be abolished by bank manipulation. In the eyes of cranks and demagogues, interest is a product of the sinister machinations of rugged exploiters. The age-old disapprobation of interest has been fully revived by modern interventionism. It clings to the dogma that it is one of the foremost duties of good government to lower the rate of interest as far as possible or to abolish it altogether. All present-day governments are fanatically committed to an easy money policy.
So the by-product of the challenge to substitute the law of scarcity with abundance from something for nothing policies has been the unsustainable expansion of debt—part of which is the reason behind bubble cycle dynamics and of today’s rioting bond markets.

More Signs of the Triffin Dilemma

Another important reason for the intensification of the presence of the bond vigilantes has been the Triffin Dilemma[20].

The Paradox is premised on a reserve currency’s conflict of interests between the short term domestic and long term international objectives, such that a nation with the reserve currency enjoys the benefits of consuming more by maintaining deficits (trade and or budget) with foreign trading partners. 

On the other hand, the non-reserve partners finance such deficits by recycling (vendor financing) their excess reserves or surpluses with assets of the reserve currency.

With recent improvements in the fiscal and trade deficits of the US, the reduction of deficits extrapolates to lesser availability of US dollars on the global financial system on a relative scale. Thus with reduced supply, the unintended result has been a disorderly response to the unofficial tightening or withdrawal of US dollars in the system.

On the demand side there will also be lesser demand for US treasuries. This has been supported by the massive reduction in foreign buying of UST last June as noted last week. It’s not just on USTs, over the same period, US stocks also suffered outflows, while agency and corporate bonds have been neutral.

This also contravenes the mainstream idea that today’s meltdown has been prompting for a rotation towards US assets[21].

Ironically the Euro and China’s yuan have been firming which may hint that part of the capital migration has been to shift to Euro assets and the inflation of China’s bubbles.

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And shown in the above chart[22], the FED will be forced to reduce purchasing even if there will not be an official “tapering” due to decreased US treasury issuance.

Again the unforeseen consequences from the markets may have to force the hands of central bank officials.

And when there is a shortage of US dollars, the predilection of non-reserve trading partners will be to use reserves to finance such void.

As proof of this, central banks of the developing ex-China world have lost $81 billion of international reserves equivalent to 2 per cent of all developing country central bank reserves since early May through July.

Reports the Financial Times[23]:
However, some countries have suffered more precipitous drops. Indonesia has lost 13.6 per cent of its central bank reserves from the end of April until the end of July, Turkey spent 12.7 per cent and Ukraine burnt through almost 10 per cent. India, another country that has seen its currency pummelled in recent months, has shed almost 5.5 per cent of its reserves.

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The Gross International Reserves of the Philippines (GIR) appears to be peaking. And if the bond vigilante impelled run on Philippine assets continues, as noted before[24], we may see the same depletion dynamics of the domestic gross international reserves.

The bottom line is that whether the FED tapers or not, bond vigilantes running amok are indications of the widening wedge between policy goals of central banks and market pricing.

Such perceived divergences, or may I say the growing loss of confidence over central actions, accentuate the uncertainties clouding the marketplace. And market uncertainties fertilizes on the reflexive feedback mechanism for more volatility.

Yet if the US markets fall deeper from the current levels or deep enough (say 10-20%) to impact the housing markets and the economy, then expect the FED to expand its QE.

But this will not guarantee a return to a risk ON environment. Yet if yields continue to surge then expect that the same pressures plaguing Asia today to have reached US shores.

Meltdown has been a Regional Dynamic Not Limited to Emerging Markets

Another fashionable media myth has been to portray the current selloffs as entirely an emerging market dynamic brought about by current account deficits.

While it is true the countries with current account deficits have suffered the most damage so far, what has hardly been seen is the growing contagion or the escalatory effects from the revolt of the global bond vigilantes.

Unlike Indonesia, whose deficits have been swiftly widening, the Philippines and Malaysia still maintains current account surpluses. Thailand has a small current account deficit. Yet all four has been under sustained selling pressures.

Meanwhile the first world developed ASEAN neighbor Singapore holds not only a huge current account surplus but likewise massive amounts of international currency reserve (2.13x the Philippines).

If we are to believe the mainstream’s logic, then this makes Singapore’s “strong macro economic” fundamental, which is far far far superior than the Philippines, as supposedly least vulnerable to recent market turbulence.

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Lo and behold, Singapore’s financial markets has, like her ASEAN peers, similarly been smacked hard.

Singapore’s equity benchmark, the STI, seem as testing the June lows (above pane). Yields of 10 year Singapore bonds have likewise been soaring (middle pane).

Meanwhile the USD-Singapore dollar has been falling from late 2012 but the losses have been accelerating since May (lower pane).

If Singapore’s markets are being squeezed, then why should her emerging market, less wealthy peers, not be squeezed harder?

For the bond vigilantes to affect Singapore is not something to be ignored and dismissed as nonevent. To do so would mean to court disaster for one’s portfolio.

Should the bond vigilantes persist to haunt Singapore, then this would signify as a warning sign for a possible black swan event to occur in Asia.

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And the unpleasant impact from the uprising of the bond vigilantes has also been affecting the yields of 10 year bond markets[25] of the wealthier East Asian neighbors. So far, the impairments has been limited relatively to the just the bond markets. It remains to be seen if these markets will be able to withstand more bond market strains.

The bottom line is that the negative effect from the raging bond market riots have been spreading not only on emerging markets but to wealthier neighbors as well.

Additionally the story of current account deficits as triggers to the current financial market meltdown seems deeply misplaced.

Bond Markets are Interconnected, Philippine Yields will Rise

Another myth broached by local Pollyannaish experts has been that the Philippines supposedly will be shielded by rising bond yields abroad. 

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The G-7 group[26] basically controls 71% share of the USD 99.5 trillion of the international bond markets as of 2012[27]. Government debt at US 43.7 trillion accounts for 43.9% of the total bond markets.

Excluding Canada, this makes 4 central banks, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan as dominant policymakers influencing the global the bond and debt security markets.

This also means that actions in bond markets of these economies will affect activities of the rest of the bond and debt markets.

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Surging yields of the USTs have not been isolated.

Yields of 10 year bonds of the United Kingdom, Germany and France are nearly at 1-2 year highs. Japan JGBs has been declining from a recent spike. But it is unlikely that this decline will be sustained given both internal weaknesses and external developments.

Yields of Canada’s 10 year bond note also shares the same level of ascent. Only Italy’s bond yields have been significantly off this year’s high. But like Japan, I suspect this wouldn’t last long.

As shown earlier, yields of most of ASEAN, East Asia and South Asia led by India have been climbing at relative different pace and intensity.

The Philippines has been providential enough for bond levels to be little changed. But mounting pressure on the peso and stocks are signs that local bond yields are unsustainable and will rise if the bond market turmoil extends.

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Bond yields affect interest rates. As previously explained interest rates affect consumption, saving, and investing patterns, this also means the economy, corporate earnings and political finance will change to reflect on the new realities.

Trade patterns, prices and yields of various securities will also change.

Given that the Philippines has significant external exposure via different channels particularly

-remittances which has been about 10-12% of statistical GDP,
-merchandise trade constituting 46.9% of GDP (2012)[28],
-Gross International Reserves are at $82.9 billion as of July[29] where 84% have been allocated to foreign securities and foreign exchange as of December 2012[30],
-US treasury holdings largely held by the Philippine government at $37.1 as of June 2013[31] and
-external debt based on different currencies mostly the US dollar and Japanese yen (as of December),

This means that changes in global bond yields will also influence all these dynamics. That’s unless the Philippines operates in a vacuum or an imaginary world where prices have been stuck in a stasis.

The bottom line is that changes in global bond markets, especially by the bond markets covering the big 4, will also influence domestic bond markets as well as interest rates.

This Time is Different: Asian Crisis 2.0 is Remote

The biggest myth I have encountered is in the suggestion that the risks of an Asian crisis today is remote for the following reasons: floating exchange rates, foreign reserves, transparency, current account balances, foreign debt, and banking reform[32].

While it is true that Asia is different today than in 1997, the spin to sanitize the risks of a crisis have all been flimsy.

-On floating exchange rate:

Having a floating exchange rate hardly serves a guarantee for a crisis free environment. 

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While there have supposedly been more accounts of crises under a pegged rate regime, floating rates have not been immune to a crisis. The above chart is based on an IMF study[33] which shows of the share of pegged and floating regimes in the episodes of crises.

Looking at exchange rate is hardly the factor determining the risks of a crisis. Even chief proponent of floating exchange rate, Milton Friedman understood this[34]. (bold mine)
Let me emphasise that there's nothing special about exchange rates. If Australia tries to peg the price of wool - let's say wool is a major product of Australia - and if it sets the price too high, it'll have the same effects as if the exchange rate is set at too high a rate. If it sets it too high, then there will be a surplus of people trying to sell wool and a shortage of people trying to buy wool. If it sets it too low, it'll be the other way around. And the government can maintain the price only if it is willing to accumulate stocks of wool in the one case or to provide wool from inventories in the other. Everything I've just said about wool applies just as well to the Thai baht.
In short, in free markets economic forces determines exchange rate values. Distortions, thus, are a function of government interventions.

-On foreign reserves.

Foreign currency reserves have signified as ramifications of the Triffin dilemma principle operating behind the US dollar standard as noted above. The conditions of foreign reserves should be seen in the context parallel to the conditions of the accrued public and private sector debt. Yet having enormous foreign reserves serves no guarantee against a crisis as in Japan’s case in 1990[35].

Moreover given the highly fragile system where every region has been unduly exposed to huge debt, international bailouts similar to the 1990s will hardly be the same dynamic in case another global crisis erupts.

Developed economies can hardly even wean away from their dependence on central banks.

-On current accounts

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Current account deficits have been used as the popular bogeyman for sudden stop triggered crises. But in the case of currency crises, not all have been due to sudden stops: a sudden desistance or slowdown of capital flows to a country as shown above.

A currency crisis may be triggered by bank runs or vice versa[36], or by sovereign debt default either by foreigners (sudden stops) or by residents or by both.

-On the shift to local debt from foreign debt

The idea that shifting from foreign debt to local debt hardly represents a “get out of jail free card” against a crisis.

Let me quote Harvard Professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff[37]: (bold mine)
This brings us to our central theme—the “this time is different syndrome.” There is a view today that both countries and creditors have learned from their mistakes. Thanks to better-informed macroeconomic policies and more discriminating lending practices, it is argued, the world is not likely to again see a major wave of defaults. Indeed, an often-cited reason these days why “this time it’s different” for the emerging markets is that governments there are relying more on domestic debt financing.
The dynamic duo documented 70 cases of domestic public debt default from 1800-2007 citing that[38]
domestic debt crises typically occur against much worse economic conditions than the average external default. Domestic debt crises do not usually involve external creditors, which may help explain why so many episodes go unnoticed
And what strings up the factors that led to all the debt crises (currency crises, banking crises, sovereign debt defaults and serial defaults) which apparently have been missed out by mainstream commentators?

Again Professors Reinhart and Rogoff[39]
Ahead of banking crises, private debts (external debt, broader private capital inflows, domestic bank debt) also display a repeated cycle of boom and bust—the run-up in debts accelerates as the crisis nears.
The consensus almost always downplays, overlooks or dismisses the role played by debt.

-Finally on transparency and bank reform

Similar to bank stress tests which many have used to determine the supposed strength of the banking system but frustratingly fail in the face of a crisis, the efficacy of so-called transparency and bank reform will only be revealed only after the storm has passed or ex-post. 

We will never know how many skeletons were kept in the proverbial closet or as a Chinese war strategy denotes “beat the grass to startle the snake[40]

Recommendation: Play Defensive

Even some of the mainstream reporting appears to be partially getting it.

This from Reuters[41]:
Having failed to dismantle politically and socially knotty obstacles to growth, Asia has instead relied on low interest rates and massive borrowing to keep its economies expanding, particularly since the 2008/09 global financial crisis that prompted the Fed to start aggressively buying bonds.
The accumulated policies to put in effect the “euthanasia of the rentier” in Asia appear to be facing its unintended comeuppance.

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As interest rates rise while economic growth slows, rising real funding cost[42] will increase a litany of risks covering currency risks, interest rate risks, credit risks, counterparty risks, default risks and market risks.

The deepening fragility of Asian financial markets and the economies have been exposed by the two episodes of financial markets meltdown in a span of three months. The fact that the meltdown has contaminated Singapore is by itself a source of alarm.

With major ASEAN equity markets now trading below or near the June lows, every additional incidence of market shocks will lower the public’s confidence levels, leaving the Asian-ASEAN markets increasingly susceptible to even larger downside moves or panics.

Violent swings in both directions by yields alone may be enough to unsettle the bond markets.

Instability will also be represented by the scale and intensity of yield increases of the bond markets. Thus, everything else (recession, crisis or quasi-recovery) will depend on the conditions of the bond markets.

For as long as the global bond market remain unstable, financial markets are likely to remain under selling pressure.

The bond markets are on the way to cleanse the system of its excesses and to correct the grotesque distortions on other financial markets and economies brought to fore by its politicization.

In short, the risk environment has been deteriorating.

Here is a little piece of advice:

-Build cash by reducing some position or lightening up on the market.

-Reduce credit exposure (on anything business or personal) especially on financing covered by floating rates.

-Use higher discounting rates (200-300 basis points at least) in computing for net present values for future projects or investments. Remember to keep a margin of safety especially under the current environment.

-Share this piece of advice with your friends.

-Smile. There will be wonderful opportunities ahead.





[3] BBC.co.uk Thailand's economy enters recession August 19, 2013

[4] See Thailand’s Credit Bubble January 26, 2013



[7] Tradingeconomics.com THAILAND EXTERNAL DEBT

[8] Real Time Economics Blog Current-Account Figures Key for Malaysia Investors Wall Street Journal August 21, 2013



[11] Inquirer.net Local stock prices, peso fall August 22, 2013






[17] Federal Reserve of Chicago Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound

[18] John Maynard Keynes Chapter 24. Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might Lead The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money Marxists.org

[19] Ludwig von Mises, 8. The Monetary or Circulation Credit Theory of the Trade Cycle XX. INTEREST, CREDIT EXPANSION, AND THE TRADE CYCLE Human Action Mises.org

[20] Wikipedia.org Triffin dilemma






[26] Wikipedia.org G7

[27] Morgan Stanley Investment Focus The Evolution of the Global Bond Market April 2012


[29] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas End-July 2013 GIR Increases to US$82.9 Billion August 7, 2013

[30] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Annual Report 2012


[32] Real Time Economics, Asia 1997 vs. Asia 2013 August 22, 2013

[33] Andrea Bubula and Inci Otker-Robe Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone? November 2003



[36] Reuven Glick of Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Michael Hutchison of University of California, Santa Cruz Currency Crises FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO September 2011

[37] Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises p.53 April 16, 2008

[38] Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis p.1680

[39] Ibid 1687

[40] Wengu.tartarie.com Beat The Grass To Startle The Snake Thirty Six Strategies