Sunday, April 05, 2026

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet? The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

 

It is particularly odd that economists who profess to be champions of a free-market economy, should go to such twists and turns to avoid facing the plain fact: that gold, that scarce and valuable market-produced metal, has always been, and will continue to be, by far the best money for human society— Murray Rothbard

In this issue

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

I. What the Quiet Actually Means

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II) 

Energy shocks, dollar liquidity stress, and why gold often lags before it leads during financial crises 

Part II 

I. What the Quiet Actually Means 

Part I examined why gold has remained surprisingly subdued despite escalating geopolitical tensions and rising oil prices. The explanation lies not in the failure of gold’s safe-haven role, but in the mechanics of liquidity stress and the structure of the global bullion system

Part II explores what that quiet may be signaling. By examining the relationship between gold and oil, the liquidity dynamics of financial crises, and gold’s behavior across monetary regimes, a clearer picture begins to emerge. 

Gold’s silence may not reflect stability. 

It may instead reflect the early stage of a broader liquidity adjustment inside the global dollar system. 

While modern financial systems are built on credit rather than metal, periods of stress often reveal that the hierarchy of money still persists beneath the surface. 

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money 

Safe-haven assets are often misunderstood. In practice, they represent savings held in forms with high moneyness—assets expected to preserve value (store of value) while remaining readily marketable during periods of stress. 

Their appeal rests on two characteristics: the ability to preserve purchasing power and the ability to be converted into cash quickly with minimal price disruption or marketability. 

Crucially, these properties are context-dependent. Assets perceived as safe are not inherently risk-free; their status reflects market confidence in their liquidity and convertibility. U.S. Treasuries, for example, are technically government liabilities, yet they function as safe assets because of their deep, liquid markets and the central role of the dollar in global finance. 

Gold occupies a distinct position in this hierarchy. Its moneyness is reinforced not only by the absence of counterparty risk but also by physical characteristics—durability, divisibility, recognizability, and malleability—that historically supported its acceptability across time and geography. 

These features contributed to gold’s persistent marketability, particularly in environments where trust in financial intermediaries weakens

However, as Austrian economist Gary North emphasized, these properties do not constitute intrinsic value. Value is not inherent in the metal itself but is imputed by market participants. Gold’s status as a safe-haven asset therefore arises from sustained confidence in its liquidity and acceptability, especially under conditions of stress

This hierarchy becomes clearer when markets transition from stability to crisis. 


Figure 1

The divergence among major fiat currencies highlights how gold’s moneyness becomes more pronounced as confidence in fiat purchasing power declines. (chart from Jesse Colombo’s The Bubble Bubble Report) [Figure 1] 

As described by Hyman Minsky, prolonged financial stability encourages leverage and risk-taking. When stress emerges, this dynamic reverses abruptly. Market participants experience a liquidity squeeze, reprioritizing assets according to their moneyness—favoring those that can be converted into cash quickly and reliably without significant loss of value. 

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission 

One way to understand gold’s muted response to current geopolitical tensions is through its relationship with oil. 

Oil represents an immediate claim on global liquidity. It is consumed, dollar-priced "Petrodollar", and highly sensitive to geopolitical disruption. Gold, by contrast, represents stored value—held primarily as protection against monetary instability. 

(Incidentally, oil is often called “black gold,” reflecting its quasi-monetary properties: global acceptability, scarcity, and embedded value as the economy’s primary energy input.)  


Figure 2

In real terms, Brent oil’s price trend appears to have formed a secular bottom in the late 1990s around the Asian Financial Crisis. (Figure 2, upper chart) 

Since then, the broader trajectory has been upward, interrupted by the 2000s commodity spike and the pandemic collapse. This pattern points to deeper structural forces: monetary expansion, chronic underinvestment in energy, and rising geopolitical risk

With Middle East tensions intensifying and war-economy dynamics increasingly shaping policy, the current oil shock may prove more persistent than markets expect. 

When geopolitical shocks drive oil prices sharply higher, the global financial system experiences a liquidity drain as energy-importing economies scramble for additional dollars to fund higher fuel costs—tightening financial conditions across currencies and credit markets. 

With dollar credit estimated at roughly $14 trillion—over half in debt securities (Bank of International Settlement)—this dynamic amplifies dollar demand during periods of stress. [Figure 2, lower image] 

This mechanism echoes economist Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation dynamics: rising costs and tightening collateral conditions force economic actors into a dollar funding pressure

In such episodes, gold does not always rise immediately

Instead, the gold–oil ratio compresses as oil outpaces gold. The system prioritizes settlement over preservation—dollars are needed to pay for energy before reserves can be accumulated as protection. 

Historically, this reflects the early phase of crisis transmission. Energy shocks propagate rapidly through trade balances, currencies, and funding markets, triggering collateral demand that can temporarily suppress traditional hedges. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses take hold—does gold tend to reassert itself. 

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio 

The gold–oil ratio captures the relative performance of the two commodities; recently, gold has significantly outperformed oil. Heuristically, it can be read as follows:

  • High ratio: monetary stress, weak growth, disinflationary pressures
  • Falling ratio (oil catching up): cyclical inflation, supply shocks, rearmament, and stronger industrial demand

If the global economy is transitioning toward a war footing—characterized by higher defense spending, rising commodity intensity, and tightening energy geopolitics—then near-term oil outperformance relative to gold is plausible. 

Even in a less oil-dependent world, geopolitical tensions can amplify supply–demand imbalances. 

That said, these forces can overlap. Inflationary pressures, financial stress, and supply shocks may coexist rather than unfold sequentially. 

Mean reversion suggests scope for oil to outperform gold, with historical anchors around ~18–22 (mean) and ~15–18 (median). However, these benchmarks may no longer be stable.

First, Goodhart’s Law applies: once the ratio becomes a widely targeted signal, its reliability deteriorates.

Second, base effects distort comparisons, especially after extreme moves. When ratios are measured off extreme starting points—such as the pandemic collapse in oil or gold’s surge during periods of monetary stress—subsequent moves can appear disproportionately large or directional. In reality, these shifts may reflect mechanical normalization from distorted bases, rather than a clean cyclical signal.


Figure 3

Third, the apparent gold-oil ratio uptrend since 2008 indicates shifting structural drivers—implying that historical mean/median benchmarks may themselves be drifting higher. (Figure 3) 

In short, while mean reversion remains a useful guide, the regime may be evolving—making static historical anchors increasingly unreliable. 

It may be that the recent compression in the gold–oil ratio reflects gold’s prior fat-tailed outperformance, with the current move representing a normalization back toward its two-decade trend channel rather than a structural reversal. 

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First 

One of the most counterintuitive features of financial crises is that gold can weaken precisely when investors expect it to strengthen. 

This occurs because gold is not only a store of value—it is also one of the most liquid assets in global markets

When financial stress intensifies, institutions face margin calls, collateral demands, and funding obligations. To meet these pressures, they liquidate assets that can be sold quickly.

Gold often becomes one of those assets.

This reflects the liquidity phase described by Hyman Minsky, in which the immediate need for funding temporarily overrides longer-term investment considerations.

During this stage of a crisis, the system prioritizes cash over protection.

Gold may weaken not because its safe-haven role has disappeared, but because it remains one of the few assets capable of generating immediate liquidity.

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales 


Figure 4

Recent news reports indicates that Turkey deployed gold-linked lira and foreign-exchange swaps, alongside outright sales, to support the lira during a period of market stress, as the USD/TRY exchange rate surged to successive record highs. Its gold reserves fell by roughly 50 tonnes (to 772 tonnes), the largest decline since 2018. [Figure 4] 

Such operations illustrate another dimension of gold’s role in modern reserve management. By mobilizing gold through swaps, central banks can generate immediate foreign-currency liquidity, effectively using gold as a liquidity bridge—complementing direct FX intervention rather than fully substituting for it. 

However, these tools primarily address short-term liquidity pressures rather than underlying macroeconomic imbalances. 

When markets perceive that a central bank is actively deploying finite reserve assets, these actions can signal constraint—potentially raising risk premia and intensifying pressure on the currency. 

As external buffers are drawn down, the policy path often becomes increasingly dependent on domestic liquidity provision, with central banks resorting to expansion of the monetary base to sustain market functioning. 

This dynamic highlights the reflexive nature of intervention: measures intended to stabilize markets can amplify fragilities over time through resource misallocation.

Importantly, such actions do not diminish gold’s monetary role. On the contrary, they demonstrate that gold continues to function as high-quality collateral within the global financial system during periods of stress. 

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE 

Recent developments in the Gulf financial system offer a contemporary illustration of these dynamics.


Figure 5

Following a sharp collapse in banking liquidity—reportedly approaching 45 percent in parts of the regional funding market—the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates moved to inject massive amounts of liquidity into domestic banks. [Figure 5, upper diagram] 

The intervention aimed to stabilize funding conditions and prevent disruptions in the region’s financial system. 

While such measures can temporarily ease liquidity pressures, they also reveal the underlying structure of modern crises. When funding conditions tighten, policymakers must often intervene rapidly to maintain the functioning of credit markets. In the short term, these interventions can strengthen demand for dollar liquidity, particularly in economies closely tied to global energy markets. 

The result is a paradox. 

Even as geopolitical tensions rise and energy prices surge—conditions that would normally support gold—financial systems may initially prioritize liquidity stabilization over reserve accumulation. 

Gold’s subdued behavior during such episodes may therefore reflect not complacency, but temporary pressure within the global funding system. 

This dynamic is further illustrated by recent developments in the U.S. dollar. Despite shocks including the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the DXY index has shown muted gains and even diverges from 2-year rate differentials. [Figure 5, lower pane] 

This suggests that dollar strength in this period is less about a classic safe-haven bid and more about liquidity demand driven by de-risking and deleveraging. 

The lack of coordinated upside in gold, bonds, and bitcoin points to collateral stress rather than a simple flight to safety. Meanwhile, interest rates themselves may reflect not only policy and war risk, but also fiscal pressures and issuance dynamics, blurring the signals that rate differentials typically provide. 

In classic safe-haven episodes, defensive assets tend to rise together. When that coordination breaks down, it often signals that markets are prioritizing liquidity and collateral access rather than portfolio hedging. 

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes


Figure 6 

Gold’s long-term behavior is non-linear. Its bull markets tend to move in waves associated with epochal shifts in global monetary regimes. [Figure 6] 

The first bull cycle followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system after the Nixon Shock and lasted until the early 1980s. This was followed by a bear market and a two-decade lull, reflecting the “salad days” of the U.S. dollar standard—characterized by the rise of globalization, the Fed’s drift toward easy-money policies, and the deepening of the dollar’s exorbitant privilege. 

A second wave emerged in the early 2000s and accelerated after the Global Financial Crisis, when central banks dramatically expanded their balance sheets in response to economic shocks. 

The current period represents a third phase—marked by a drift toward a war economy: protectionism, sanctions, and kinetic conflict—while also shaped by overlapping forces including evolving monetary policies, the weaponization of the dollar, oil and commodity dynamics, AI-driven structural uncertainty, and central bank accumulation of gold. 

These forces are gradually reshaping how gold is accumulated, traded, and—for central banks—deployed within national reserve strategies. 

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Gold’s current calm should not be mistaken for irrelevance. 

Financial crises rarely begin with a clean flight to safety. Instead, they begin with liquidity stress. Funding markets tighten, institutions scramble for cash, and the most liquid assets are often sold first to meet obligations. 

In these early stages, the global financial system prioritizes settlement over preservation. Energy shocks drain dollars from the system, trade balances shift abruptly, and capital flows reprice risk across currencies and credit markets. 

This sequence helps explain why gold can appear subdued even as geopolitical tensions escalate. Oil shocks transmit stress through the real economy first, tightening liquidity before investors turn toward long-term stores of value. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses expand—does gold typically reassert its defensive role. 

The current compression in the gold–oil ratio may therefore reflect not the failure of gold as a safe haven, but the timing of crisis transmission within a dollar-centric financial system

If the emerging environment is indeed shifting toward a more fragmented geopolitical order—characterized by energy insecurity, fiscal expansion, de-globalization, kinetic conflicts, and a gradual erosion of monetary trust—then gold’s quiet phase may represent the prelude rather than the conclusion of its cycle. 

The signal is not absent. 

It may simply be arriving later in the crisis sequence. 


Sunday, March 29, 2026

EO-110 and the Politics of Price Suppression: How the Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Nationwide Economic Intervention

 

Economics does not say that isolated government interference with the prices of only one commodity or a few commodities is unfair, bad, or unfeasible. It says that such interference produces results contrary to its purpose, that it makes conditions worse, not better, from the point of view of the government and those backing its interference—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue:

EO-110 and the Politics of Price Suppression: How the Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Nationwide Economic Intervention

I. From Oil Shock to Emergency Response

II. The Rice Policy Template

III. Administrative Pricing Returns: The Suspension of the Power Spot Market

IV. Price Control Proof Is Already in the Streets: Shortages Appear

V. Crisis Messaging and Political Theater

VI. Crony Gains in an Energy Emergency

VII. The Financial Stability Motive

VIII. Markets Push Back

IX. Intervention Begets Intervention

X. Echoes of the Energy Crisis—Marcos Sr. vs Marcos Jr.

XI. Conclusion: Suppressing Scarcity, Shifting the Pressure 

EO-110 and the Politics of Price Suppression: How the Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Nationwide Economic Intervention 

How EO-110, emergency powers, and BSP policy are converging into a nationwide price-control regime. 

I. From Oil Shock to Emergency Response 

In a previous report, we warned that the Philippines might be entering the early stages of an oil shock.

Events over the past week suggest the policy response is now accelerating. 

Within a span of only a few days, the government has rolled out an unusually rapid sequence of interventions. 

  • On March 24, the administration issued Executive Order 110, declaring a national energy emergency.
  • On March 25, Congress moved to grant emergency authority to suspend fuel excise taxes.
  • On March 26, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) held an off-cycle policy meeting and decided to keep interest rates unchanged. 

Each step has been framed as an effort to protect consumers from the impact of rising energy costs. 

Yet taken together, they reveal something broader: the emergence of an integrated policy approach aimed at suppressing the economic transmission of the oil shock. 

This strategy is not entirely new. 

It closely resembles the template already deployed in another politically sensitive sector—rice. 

II. The Rice Policy Template 

Over the past year, rice policy has increasingly relied on administrative intervention. 

The government imposed maximum suggested retail prices (MSRP), released reserves through the National Food Authority, introduced the highly publicized Php 20 rice program, and deployed fiscal subsidies to farmers and importers. 

In effect, the state has attempted to contain consumer prices by transferring costs elsewhere—through fiscal spending, balance-sheet adjustments, and administrative supply management. 

Public choice theorists such as James M. Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan in The Power to Tax describe this phenomenon as fiscal illusion: the obscuring of the true cost of government through indirect financing—such as borrowing, inflation, or off-budget transfers—allowing policymakers to sustain the appearance of relief while shifting the burden forward. 

This same policy template now appears to be extending into energy markets. 

The national response to the oil shock has included:

Demands for price controls are also broadening, now encompassing LPG and imported rice. 

As with the rice program, these measures aim to soften the visible price impact of scarcity—while redistributing the underlying costs across the fiscal system and the broader economy.


Figure/Table 1

Policy intervention appears to be expanding sector by sector. Measures initially introduced to stabilize politically sensitive goods are gradually extending into energy markets and financial policy. (Table 1) 

III. Administrative Pricing Returns: The Suspension of the Power Spot Market 

The spread of price suppression is not limited to transport fuels. 

On March 25, the Energy Regulatory Commission ordered the temporary suspension of the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) across the Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao grids after simulations suggested electricity prices could surge to around ₱9 per kilowatt-hour amid the Middle East energy shock. 

The WESM is the Philippines’ real-time electricity trading platform, where elite owned and controlled power producers and distributors buy and sell electricity based on supply and demand conditions. Prices in this ‘caged’ market normally fluctuate to reflect fuel costs, generation capacity, and grid constraints. 

By suspending the market, regulators effectively replaced price discovery with administrative allocation. 

The objective is straightforward: prevent a sudden spike in electricity prices from feeding into consumer inflation. 

But the economic implications are significant. 

Spot markets exist precisely to coordinate supply and demand under changing conditions. When prices rise, they signal scarcity and encourage additional generation or conservation. 

Administrative suspension interrupts that signal. 

Instead of electricity being allocated through price adjustments, dispatch decisions increasingly become centralized—determined by regulatory directives rather than market incentives. 

The result may temporarily contain visible price increases, but it also risks creating deeper distortions in the power sector. 

Power producers must now operate under uncertain compensation conditions, while distributors and large consumers lose the market signals that normally guide electricity procurement. 

In effect, one of the country’s most important energy markets has been replaced—at least temporarily—by administrative pricing. 

This development reinforces a broader pattern emerging across sectors: the gradual substitution of price mechanisms with regulatory control. 

But suppressing prices does not eliminate the underlying imbalance between supply and demand. 

As Friedrich Hayek famously argued in The Use of Knowledge in Society, prices function as signals coordinating dispersed knowledge across the economy. Suspending markets may suppress volatility, but it also suppresses the information that allows the system to adjust. 

If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them 

Or suppressing those signals inevitably disrupts the coordination process. It also shifts the adjustment to other parts of the economy.

Yet authorities have not only suspended WESM; they are reportedly considering permanently repealing the only partially deregulated segment of the energy sector, as well as the removal of VAT. Both measures may provide temporary relief, but such band-aid solutions carry the risk of future unintended consequences. 

Moreover, while reducing taxes may be desirable, without corresponding spending constraints this approach would likely worsen fiscal deficits and heighten the fragility of public finances. 

In effect, short-term interventions may shield consumers today, but they also deepen structural vulnerabilities that could amplify costs tomorrow. 

IV. Price Control Proof Is Already in the Streets: Shortages Appear 

Basic economic theory predicts that price ceilings eventually produce shortages. 

Early signs of this dynamic are already emerging. 

Reports indicate that more than 400 gasoline stations have temporarily closed, citing supply difficulties even as authorities insist that fuel inventories remain sufficient. 

Public transport is showing similar strains. 

Jeepneys in Quezon City and bus operators in Metro Manila (about 20%) and Baguio City (up to 50%) have significantly reduced operations, with stranded commuters and growing protests highlighting the mismatch between controlled fares and rising fuel costs. 

As an aside, this is just the first few days! 

Despite subsidy rollouts, the economics of operating public transport under capped fares have become increasingly difficult.

Figure 2

The result is a classic outcome described in the literature on price ceiling: supply contraction rather than price adjustment. (Figure 2, upper window) 

Retail markets are beginning to reflect the same pressures. 

Supermarkets and some food manufacturers have signaled price increases beginning April 1, reversing a March commitment to uphold a temporary two-month price freeze. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), however, insists that any price adjustments should not take effect until April 16. 

In the aviation sector, the pattern has been equally revealing. 

After the president warned that aircraft might be grounded if fuel shortages worsened, Philippine Airlines assured the public that jet fuel supplies were sufficient for the ‘foreseeable future.” 

Shortly afterward, the airline quietly cut several domestic and international flight routes  suggesting fuel conservation moves. 

These episodes illustrate a recurring feature of interventionist policy regimes: the widening gap between official reassurance and market behavior. 

V. Crisis Messaging and Political Theater 

Public messaging surrounding the energy situation has evolved rapidly. 

Initially, officials emphasized that there was ‘no energy crisis.’ 

More recently, the government has declared an energy emergency while simultaneously insisting that there is still no reason to panic. 

The pattern echoes a famous observation often attributed to Otto von Bismarck:
never believe anything until it has been officially denied. 

Policy actions suggest a far more serious assessment than the rhetoric implies. 

Authorities have begun cracking down on alleged fuel hoarding, floated the possibility of repealing elements of the country’s oil deregulation law, and raised the prospect of removing the value-added tax on petroleum products (as noted above). 

At the extreme end of the policy spectrum, discussions have even surfaced about the possibility of an energy lockdown should supply conditions deteriorate further. 

As political economist Albert O. Hirschman observed in The Rhetoric of Reaction, crisis politics often produces a distinctive rhetorical pattern: policies framed as temporary necessities gradually become permanent features of governance. 

Taken together, these measures suggest a steady expansion of administrative control not only over the energy sector, but more broadly across society. 

VI. Crony Gains in an Energy Emergency 

While the policy framework emphasizes consumer protection, the distribution of benefits within the energy sector tells a more complex story. 

Several large corporate groups appear poised to gain from the shifting landscape. 

Petron Corporation, a subsidiary of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), has reportedly sourced discounted Russian crude, including last week’s shipments of roughly 700,000 barrels. 

At the same time, Tycoon and SMC chair, Ramon S. Ang has revived proposals for the government to acquire Petron—a move that could effectively transfer part of the firm’s humungous debt burden onto the public balance sheet. 

Such a shift reflects what Gordon Tullock described as rent-seeking dynamics: firms capture gains during favorable market conditions, yet seek to socialize losses when the cycle turns. Private upside, public downside. 

Other developments point in a similar direction. Amid public pressure against coal, policymakers have signaled support for its “temporary” expansion under the banner of energy security—even as official rhetoric continues to favor renewables. 

Despite its political unpopularity, Department of Energy data indicate that coal accounted for an all-time high 62% of gross power generation in 2024. (Figure 2, lower image) 

A subsidiary of Manila Electric Company, Meralco PowerGen Corp. (MGEN), has reportedly expressed interest in assets linked to Semirara Mining and Power Corporation (PSE: SCC). 

Notably, some of these assets had already been subjected to regulatory or contractual rebidding processes prior to the current crisis.  

In that context, the present moment may be less a sudden policy shift than an acceleration of an existing trajectory—one in which administrative actions reshape ownership and market structure. The result is a coal sector that may not only revive, but consolidate under a few hands through policy-mediated channels.

Meanwhile, announcements surrounding the Camago-3 field within the Malampaya Phase 4 gas field development have been presented as evidence of incoming domestic supply. Yet such projects typically take years to materially affect output, and gas contracts remain indexed to global prices.  Absent subsidies, price relief is unlikely in the near term. For now, these announcements function more as reassurance than resolution. 

While the timing of benefits to consumers remains uncertain, the consortium—particularly Tycoon Enrique Razon led Prime Energy—is clearly positioned to capture upstream gains 

As Mancur Olson observed in The Rise and Decline of Nations, crises tend to strengthen “distributional coalitions”—organized interests that secure concentrated benefits while dispersing costs across the broader public. 

The pattern is hardly new. Frédéric Bastiat, in The Law, warned that when the state becomes an instrument for particular interests to extract from the public, law itself is transformed—from a protector of rights into a vehicle for legalized transfer. 

The emerging picture suggests not merely an energy response, but a reconfiguration of advantage. The beneficiaries appear to be those corporate groups already positioned to consolidate and potentially cartelize segments of the country’s energy supply chain. 

In effect, the crisis is not only redistributing costs—it also seems to be concentrating access to resources, decision-making power, and control in fewer hands. 

VII. The Financial Stability Motive 

The government’s intervention in energy and monetary policy may extend beyond protecting consumers. 

Energy shocks transmit rapidly through the financial system: higher fuel prices feed into consumer inflation, which in turn pressures the central bank to tighten policy. The BSP recently revised its 2026 inflation forecast to 5.1%—well above its 2–4% target, underscoring the magnitude of underlying price pressures. Rising interest rates reduce asset valuations and weaken collateral across the banking system.


Figure 3 

As an aside, the BSP’s 5.1% 2026 inflation forecast reveals much about their expectations. With January and February CPI at 2% and 2.4%, this implies that the average CPI for the remaining ten months would need to reach roughly 5.68%. Such a trajectory would push monthly CPI above 6%, potentially testing or exceeding the 8.7% high recorded in February 2023! If realized, this would reinforce what appears to be our long projected third wave of the CPI cycle since 2015. (Figure 3, upper graph) 

Banks in the Philippines are heavily exposed to property lending and government securities. A rapid rise in rates could trigger cascading balance-sheet pressures—falling bond prices, declining property valuations, and rising non-performing loans. From this perspective, suppressing the visible impact of the oil shock may help delay financial tightening. 

The BSP’s off-cycle decision to hold policy rates steady has been widely interpreted as part of this stabilization effort. Officials from the Bureau of the Treasury have acknowledged or admitted that maintaining stable borrowing conditions in the bond market was an important consideration. 

In effect, the policy response aims to keep inflation, interest rates, and asset prices contained simultaneously. 

These constraints are consistent with the structural limitations faced by semi-peripheral economies. The Philippines’ persistent savings–investment gap makes it reliant on external capital, which limits independent monetary policy and exposes the financial system to global market pressures. As Giovanni Arrighi observed, countries in the semi-periphery are structurally dependent on foreign financing and currency, leaving central banks with limited room to maneuver. 

The BSP is therefore not simply choosing between “good” and “bad” options; it is deciding which part of the balance sheet to protect first. 

VIII. Markets Push Back 

Financial markets rarely remain passive. The US dollar–Philippine peso exchange rate has surged to a record 60.55, marking a historic low for the peso. 

At the same time, government bond yields—particularly in the one- to seven-year segment—have moved decisively higher, underscoring growing unease about fiscal stability and inflation risks. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

Although Philippine equity markets have declined, trading patterns suggest that downside volatility is being deliberately managed, or at least cushioned, within the heavily weighted components of the PSEi-30 index. 

The market’s verdict appears clear: the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is likely to absorb external pressures through currency adjustment rather than aggressive rate hikes and use of reserves, constrained by fiscal realities. 

Inflation is nearing 5%, with second-round effects increasingly visible across transport, food, fertilizer, and electricity costs. These pressures are no longer isolated—they are feeding into broader economic feedback loops. 

Meanwhile, signs of strain are becoming more evident across the broader economy. 

The retail sector continues to undergo restructuring. Marks & Spencer has withdrawn its operations despite earlier signals of recalibration, while Robinsons Retail has announced the closure of its No Brand outlets. The conglomerate is also reportedly considering the possibility of delisting from the Philippine Stock Exchange. 

Taken together, these developments may reflect more than isolated corporate decisions. They point to a tightening environment for both consumers and listed firms, as financing conditions gradually shift and economic pressures intensify.

IX. Intervention Begets Intervention


Figure/Table 4

Intervention often follows a self-reinforcing cycle. Initial controls distort market signals, producing shortages that then justify further administrative action. (Figure 4) 

The trajectory of recent policy decisions follows a pattern long recognized in economic theory.

Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises argued that partial government intervention in markets tends to generate unintended distortions that eventually require additional intervention. 

Wrote the great von Mises 

Price control is contrary to purpose if it is limited to some commodities only. It cannot work satisfactorily within a market economy. The endeavors to make it work must enlarge the sphere of the commodities subject to price control until the prices of all commodities and services are regulated by authoritarian decree and the market ceases to work.

Either production can be directed by the prices fixed on the market by the buying or the abstention from buying on the part of the public; or it can be directed by the government’s offices. There is no third solution available. Government control of a part of prices only results in a state of affairs which—without any exception—everybody considers as absurd and contrary to purpose. Its inevitable result is chaos and social unrest. 

The preeminent Dean of Austrian School of Economics, Murray Rothbard’s concept of triangular intervention helps explain how regulating one set of exchanges can distort others, setting off a chain of interventions across sectors. 

A triangular intervention occurs when an intervener either compels a pair of people to make an exchange or prohibits them from making an exchange. The coercion may be imposed on the terms of the exchange or on the nature of one or both of the products being exchanged or on the people doing the exchanging… 

Directly, the utility of at least one set of exchangers will be injured by the control. Indirectly, as we find by further analysis, hidden, but just as certain, effects injure a substantial number of people who thought they would gain in utility from the imposed controls. The announced aim of a maximum price control is to benefit the consumer by giving him his supply at a lower price; yet the objective effect is to prevent many consumers from having the good at all. The announced aim of a minimum price control is to insure higher prices to the sellers; yet the effect will be to prevent many sellers from selling any of their surplus. Furthermore, the price controls inevitably distort the production and allocation of resources and factors in the economy, thereby injuring again the bulk of consumers. And we must not overlook the army of bureaucrats who must be financed by the binary intervention of taxation and who must administer and enforce the myriad of regulations. This army, in itself, withdraws a mass of workers from productive labor and saddles them onto the remaining producers—thereby benefiting the bureaucrats, but injuring the rest of the people. 

More broadly, the expansion of state authority during crises was famously analyzed by historian Robert Higgs, who observed that emergency conditions often lead to permanent increases in government control over economic activity. 

The emerging policy response to the oil shock appears to be following this familiar path.

  • Price controls lead to shortages.
  • Shortages trigger enforcement actions.
  • Enforcement expands administrative authority.
  • Administrative authority creates new political and economic beneficiaries. 

The cycle then repeats.

X. Echoes of the Energy Crisis—Marcos Sr. vs Marcos Jr. 

The Philippines has confronted energy shocks before. But the institutional setting of the crisis today differs profoundly from the one that shaped the policy response half a century ago. 

During the global oil shocks of the 1970s—particularly the 1973 Oil Crisis and 1979 Oil Crisis—the Philippines was already operating under authoritarian rule. Ferdinand Marcos Sr. had declared Martial Law in the Philippines in September 1972, consolidating political power and weakening institutional checks on executive authority. 

Energy policy therefore unfolded within a centralized political system capable of imposing controls, directing credit, and reorganizing industries with limited resistance. 

The current oil shock, by contrast, is unfolding under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. within a formally democratic political structure. Instead of authoritarian command, policy is emerging through a rapid layering of interventions—executive orders, emergency powers, regulatory suspensions, subsidies, and monetary accommodation. 

This difference matters.


Figure/Table 5
 

Energy shocks have struck the Philippines under both Marcos administrations. The key difference lies in the institutional pathway of intervention: centralized command under martial law in the 1970s versus layered regulatory and fiscal intervention within a democratic framework today. (Figure/Table 5) 

In the 1970s, authoritarian institutions allowed the state to impose controls directly and sustain them over time. Today, similar economic objectives must be pursued through a more fragmented political process involving subsidies, administrative pricing, and financial policy coordination. 

Yet the economic trajectory may still converge. 

The interventionist policies of the 1970s ultimately culminated in the Philippine external debt crisis of 1983, when mounting fiscal deficits, rising external borrowing, and weakening investor confidence forced a restructuring of sovereign obligations. 

Today’s macroeconomic backdrop exhibits its own form of imbalance. 

Fiscal deficits remain historically elevated. Public debt has risen sharply relative to national output. Liquidity conditions—reflected in rapid monetary expansion and sustained deficit financing—have reached levels rarely seen in the country’s economic history. 

Measured as shares of GDP, many of these indicators appear manageable. But GDP itself increasingly reflects government spending and credit expansion rather than productivity growth. 

In that sense, the underlying dynamics bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the earlier era.

The key difference is speed. 

During the 1970s, the accumulation of distortions took years to unfold. Today, early symptoms are appearing within days of the policy response. 

Transport shortages are already emerging only days after the declaration of the energy emergency. If such distortions persist, the policy logic may lead to further escalation: larger subsidies, deeper price controls, emergency procurement programs, and expanding administrative authority. 

Economic crises have historically been fertile ground for political centralization. Severe shocks—whether economic, geopolitical, or social—often generate the conditions under which governments justify extraordinary powers. 

The Philippines’ current constitutional framework imposes safeguards against such outcomes. Yet history also shows that institutional constraints can erode rapidly under sustained crisis conditions. 

Whether today’s oil shock remains an economic problem—or evolves into a broader political one—will depend less on official assurances than on the incentives shaping policy decisions in the months ahead. 

XI. Conclusion: Suppressing Scarcity, Shifting the Pressure 

The oil shock may only be the beginning. EO-110 could come to be seen not as a solution, but as the opening phase of a broader cycle of intervention. 

From rice to fuel, from transportation to energy markets, policy is increasingly aimed at suppressing how rising costs flow through the economy—seeking to contain inflation, stabilize financial conditions, and preserve asset values. 

Yet economic reality rarely accommodates such efforts for long. Suppressing prices does not remove scarcity; it merely redirects it. The adjustment reemerges elsewhere—through fiscal strain, currency pressure, supply disruptions, or financial instability. 

The Philippines may therefore be entering not just an energy emergency, but a wider economic experiment: an attempt to delay market adjustment through expanding intervention. History suggests these efforts seldom end as intended. 

The real question is no longer whether adjustment will occur—but where the pressure will surface next.