Sunday, June 14, 2020

Why the USD-Php Remains a Buy: With No Major Source of Inflows, BSP FX Operations Buoyed the GIRs and Propelled the Peso Higher



The masses have never thirsted after truth. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim—Gustave Le Bon

In this issue

Why the USD-Php Remains a Buy: With No Major Source of Inflows, BSP FX Operations Buoyed the GIRs and Propelled the Peso Higher

I. The BSP’s Push to Cover Economic and Financial Stress by Powering the Peso Higher!
II. USD Supply: No Major Source of Inflows from the Economic Backdrop
III. Increasing Risks of Inflation from Bailouts Financed by the Printing Press
IV. GIR’s Cosmetic Gains: The Use of Financial Derivatives Possibly Financed by the Banking System’s FX Deposits
V. As the World Goes MMT, Gold Should Rise Against Paper Money and the Peso!

Why the USD-Php Remains a Buy: With No Major Source of Inflows, BSP FX Operations Buoyed the GIRs and Propelled the Peso Higher

Has the peso transformed into a safe-haven currency?

Why has the peso outperformed its peers?

Has the peso been supported by fundamentals or the stock and flows of the USD?

This outlook shows how the BSP’s behind the scenes operations have influenced the vigor of the peso, mainly through the record-high GIR, and secondly, through market interventions.

The strength of the peso has been artificial and is likely to unravel as challenges to the economy are prolonged.

I. The BSP’s Push to Cover Economic and Financial Stress by Powering the Peso Higher!

Ever since the USD-PHP topped in the 4Q of 2018, its winning streak has continued. Since it peaked at 54.25 on September 26, 2018, the peso has returned 8.2%. Its .87% return in 2020 makes it one of the best-performing currencies in Asia.

The USD functioned as a traditional safe-haven when the Philippine economy suffered from a sharp slowdown or a recession or a crisis. (figure 1, table)
Figure 1

For instance, the USD-PHP zoomed for three successive years (30.13% in 1983, 50.27% in 1984 and 11.43% 1985) when the Philippines suffered an economic crisis following the declaration of the debt moratorium in 1983.

Nota Bene: The following USD-PHP quotes are based on the average annual USD-PHP as provided by the BSP.

Also, a year after the Asian Crisis surfaced in 1997, the USD-Php rallied by 38.8%. And as the economy healed from 2000 to 2001, the USD-Php firmed up by 13.06% and 15.38% significantly anew following a slight rebound in 1999.

The USD Php strengthened by 7.11% in 2009 as the economy nearly fell to a recession from the Great Financial Crisis.

The peso typically strengthens during the sweet spot of the economic growth.

But not today.

Despite the recent economic downturn/recession as a consequence of the political response to the COVID-19, the peso has remained ironically or contrastingly resilient.

The ECQ has added to the recent gains.

The peso rallied furiously, breaking below the 50-level when trading volume plummeted to multi-year lows as bank operations were less than half of its capacity during the ECQ. (figure 1, middle window)

Like the PSEi’s latest rebound, the strength of the peso emerged not only in the face of low volume but also because of the pullback of foreign participation. Foreigners were net sellers of Philippine assets in the first four months of 2020, according to the BSP’s Foreign Portfolio data. The four-month outflows reached USD 1.58 billion on the back of a 16% decline of USD volume.

The BSP chief has bragged they have been intervening to rein the strength of the peso.

From the Philstar (June 9): Diokno said the Philippines is well prepared in facing a crisis such as the coronavirus disease 2019 or COVID-19 pandemic compared to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 as well as the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. “We are really in a very good shape, our reserve is at its highest at $90 billion in March and we feel it will be around $95 billion by the end of the year. Our banking industry is much, much stronger compared to where it was during the Asian financial crisis,” he said. The central bank usually participates in the foreign exchange market to soften the volatility of the local currency by dipping into its gross international reserves to buy or sell dollars. “We are already intervening. It could have gone much, much faster. It could have appreciated more if we did not participate in the market,” Diokno said. The BSP chief said there is a need to keep the peso competitive to support the export sector “I can tell you we are participating in the market,” he said.

My counterclaim is that instead of intervening to weaken the peso, the BSP has done the opposite.

By reducing foreign participation, organized local buying, most likely led by the BSP, constituted the demand side that propelled the peso to the upside.

II. USD Supply: No Major Source of Inflows from the Economic Backdrop

But the BSP has long been intervening to prop the peso up!

Figure 2

Domestic liabilities, such as deposits and currency issuances, are benchmarked to the international reserves, which account for 84% to 87% of the BSP’s assets. That is, the growth of the BSP's assets sets the limit to the growth of its liquidity. (figure 2, upmost pane)

Hence, for the BSP to remain in an expansionary mode, the amassment of FX assets have been a prerequisite. So as the BSP chopped bank reserves to reduce its share, the currency issuance share of total liability has been ramping up.

The BSP's GIR has been the fountainhead of the peso's strength. So they always say.

But that’s misleading. These represent instead post hoc rationalizations. Explosive growth in the foreign reserves of neighboring Thailand, Singapore and South Korea hasn’t prevented their respective currencies from weakening. As of June 12, the baht, SD, and won were down against the USD by 4.46%, 4.18, and 3.46% (year-to-date), correspondingly.

But importantly, has fundamentals or the supply side been supportive of this runup?

The supply of dollars that should make up the GIRs, from the economic operations, has been inadequate.

You read it from the news.

Expected to plunge are the dollar receipts from OFW remittances and tourism revenues.

From the Inquirer (June 5): The Philippines is seen as among the emerging markets to be hit by an up to 30-percent drop in remittances, based on the projection of Washington-based Institute of International Finance (IIF).

From the GMA (June 11): In a mobile message, BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno said tourism receipts are expected to contract by 56.9% this year, which could be the worst drop since the government started data collection on tourism receipts.

OFW remittances declined by 5% in March and have reinforced its long-term downtrend since 2014. (figure 2, middle window)

The Department of Tourism has not updated its visitor arrival statistics for 2020.

As stated above, foreign portfolio registered net outflows in the four months of 2020. Meanwhile, the growth dynamics of FDIs and services exports (BPOs) have continued to decline even before the emergence of COVID-19. The BSP’s FDI plummeted 32% last February, even before the ECQ, bolstering the downtrend since 2016. (figure 2, lowest pane)

From Philstar, June 11: Speaking of IT, while the outlook is bleak for remittances, the business process outsourcing (BPO) is likely to sustain its momentum. BSP sees BPO earnings growing 2% this year and 4% by 2021, although in absolute terms, dollars they funnel to the economy will remain below that of remittances at $22.8 billion by next year.

Even BPOs revenues have been in a decline.
Figure 3

And amidst the economic shutdown, a slight trade deficit (USD 500 million) still emerged as imports (-65%) and exports (-51%) collapsed in April. Trends that had been shaped in 2016-2017 have been cemented by the crash in merchandise trade last April.

These declines highlight the ongoing atrophy in the system even before the ECQ.

Again nowhere in the real economy has generated sufficient flows, so where has the BSP been getting its US dollars to prop up its GIRs?

III. Increasing Risks of Inflation from Bailouts Financed by the Printing Press

And here’s the thing. With deficit-to-GDP expected to hit 8.4% in 2020, aside from where will it come from, will there be sufficient supply from existing reserves to service domestic foreign exchange requirements (imports, debt servicing, financial trading, and others)?

And what about the money supply, which has recently spiked due to BSP monetization of the NG's fiscal deficit as the bank's economic loan portfolio slowed last March? 

M3 jumped from 10.9% in February to 13.34% in March.  Meanwhile, currency in circulation rocketed from 13.5% to 19.5%, possibly in preparation for the Php 200 billion cash transfer measure, the Social Amelioration Program (SAP), released last April. (Figure 3, middle pane)

The BSP has accounted for the most share of money supply growth, as the Total Loan Portfolio growth of the banking system decelerated from 10.96% to 7.86%. (Figure 3, lower pane)

From a different angle, so far, the BSP’s use of high-powered money through the direct financing of the record deficit, have offset the slowdown in credit expansion of the banking system, hence the tightening.

But what if sustained injections combust street inflation (and eventually the CPI)?

And with bailouts becoming entrenched as a popular fix to the economic quagmire, the use of the nuclear option policy of monetization of the deficits will likely escalate.

IV. GIR’s Cosmetic Gains: The Use of Financial Derivatives Possibly Financed by the Banking System’s FX Deposits

With a vastly reduced source of the USD from the economy, how has the BSP been able to spruce up the peso?

The short answer: derivatives.

Figure 4

Through 2019, the IMF’s data shows that the organic component of BSP’s GIRs has barely grown.

Ever since the USD-Php peaked in the 4Q of 2018, a buildup of “other foreign reserve assets” comprised the BSP’s GIRs through 2019, as shown by the IMF’s International Reserve and Foreign Currency Liquidity (IRFCL) data. (Figure 4, highest window)

“Other foreign reserve assets”, according to the IMF, constitute the marked-to-market value of financial derivatives, short-term foreign currency loans, other financial assets (such as non-negotiable investment funds shares/units arising from pooled asset schemes) and repo assets.

Furthermore, the growth of FX deposits in the banking system has not only been in a downtrend but has recently suffered contraction (last November and December), which comes as the GIRs reached a record. (Figure 4, middle pane)

Have FX deposits of the banking system been diverted to the propping up of the BSP’s GIRs?

And related to this, Philippine financial system interactions with the US banking system have surged since 4Q 2018, as shown by the spike in % growth of US banking claims on the Philippines. The same holds true for US banking liabilities to the Philippines. (Figure 4, lowest panes)

I dealt with this last January*.


Have the FX deposits of the banking system been diverted or used to fund a massive dollar short position via financial derivative trades (FX swaps, repos, and other instruments) to prop up the GIRs as exhibited by the IMF’s IRFCL data?

To simplify, the record-shuttering streak of the GIR appears to have emanated from the BSP’s stealth FX operations, as well as, partly from official external borrowings.

What will be the costs of taking on these dollar short positions? And how long can the BSP’s operation mask the looming shortages of in the supply of the domestic USD?

Yes, Japan’s credit rating agency, the JCR, upgraded the credit profile of the Philippines last week, but rather than the understanding of how GIRs work, this upgrade was based on statistics and hope.

Once the BSP’s cosmetic procedures unravel, we can expect these credit rating agencies to adjust swiftly.

In this perspective, the USD PHP remains a buy.

V. As the World Goes MMT, Gold Should Rise Against Paper Money and the Peso!

Finally, the valuation of a monetary unit, wrote the great Ludwig von Mises, depends on the relationship between the quantity of, and demand for, money.
Figure 5

The US M2 rocketed 23.22% last June 1 as the Fed increased its balance sheet by the $3.01 trillion in about three months, the fastest expansion in history, and as the Trump administration unveiled a USD 2 trillion fiscal bailout program last March. (Figure 5)

Because of this bailout, US deficits nearly doubled last May, while total domestic nonfinancial debt jumped by 11.7% to $55.9 trillion. (Figure 5)

The peso would seem to benefit from the recent developments in the US, but the US has a unique advantage, its role as the primary foreign exchange reserve under the de facto US dollar standard.  

Furthermore, everything is in a state of flux. With over 80% of countries in the world about to endure a recession, an unparalleled event since 1871(Figure 5, lowest pane right), and one can expect similar central bank financed bailouts implemented in these affected nations. As such, the use of the central bank’s nuclear option will not only be a feature; it will be on a historic scale.

It will be a race to the bottom for fiat currencies.

And the gold’s ascent against the paper money system (including the PHP) can be expected to accelerate. (Figure 5, lowest pane left)



Monday, June 08, 2020

San Miguel’s Stunning Race to Reach Php 1 Trillion Debt!


San Miguel’s Stunning Race to Reach Php 1 Trillion Debt!

San Miguel Corporation has spent over Php 13 billion to help people affected by the ECQ. That seems to be a cause-worthy mission.

But philanthropy isn’t the issue here.

Instead, San Miguel’s financial case proves the severe distortion of the stock market’s role as a discounting mechanism.

 
Of the twenty-six companies that have reported their respective 17-Qs for the 1Q, aside from Jollibee declaring an actual loss, the infrastructure and food holding firm San Miguel posted the largest (91%) decline in published income.

SMC’s income dived to Php 1.093 billion from Php 12.83 billion the same period a year ago, but it also reported a loss of 1.25 in earnings per share, its first in at least a decade.

Though it would be unsurprising to see declines in revenues and earnings in the period when the National Government imposed a rigorous lockdown in the latter half of March, in the face of the increasing strains on the topline, what is striking was that SMC’s debt skyrocketed by 20% or by a staggering Php 162.25 billion to Php 971.03 billion from Php 810.783 billion a year ago! On a quarter to quarter basis, SMC’s debt ballooned by an incredible Php 119 billion from Php 852 billion in 4Q 2019 to Php 971 billion in the 1Q this year!

As this happened, SMC’s interest coverage ratio (EBIT/interest expense) fell to 1.3%, below the crucial standard threshold 1.5, which should have raised doubts on the firm’s ability to meet interest expenses.
 
Curiously, the firm’s interest rate expense even dropped 3.18% despite the Php 43.25 billion of loans tacked into its liabilities in the last three quarters of 2019.

Lower interest rates must have been a crucial contributor, or actual financing expenditures may not have been declared.

Nevertheless, low rates exhibit how a company up to the eyeballs with debt can kick the proverbial can down the road.

But the day of reckoning is nigh.
  
Operating under normal conditions in 2 and a half months in Q1, SMC suffered a nasty 14.7% plunge in sales to Php 214.07 billion from Php 250.9 billion a year ago. Considering two additional months of shutdown in Q2, the loss of sales would translate to debt topping its annual sales in 2020!


Tumbling profit margins, an extant trend since 2016, have compounded on SMC’s 1Q sales.

SMC faces escalating incredible risks (interest rate, credit, currency, and economic). About to escalate on its balance sheets woes is the interest expense from the Q1 2020 Php 119 surge in debt, as the faltering topline saps on the company’s liquidity. 

Moreover, the financing of the National Government’s record deficit in competition with banks may begin to pressure rates higher, aggravating the firm’s interest rate burden. And even though interest rates may persist at current levels, weak sales and lower prices (inflation) and compression in profit margins should aggravate the firm’s capacity to service its debts.

The ECQ, which has suspended collection of interest rates, may provide a reprieve on its beleaguered balance sheets in the 2Q. But SMC can’t hide from this.
 
In perspective, SMC’s debt would signify a stunning 4.23% of the Php 22.927 trillion domestic financial system’s resources, as of the 1Q, a historic high!

Put differently, because SMC's rate of debt growth has eclipsed the growth of the entire financial system’s resources, the size of the SMC's debt has now signified a bigger % share of the latter, thereby, raising concentration risks on a systemic scale.

Even more, SMC’s debt is not just about statistics and ratios.  Including banks, chains of local and international creditors overlap to provide financing SMC, including retail savings through bonds.   Creditors are consumers too. Some also play a role in the production and service provision side. So disruptions on credit flows may result in dislocations in many parts of the real economy.

While SMC may not be entirely representative of the entire system, the common denominator is that debt has increasingly been relied on by big-league companies to satisfy the deficit in liquidity, reflecting the banking system’s condition.

And how can an increasingly fragile SMC provide confidence to the health of the financial system?

Yet the magnification of risks has barely been incorporated in SMC’s financial prices (including stocks).

This reveals how the mainstream dismisses or glosses over the role of debt as a component of economic operations. It also demonstrates how prices have become disfigured from endless manipulations to lose functionality as a communication system of economic conditions.

Moving along to the political aspect, has San Miguel been part of the lobby group representing a large group of companies that solicited capital infusion assistance from the National Government, under the DoF sponsored PH Progesso bill?

Has SMC's philanthropic approach been designed to curry favor with the administration to bail them out?

How can the economy strongly recover when the diversion of scarce resources into unproductive, debt-soaked, capital consuming zombie companies will only escalate?



Following a Record Spike, Will the PSE’s Broader Market Stage a 4-5 Week Relief Rally?



Following a Record Spike, Will the PSE’s Broader Market Stage a 4-5 Week Relief Rally?
 
Global central banks have concertedly been pushing unprecedented amounts of liquidity by aggressively expanding their balance sheets, as part of the many measures to stabilize the financial system.

Instead, speculative excess and market dislocation resulted in a melt-up of equities that have become detached with actions on the ground. Retail manic buying has incited a pure price multiple expansion in the US. The S&P 500 rocketed 4.91% this week, which added to a three week gain of 11.53% to explode its forward PE ratio to multi-decade highs!

Meanwhile, raging rallies have fired a spectacular 10.73% weekly gain of the 5-issue dominant main local equity index, the PhiSYx, which bested the region.

 

Not only has this week’s spike been the fourth-best weekly performance since 2007, but the 16.72% two-consecutive week surge represents the steepest advance since the last half of August 2007’s 16.67%. The August 2007 rally recovered all its losses but sputtered from then in October.
The index lost 55% in about a year.

Importantly, last week’s advancers set a fresh record high margin of 312 over decliners.

Seen from a nearer time framework, the recent gyrations, which have been historic by scale, may have highlighted the extensive oversold conditions or the interim bottom of the broader market.

The margin of decliners over advancers likewise hit a record last March or during the selling climax underscoring the pronounced volatility afflicting the market.

The largest margin spread of over 200s occurred in the January’s of 2016 and 2017, which emerged in response to sharp selloffs and where the broader market rally extended to the next five weeks or so before yielding to exhaustion.

Will history rhyme?

Aside from the big margin spreads in favor of buyers, the second-best two-week advance in August 2007 had also been in reaction to a selloff.

In the current setting, however, the record two-week returns and extreme bullishness of market internals (advance decline spread) have signified the second leg of the bear market rally.

Nevertheless, the peso volume will remain the key to a sustainable broad-based relief rally.

The bounce-off the March 2020 low was driven primarily by locals even as volume and foreign participation diminished. Foreign money were net sellers back then.

The ambiance radically changed in the last two weeks as volume jumped, whereas foreign money flows turned positive last week. But foreign participation as a share of total trade diminished anew.

 
Again, the broadening rally represents the positive part of this central bank inspired gamble.

The negative aspect is that retail players may have become energized to propel higher the number of daily trades.

If history rhymes, we may see a broad market rally in the next 4-5 weeks.

Trade accordingly and cautiously.