Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop

 

My cynical view is that 90 percent of financial strategy is either tax minimization, regulatory arbitrage (coming up with instruments to comply with the letter of regulations while violating their spirit), or accounting charades (complying with the letter of accounting rules while disguising reality)— Arnold Kling 

In this issue

Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop 

Segment 1.0: The PSEi Debt Financed Asset Transfer Charade

1A. Debt, Not Productivity, Drives the Philippine Economy

1B. The Big Three Borrowers: MER, SMC, AEV The Mechanism: Asset Transfers

1C. The Circular Boost: A Fragility Loop 

Segment 2.0: San Miguel Corporation — The Minsky Ponzi Finance Core

2A. Fragility in Plain Sight

2B. SMC’s Camouflage Tactics

2C. The Mirage of Liquidity

2D. Political Angle: Deals, Influence, and the Administration’s Footprint 

Segment 2.1 — Meralco: A Utility Showing Profit, But Hiding Stress

2.1A. Chromite Gas Holdings: Meralco’s New Largest Exposure

2.1B. Q3 and 9M Performance: Meralco’s Money Illusion Revenues

2.1C. GDP Mirage and Debt Surge and Asset Inflation

2.1D. What This Really Means: Meralco as the Balance-Sheet Absorber 

Segment 2.2 – AEV: Revenue Spikes as Balance-Sheet Shock Absorption

2.2A AEV’s Q3–9M: Not Evidence of Business Growth 

Segment 3.0 — The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI Triangle

3.A How One Deal Created Three Balance-Sheet Miracles 

Segment 4.0: Conclusion: How Concentration Becomes Crisis: The Philippine Energy Paradox 

Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop 

SMC, Meralco, and AEV’s energy partnership reveals how asset transfers inflate profits, recycle fragility across balance sheets 

Disclaimer: This article presents an independent analysis and opinion based solely on publicly available financial reports, regulatory filings, and market data. It does not allege any unlawful conduct, nor does it assert knowledge of internal decision-making or intent by any company or individual. All interpretations reflect broader political-economic dynamics and systemic incentives rather than judgments about specific actors. Readers should treat this as an analytical commentary, not as a statement of fact regarding any wrongdoing. 

Segment 1.0: The PSEi Debt Financed Asset Transfer Charade 

1A. Debt, Not Productivity, Drives the Philippine Economy 

Debt, not productivity, is the engine of the Philippine economy. We’ve said this repeatedly, but what’s striking in 2025 is how debt growth has concentrated in just a handful of dominant companies.

Figure 1 

In the first nine months of 2025, the 26 non‑bank members of the elite PSEi 30 added Php 603.149 billion in debt—a growth rate of 11.22%, pushing their total to an all‑time high of Php 5.979 trillion. This was the second fastest pace after 2022. (Figure 1, upper window) 

The banks were not far behind. Bills payable of the four PSEi 30 banks rose Php 191.8 billion to Php 1.125 trillion. 

Meanwhile, BSP data shows bills and bonds payable across the entire banking industry climbed 9.34% YoY in September (Q3) to Php 1.861 trillion, the third highest on record. (Figure 1, lower chart) 

For clarity, let’s stick to the 26 non‑bank PSEi firms. 

Note: these figures exclude the rest of the 284 listed companies as of Q2. Because holding companies consolidate subsidiary debt, there are double counts here. And these are only published debts—some firms appear to have shifted borrowings into other liabilities or kept exposures off balance sheet. 

Even with those caveats, the Php 5.979 trillion in published PSEi non-bank debt is large enough to equal: 

• 16.8% of the Philippine financial system’s September Php 35.582 trillion in resources/assets; and
• 29.74% of the Php 20.15 trillion in nominal GDP over the first nine months. 

The Php 603.15 billion increase alone accounts for 75% of nominal GDP growth (Php 796.224 billion, or 4.96%) in the same period. 

In short, the debt of the non‑bank PSEi 30 is not just a corporate statistic—it is macro‑significant, shaping both banking dynamics and GDP itself.

1B. The Big Three Borrowers: MER, SMC, AEV The Mechanism: Asset Transfers 

Figure 2

In January–September 2025, the top three debt expanders among the non-bank PSEi 30—Meralco [PSE:MER], San Miguel [PSE:SMC], and Aboitiz Equity Ventures [PSE:AEV]—accounted for 52.65% of the Php 603.15 billion increase. (Figure 2, table and chart) 

Meralco (MER) debt more than doubled, rising 139.4% from Php 89.147 billion to Php 213.43 billion Php (+Php 124.283 billion). 

San Miguel (SMC) debt rose 7%, adding Php 103.312B, reaching a record Php 1.581 trillion. Yes, a T-R-I-L-L-I-O-N! 

Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) debt jumped 24.26%, or Php 89.945B, to Php 460.7B. 

This was not coincidence. 

The synchronized surge reflects the Meralco–Aboitiz buy-in to San Miguel’s energy assets. 

As discussed last August 

"Beneath the surface, SMC’s debt dynamics resemble quasi-Ponzi finance—borrowing Php 681 billion to repay Php 727 billion in 1H 2025, while plugging the gap with preferred share issuance and asset monetization. The latter includes the deconsolidation and valuation uplift of its residual stakes in the Ilijan power facility and Excellent Energy Resources Inc. (EERI), as well as the $3.3 billion LNG deal with Meralco and AboitizPower in Batangas. Though framed as strategic partnerships, these transactions involved asset transfers that contributed heavily to the surge in reported profits. 

"The simulacrum of deleveraging—from Php 1.56 trillion in Q4 2024 to Php 1.506 trillion in Q2/1H 2025—appears to be a product of financial engineering, not structural improvement." 

In other words, SMC’s Q2 “deleveraging” was cosmetic. 

Its debt didn’t fall because operations improved; it fell because SMC dumped assets, liabilities, and valuation gains onto Meralco and Aboitiz.

1C. The Circular Boost: A Fragility Loop 

This buyout sequence increasingly resembles an asset transfer charade:

• SMC unloads assets with embedded liabilities.
• Meralco and AEV borrow heavily to “acquire” them.

Both sides book accounting gains via fair-value adjustments, reclassification, and deconsolidation. 

• Optics improve—higher assets, higher income, stronger balance sheets.
• Substance does not—real cash flow remains weak, debt dependence accelerates, and system-wide concentration rises. 

Each company props up another’s balance sheet, recycling fragility and presenting it as growth. 

The Philippine power sector is already intensely politicized, dominated by quasi-monopolies that operate in their respective territories. Markets exist only in form; in substance, the sector functions as a pseudo-market inside an oligopolistic cage. 

Approximate generation market shares illustrate this concentration: SMC Global ~20–25%, Aboitiz Power ~23%, First Gen + EDC ~12–18%, Meralco/MGen ~7–10%, and ACEN ~5–7% (figures vary by region, fuel type, and year). 

Recent deals only deepen this centralization, reinforcing the economic and political power of these dominant players, while regulatory bottlenecks and concentrated capital ensure that true competition remains largely symbolic. 

Segment 2.0: San Miguel Corporation — The Minsky Ponzi Finance Core 

The Chromite Gas Holdings acquisition is central to understanding SMC’s 2025 numbers.

MGen acquired 60% and Aboitiz’s TNGP took 40%, giving Chromite a 67% stake in several former San Miguel Global Power (SMGP) entities. SMGP retained 33%. This was not an expansion — again, it was an asset transfer. 

Q2: The Illusion of Improvement 

This maneuver produced a dramatic one‑off effect in Q2:

• Debt dipped slightly from Php 1.511 trillion (Q1) to Php 1.504 trillion.
• Cash surged +26.5% YoY to Php 321.14 billion.
• Profits exploded +398% YoY, from Php 4.691 billion to Php 23.4 billion. 

Q3: The Underlying Reality Reappears 

But the illusion unraveled in Q3: 

• Revenues contracted –4.5% in a weak economy.
• Profits collapsed –49.5% to Php 11.9 billion.
• Cash rose again +22.4% to Php 344 billion.

Figure 3

Debt soared Php 103.312 billion YoY, Php 76.28 billion QoQ, bringing total debt to a staggering Php 1.58 trillion. (Figure 3, topmost graph, middle table) 

2A. Fragility in Plain Sight 

Even with the current the sharp rebound in SMC’s share price — whether due to benchmark-ism (potential gaming market prices by the establishment to conceal embedded fragilities) or implicit cross-ownership effects from the Chromite transaction — market cap remains below Php 180B. 

• Borrowing growth this quarter alone equaled ≈40-45% of SMC’s entire market cap (as of the third week of November). 
• Debt outstanding exceeds annual sales. 
• Debt equals 4.44% of the entire Philippine financial system’s assets. 

This is not normal corporate leverage. 

This is systemic leverage. 

2B. SMC’s Camouflage Tactics 

SMC has been masking its worsening debt structure through: 

• Preferred share issuances (debt disguised as equity), another Php 48.6 billion raised in October.
• Asset transfers involving Meralco and Aboitiz (the Chromite–Ilijan–EERI triangle)
• Aggressive fair-value reclassification and balance-sheet engineering 

All three are textbook Minsky Ponzi Finance indicators: Cash flows cannot meet obligations; survival depends on rolling over liabilities and selling assets. 

2C. The Mirage of Liquidity 

SMC reports cash reserves (Php 344 billion) rising to nearly matching short‑term debt (Php 358 billion). (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

But internal breakdowns suggest: 

• A portion of “cash” is restricted
• Some is pledged to lenders
• Some sits inside joint ventures 

Balance-sheet “cash” includes mark-to-model items tied to asset transfers 

Meaning: true liquidity is far lower than reported. 

2D. Political Angle: Deals, Influence, and the Administration’s Footprint 

In the current political climate, the administration’s footprint is crucial for every major economic deal. 

SMC’s transactions likely benefited from proximity to the leadership — but political shifts also show how influence-connection-network shapes outcomes across the corporate landscape. 

Take the Villar group: after apparently losing favor with the administration, their Primewater franchise has been terminated in several provinces, and authorities have cracked down on their real estate assets, claiming prior valuations were inflated. The SEC even revoked the accreditation of the appraiser involved. 

Meanwhile, MVP of Meralco reportedly eyes Primewater, underscoring how political favor reshapes corporate fortunes. Where Villar faces contraction, SMC and its allies (Meralco, Aboitiz) secure expansion through administration‑blessed asset transfers. 

In any case, it is possible that the deal had administrative blessing—or at least the nudge, given the proximity of the principals involved. The other possible angle is that this could be an implicit bailout dressed up as a buy-in deal. 

But the more important point is this: 

Even political closeness cannot permanently mask structural insolvency. 

SMC is too big to fail on paper — but too debt-bloated to hide forever, or political cover buys time, not solvency. 

Segment 2.1 — Meralco: A Utility Showing Profit, But Hiding Stress 

2.1A. Chromite Gas Holdings: Meralco’s New Largest Exposure 

Meralco’s Chromite Gas Holdings investment has become its largest exposure among joint ventures and associates, carried at Php 84.08 billion in 2025. Yet, despite the size, Chromite has contributed no direct revenues so far. 

The assets acquired from San Miguel Global are framed as enhancing Meralco’s ability to deliver reliable, stable, and cost‑effective electricity—but the numbers tell a different story—one shaped more by accounting and regulatory pass-throughs than by genuine economic or demand strength. 

2.1B. Q3 and 9M Performance: Meralco’s Money Illusion Revenues

Figure 4 

The headline 4% GDP in Q3 exposed Meralco’s fragility: 

• Revenues in gwh: –2.08% YoY, –6.64% QoQ.
• Electricity sales in pesos: +7.09% YoY, –3.35% QoQ.
• 9M gwh sales: –0.37% YoY, while peso sales rose +6%.
• Profitability: +18.19% in Q3, +9.93% in 9M. 

This is classic money illusion: peso revenues rise while physical demand falls. (Figure 4, upper and lower graphs) 

Operational output is not driving earnings. Instead, tariff pass‑throughs, higher generation charges, and regulatory adjustments inflate nominal sales. It is a regulatory inflation windfall, not genuine demand strength. 

2.1C. GDP Mirage and Debt Surge and Asset Inflation 

Meralco’s results reinforce that Q3 GDP was effectively lower than the 4% headline once adjusted for inflation and real‑sector contraction. Nominal growth masks real decline—exactly the GDP mirage motif you’ve been threading. 

More troubling is the balance sheet: 

• Debt surged +139% to Php 213.4 billion.
• Assets inflated +34.5% to Php 792 billion. 

This scale of short‑term expansion is not normal for a utility. It only happens when major assets are shuffled, revalued, or purchased at non‑market prices. Capex and operations do not explain it. Asset transfers do. 

2.1D. What This Really Means: Meralco as the Balance-Sheet Absorber 

Regulated returns (tariff-based profits) look stable, but the underlying structure is growing riskier. A utility with: 

• falling physical demand,
• surging debt, and
• massive non-operational asset expansion

is not strengthening — it is absorbing leverage for some entity. 

And that entity is SMC. 

The Chromite/Ilijan/EERI structure effectively places Meralco in the role of balance-sheet absorber for San Miguel’s asset-lightening strategy. 

Meralco’s earnings stability conceals a fragile, debt-heavy balance sheet inflated by SMC-linked asset transfers, not by real demand or utility fundamentals 

Segment 2.2 – AEV: Revenue Spikes as Balance-Sheet Shock Absorption 

Almost the same story applies to Aboitiz Equity Ventures. 

While AEV publicly emphasizes energy security, stability, market dominance, and regulatory influence as its core priorities, the weakening macro economy reveals a different angle.

Figure 5 

AEV posted Q3 revenues of +19.6%, pushing net income up +12.8%. (Figure 5, upper visual) 

But on a 9M basis, revenues were only +2.84% while net income fell –10.6% — a clear mismatch between quarterly momentum and year-to-date weakness. 

In its 17Q report, AEV notes that fresh contributions from Chromite Gas Holdings, Inc. (CGHI) drove the 5% rise in equity earnings from investees. This aligns precisely with the pattern seen in Meralco: newly consolidated or newly transferred assets creating a one-off jump. 

Meanwhile, the balance sheet shows the real story: 

• Debt surged 24.3% to Php 460.7B
• Cash jumped 15% to Php 90.84B
• Assets expanded 14.94% to Php 971B 

A sudden Q3 revenue surge combined with a weak 9M total is entirely consistent with: 

• Newly absorbed assets booking revenue only after transfer
• Acquisition timing falling post–June 2025
• Consolidation effects appearing sharply in Q3 

This means the revenue spike is not organic growth — it is the accounting after-effect of assets acquired or transferred in 1H but only recognized operationally in Q3. 

AEV’s cash swelling amid rapid debt accumulation strongly suggests:

• bridging loans used during staged acquisition payments
• temporary liquidity buffers ahead of full transfer pricing
• staggered settlement structures typical in large utility-energy asset sales
• pending regulatory approvals delaying full cash deployment 

Cash rises first → debt stays elevated → assets revalue → revenue shows up later. 

This pattern is classic in large asset transfers, not in real economic expansion. 

2.2A AEV’s Q3–9M: Not Evidence of Business Growth 

They are the accounting shadow of San Miguel’s 1H asset unloading—financed by AEV’s debt surge and disguised as operational growth. 

What looks like stability is really fragility recycling: AEV, like Meralco, has become a balance-sheet counterparty absorbing the system-wide effects of SMC’s asset-lightening strategy, with short-term profitability masking long-term stress. 

Segment 3.0 — The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI Triangle 

3.A How One Deal Created Three Balance-Sheet Miracles 

If Segment 2 showed the operational weakness across SMC, Meralco, and Aboitiz, Segment 3 explains why their balance sheets still looked strangely “strong.” 

The answer lies in one of 2025’s most consequential but least-understood restructurings: 

The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI triangle. 

This single transaction is the hidden engine behind the debt spikes, asset jumps, and sudden income boosts in Q2–Q3. 

Once you see this triangle, everything else snaps into place. 

1. The Triangle in One Line 

This wasn’t three companies expanding. 

It was one deal split three ways, enabling:

• SMC to book gains and create a “deleveraging” illusion
• Meralco to justify its 139% debt explosion
• Aboitiz to absorb a 24% debt spike while looking “strategically positioned” 

All this happened without producing a single additional unit of electricity. 

While the EERI–Ilijan complex is designed to deliver 1,200–2,500 MW of gas-fired capacity, as of Q3 only 850 MW are fully operational and a 425 MW unit remains uncertified — meaning the promised output exists largely on paper, not yet in reliable commercial dispatch. This reinforces the point: the triangle deal moved balance sheets faster than it delivered power.

2. How the Triangle Worked 

Here’s the real flow: 

• SMC restructured and monetized its stakes in Ilijan, Excellent Energy Resources Inc. (EERI) and Batangas LNG terminal
• Meralco bought in — financed almost entirely by new debt
• AboitizPower bought in — also financed by new debt 

The valuation uplift flowed back to SMC, booked as income and “deleveraging progress” 

The result: 

• All three balance sheets expanded
• None of them improved real output
• This was transaction-driven balance-sheet inflation, not industrial growth. 

3. Why This Triangle Matters: It Solves Every Q3 Puzzle 

Without this transaction, Q3 numbers look impossible:

• Meralco’s debt doubling despite falling electricity volume
• AEV’s Php 90B debt jump despite declining operating income
• SMC’s “improving leverage” despite worsening cash burn 

Once the triangle is added back in, the contradictions vanish:

• Meralco and AEV levered up to buy SMC’s assets
• SMC booked the valuation uplift as earnings
• All three appeared financially healthier — e.g. cash reserves jumped— without becoming economically healthier (Figure 5, middle graph) 

Q3 looked disconnected from reality because it was. 

4. The Illusion of Progress 

On paper:

• SMC: higher profit
• Meralco: larger asset base
• AEV: greater scale 

In substance:

• SMC gave up future revenue streams
• Meralco and AEV loaded up on liabilities
• System-wide fragility increased— e.g. accelerates the rising trend of financing charges. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

The triangle recycles the same underlying cash flows, but layers more leverage on them. 

This is growth by relabeling, not growth by production. 

5. What This Signals for 2025–2026 

The triangle exposes the real state of Philippine corporate finance:

• cash liquidity is tight
• banks are reaching their risk limits
• debt has become the default funding model
• GDP “growth” is being propped up by inter-corporate transactions, not capex
• conglomerates are supporting each other through balance-sheet swaps 

Most importantly: 

This is a leverage loop, not an investment cycle. The mainstream is confusing balance-sheet inflation for economic progress. 

The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI triangle created no new power capacity. Instead, it created the appearance of corporate strength.

Segment 4.0: Conclusion: How Concentration Becomes Crisis: The Philippine Energy Paradox 

The Philippine energy sector operates as a political monopoly with only the façade of market competition. 

The triad of San Miguel, Aboitiz, and Meralco illustrates deepening centralization, pillared on a political–economic feedback loop. 

Major industry transactions, carried out with either administration blessing or tacit nudging, function as implicit bailouts channeled through oligarchic control. 

This further entrenches concentration, while regulatory capture blinds the BSP, DOE, and ERC to mounting risks—encouraging moral hazard and ever-bolder risk-taking in expectation of eventual government backstops. 

This concentration funnels public and private savings into monopolistic hands, fueling outsized debt that competes directly with banks and government borrowings, intensifying crowding-out dynamics, resulting in worsening savings conditions, suppressing productivity gains, and constraining consumer growth. 

Fragility risks do not stop with the borrowers: counterparties—savers, local and foreign lenders, banks, and bond markets—are exposed as well, creating the potential for contagion across the broader economy. 

The feedback loop is self-reinforcing: policies fuel malinvestments, these malinvestments weaken the economy, and weakness justifies further interventions that deepen concentration, heighten vulnerability, and accelerate structural maladjustments. 

Viewed through a theoretical lens, San Miguel’s ever-expanding leverage fits a Minsky-style financial instability pattern—now extending into deals that serve as camouflaged backstops. This reflects what I call "benchmark-ism": an engineered illusion of stability designed to pull wool over the public’s eyes, mirroring Kindleberger’s cycle of manipulation, fraud, and corruption. 

Taken together, these dynamics reveal unmistakable symptoms of late-cycle fragility. 

What is framed as reform is, in truth, a vicious cycle of concentration, political capture, extraction, and systemic decay. 

____ 

references 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong, Substack, August 24, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Is San Miguel’s Ever-Growing Debt the "Sword of Damocles" Hanging over the Philippine Economy and the PSE? December 02, 2024

 

Philippines' Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus, June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates—A Statistical Pump

 

Measurement problems abound. The housing component, frequently constituting a quarter of inflation indices, often uses the owners’ equivalent rent, which is highly subjective, with a small change in weighting—such as for single-family homes—affecting the outcome. There are multiple measures—consumer price index, producer price index, GDP price deflator— that produce different, often irreconcilable, results. Data-dependent central bankers can fit the statistics to policy—Satyajit Das 

In this issue:

Philippines' Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus, June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates—A Statistical Pump

I. June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates Hit Second to the Highest Level: A Statistical Pump

II. Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus

III. The Unintended Consequences of Raising Government Salaries in the Philippines

IV. Q2 GDP: Consumers Struggle Under Marcos-nomics

V. The GDP is Debt: GDP Won’t Outgrow Total Debt or Systemic Leverage

VI. Q2 GDP Boosted by Devaluation Effect Amid Semiconductor Export Plunge and Stagnant Capital and Consumer Goods Imports

VII. The Money Illusion: Utility GDP Manifest ‘Undeflated’ Inflation; Real Estate GDP Reveals Worsening Signs of Malinvestments

VIII. The Disconnect between GDP Growth and the PSEi 30’s Performance

Philippines' Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus, June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates—A Statistical Pump

"Marcos-nomics stimulus" powered Q2 GDP’s 6.3% as consumers struggled and as the government juiced up employment rate data

I. June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates Hit Second to the Highest Level: A Statistical Pump 

Businessworld, August 11, 2024: THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE in June fell to 3.1%, the lowest in two decades, as hiring in the construction sector surged, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported on Wednesday. Preliminary data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) showed the jobless rate slipped from 4.1% in May and 4.5% in June 2023. The June unemployment rate was the same as in December 2023. It was also the lowest jobless rate since April 2005, when the statistics agency revised its definition of unemployed to Filipinos aged 15 years and older without a job, available for work, and actively seeking one. This translated to 1.62 million unemployed Filipinos in June, down by 486,000 from 2.11 million in May. Year on year, unemployment went down by 707,000 from 2.33 million in June 2023. 

Beyond such sanguine statistics lies the issue of how this record number of employment rates was achieved. 

Essentially, who has been investing?

Figure 1

The Philippines has a low savings rate (even when calculated based on inflated GDP statistics), foreign direct investments (FDIs) remain subdued (despite Php 4 trillion promises of investment from geopolitical allies of the administration), and the distribution in the growth of the Universal Commercial (UC) bank credit expansion remains heavily skewed toward consumers and the real estate sector. (Figure 1)

The next question is: who has been hiring?

Figure 2

The June data record employment data reveals that the primary source of hiring has been the construction sector: quarter-on-quarter (1.2 million), month-on-month (680,000), and year-to-date (556,000). This massive job expansion largely stems from government-related projects, as confirmed by the industry’s boost to the Q2 GDP. (Figure 2, lowest graph)

The second-lowest unemployment rate was supported by a jump in labor participation rates. (Figure 2, topmost chart)

On a month-on-month and quarterly basis, the agricultural sector represented second-largest employers. Despite staggering losses due to weather-related challenges (Typhoon Carina estimated at Php 3.04 billion and El Niño’s Php 9.5 billion) and structural issues from inflation and other industry imbalances (e.g., entrenched protectionism), the agricultural sector added 571,000 jobs month-on-month and 497,000 jobs quarter-on-quarter. (Figure 2 middle window)

Ironically, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), agricultural volume reportedly plunged by 13% in Q2.

Government employment data suggest that agricultural investors appear to be immune to profit and loss conditions, as evidenced by the hiring spree despite ongoing losses and stagnation.

In reality, the only entity not subject to profit and loss is the government, whose existence depends on forced transfers from the public.

The trade industry was the third-largest employer month-on-month in June. Given the lackluster performance of consumers, who have become heavily dependent on credit, it is likely that we should see a reversal soon.

The PSA’s labor survey data represent one of the 31 data sources used for GDP calculation. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) and GDP are highly sensitive political-economic data, which means they are prone to reflecting the agenda of their creators rather than providing unbiased and objective estimates. 

Let us hear it from the horse’s mouth (bold added): 

CPI allows individuals, businesses, and policymakers to understand inflation trends, make economic decisions, and adjust financial plans accordingly. The CPI is also used to adjust other economic series for price changes. For example, CPI components are used as deflators for most personal consumption expenditures in the calculation of the gross domestic product.  Moreover, it serves as a basis to adjust the wages in labor management contracts, as well as pensions and retirement benefits. Increases in wages through collective bargaining agreements use the CPI as one of their bases. (PSA, FAQ on CPI) 

The System of National Accounts (SNA) helps economists to measure the level of economic development and the rate of economic growth, the change in consumption, saving, consumption, investment, debt and wealth of the economy. From the data of SNA, economists can either forecast the future growth of the economy or study impacts on the economy and the institutional sectors of identified government policies and programs. (PSA, FAQ on CPI)

Recent data suggests that authorities have inflated employment figures to boost the GDP. 

II. Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus 

In a nutshell, is the BSP concerned about how the gloomy views of consumers and businesses may translate into weaker GDP growth? (Prudent Investor, June 2024) 

It is not helpful when the establishment confuses the GDP with the overall economy, for the simple reason that the GDP has been skewed to reflect the growth of the government and the elites—the "trickle-down syndrome." (Prudent Investor, July 2024)

So, didn’t we get it right? 

While publicly unstated by authorities, the Q2 GDP growth of 6.3% represented the "Marcos-nomics" stimulus, which was anchored by near-record historic spending in Q2.

Figure 3

First, despite the cheerleading by the establishment and mainstream media, the Q2 2024 GDP remained below the exponential trend line of pre-pandemic nominal and real GDP. (Figure 3, topmost image)

Second, Q2 GDP was, in essence, another story of "Marcos-nomics ": government spending surged by 14.8% (nominal) and 10.7% (real), with government GDP posting a 16.8% share, marking its fourth highest level in the national accounts. (Figure 3, second to the highest window)

Once more, Q2 GDP validated our analysis and forecasts.

Third, Government GDP understated the public sector’s contribution to national GDP. Construction GDP was chiefly responsible for the 9.5% and 11.5% growth spikes in gross fixed capital and gross capital formation, accounting for 71.1% and 71.25% of the latter, respectively. (Figure 3, second to the lowest graph)

Importantly, real Construction GDP also represented 19.4% of the national GDP—an all-time high! 

As a side note, the surge in jobs in this sector most likely relates to government-related construction projects or contractors. 

Combined with government spending, direct government expenditures accounted for 27.4% of the Q2 2024 national accounts—the second highest ever! (Figure 3, lowest image)

Of course, this data exclusively represents direct expenditures.

The private sector’s direct contribution to government political projects (e.g., PPPs), as well as the direct and indirect supply and demand chains of these entities and those associated with the bureaucracy, are not included.

Briefly, the government’s direct and indirect contributions to the economy may easily account for about two quarters or approximately 40% of GDP.

So, while the government promotes partial economic liberalization to the public (benefiting the elites), it has been centralizing the economy through the administrative and bureaucratic state, the welfare state, and the warfare state.

The government doles out crumbs of liberalization while fortifying its political stranglehold on the economy.

Domestic wars (against vices such as drugs and POGOs, as well as inflation and poverty) and the promotion of nationalism to expand the warfare state has led to increased socialism or neo-socialism (fascism/cronyism). 

The essence of so-called war prosperity; it enriches some by what it takes from others. It is not rising wealth but a shifting of wealth and income. (Mises 1919) 

This shifting of income is most evident in the erosion of consumer spending. 

III. The Unintended Consequences of Raising Government Salaries in the Philippines 

As an aside, the political leadership has announced that it will begin increasing salaries for government bureaucrats in three tranches. 

Beyond the overall impact of adding to the record fiscal deficit, if government pay levels rise above those in the market economy, it could attract more individuals into the bureaucracy at the expense of the private sector. The rising cost of employment would exacerbate the crowding-out effect on the private sector. 

Since the government does not generate wealth on its own but instead extracts resources from the private sector through direct and indirect taxes, any increase in household spending by bureaucrats is likely to be offset by a decrease in spending by the private sector.

Moreover, this situation could lead to greater politicization of the hiring process, entrenching corruption, favoritism, and nepotism.

Jobs may increasingly be awarded to the highest bidders, friends, personal networks, or as payoffs for political favors. There will likely be more "ghost employees."

Consequently, the motivation of those in power is to increase economic interventions by introducing more laws, funded by the continuing expansion of the government’s budget, which should deepen the centralization process through the expansion of the administrative state. 

Figure 4 

According to the Civil Service Commission, the number of government employees in the new administration vaulted in 2023.  Consider how rising salaries in 2024 might lead to further increases in government jobs. (Figure 4, highest diagram) 

IV. Q2 GDP: Consumers Struggle Under Marcos-nomics 

Circling back to consumer spending: 

Although real consumer spending grew at the same rate of 4.6% in Q1 and Q2, the share of real consumer GDP plummeted from 74.4% to 67.8% as the share of government spending spiked. (Figure 4, second to the highest pane)

This trend is not an anomaly; such an antipodal path has emerged since the advent of the new millennium. This divergence accelerated in 2016 and intensified further during the pandemic recession.

Moreover, since peaking in Q1 2022, the downtrend in consumer spending growth continued into 2024, even as trade and retail GDP marginally outperformed at 6.6% in Q1 and 5.8% in Q2. (Figure 4, second to the lowest chart)

They failed to recognize that BSP policies—characterized by liquidity injections and bank credit expansion rather than productivity growth—were the primary drivers of this trend.

In other words, a large segment of retail entrepreneurs has clearly misread signals indicating that the recent bout of "revenge" spending is "sustainable."

Consequently, the rising vacancies in commercial, office, and residential properties translate to mounting losses and rising credit delinquencies that have yet to surface in bank data.

The poor top-line performance of several PSE-listed firms, which have reported their Q2 2024 results, underscores this issue.

Furthermore, consumer spending per capita continues to erode, ironically, despite record-high employment rates.  More evidence of inflated employment rates? (Figure 4, lowest graph)

V. The GDP is Debt: GDP Won’t Outgrow Total Debt or Systemic Leverage

By the same token, rising leverage has barely added to consumer spending.

UC bank lending to consumers grew by 25.01% to a record Php 1.4 trillion (excluding real estate loans) last June, marking its sixth consecutive quarter of over 25+% growth. In contrast, nominal consumer spending GDP grew by 4.6% in the first half of the year. This translates to Php 5 borrowed for every Php 1 of consumer GDP produced!

Incredible.

Figure 5

In the same vein, historic levels of systemic leverage (public debt plus UC bank credit) have barely supported growth in consumer spending per capita. (Figure 5, topmost image)

The aggregate UC Bank credit plus public debt in June amounted to an unprecedented Php 27.23 trillion, representing 108% of the annualized 2024 GDP!

Authorities are engaged in peddling smoke and mirrors, or advocating the GDP myth, when they claim that the GDP growth rate will outgrow public debt.

Fundamentally, a significant portion of GDP is derived from debt-financed public spending, which means public debt is a crucial factor behind GDP.  So how can GDP outgrow debt when deficit financing—the current driver—is based on debt? 

Secondly, similar to the period from 2009 to 2018, when slower public spending reduced the public debt-to-GDP ratio, banking debt to GDP took over. Banking credit expansion to the private sector became the principal source of finance for government revenue. (Figure 5, second to the highest diagram) 

Debt doesn’t melt away; it is juggled! 

In summary, under today’s de facto fiat money system, GDP is essentially debt. 

Today, we are now witnessing the twin engines of debt operating at full throttle. 

VI. Q2 GDP Boosted by Devaluation Effect Amid Semiconductor Export Plunge and Stagnant Capital and Consumer Goods Imports 

The devaluation effect or stronger US dollar FX via a weaker peso also magnified the contributions of external trade to GDP. 

Yet, the 29.5% plunge in semiconductor exports underscores the fragile state of local producers. Real manufacturing GDP increased by 3.6% (slower than the 4.4% growth in Q1), even as UC bank credit growth to the sector rose by 8.94% (down from 10.11% in Q1). (Figure 5, second to the lowest window) 

Stagnant nominal imports of capital and consumer goods in June further reinforce the lethargy of the private sector. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

In addition to the slowing retail GDP, other sectors in the industry show signs of weakness.

Figure 6

The previously smoldering GDP of the Accommodation and Food Services sectors has dramatically slowed to their lowest growth levels since Q1 2022. Accommodation GDP fell from 16.1% to 12.9% in Q2, while Food Services GDP dropped from 11.8% to 9.4%. (Figure 6, topmost chart)

In seeming confirmation, air transport Cebu Pacific's Q2 2024 revenue growth of 15.3% pulled its H1 2024 growth lower to 18.1%. Meanwhile, PAL's Q2 2024 revenues contracted by 0.3%, which also weighed on its 1H 2024 revenue growth, reducing it to 3.97%.

Still, the transport GDP surged from 5.4% in Q1 to 14.8% in Q2. Air transport GDP spiked 22%.

VII. The Money Illusion: Utility GDP Manifest ‘Undeflated’ Inflation; Real Estate GDP Reveals Worsening Signs of Malinvestments 

Furthermore, while the Utilities GDP (electricity, steam, water, and waste management) outperformed in Q2 2024, rising from 4.3% in Q1 to 6.1%, its real growth (despite being netted out by the deflator) reflects the oscillations of the CPI. (Figure 6, middle image)

This highlights the "money illusion"—GDP attributed to growth when, in fact, it reflects changes in spending caused by price fluctuations.

Elevated inflation, rising interest rates, and increasing leverage and non-productive economic activities have severely constrained consumer spending.

Lastly, the supply side segment of the Real Estate (RE) sector via its GDP surged from 4.5% in Q1 to 7.2% in Q2 2024.

The industry's GDP has been backed by a surge in loan growth.

UC bank lending to the RE sector’s supply side expanded by 12.34%, marking growth rates above 10% for the eighth consecutive month.

Interestingly, despite the sector’s strong Q2 GDP performance, its value-added contribution to national accounts continues to dwindle, with its share of the total falling from 5.6% to 5.4% in Q2 2024, reinforcing its downtrend. (Figure 6, lowest graph)

On the other hand, the share of bank lending to the sector continues to rebound after an interim low in Q3 2023. 

That is, more borrowing results in lesser and lesser value-added contributions or diminishing returns, which are signs of escalating malinvestments. 

VIII. The Disconnect between GDP Growth and the PSEi 30’s Performance

Anyhow, the establishment and social media seem desperate to see the PSEi 30 rise, attributing any good news to it.

For instance, some claim that Friday’s rebound was caused by a "stronger economy. " Baloney. 

On the contrary, this reflects the politicization of the PSEi 30 through attribution bias: if the index falls, external forces are blamed; but when it rises, credit is claimed for any internal factor, with indirect allusions to politics.

Figure 7

Of course, cheerleaders—who don’t declare their interests—evade the details. They fail to mention the engineered pumps. (Figure 7, topmost visuals) 

Friday’s syndicated rescue operations, which centered on the Sy Group of companies (comprising 32.4% of the PSEi 30 as of August 10th), erased the week’s losses and delivered a 0.64% weekly return on mediocre volume. 

Yet, why hasn’t GDP been boosting the PSE? 

First, GDP is not the economy.  While it attempts to measure the complex nature of millions of moving parts operating spontaneously—supposedly reflecting the economy—it cannot do so effectively. 

This is because one cannot average spending on rice with subscriptions for software. Individual utilities are not only subjective but also change frequently. I may want a burger for one meal but spaghetti for the next, depending on my means and willingness to pay the offered price. 

Second, the distribution of costs and gains is uneven. 

Record government spending benefits politicians, the bureaucracy, and their cronies, while small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which can hardly access formal credit, barely benefit from such political activities.  Instead, the costs are borne by average citizens. 

In a corporatist or neo-fascist state, benefits are concentrated while costs are diffused, resulting in privatized gains and socialized losses. 

Third, despite the myriad regulations designed to curtail and control it, market economies operate on the division of labor and division of knowledge. Unfortunately, specialization, knowledge, and entrepreneurial skills cannot be averaged. 

Fourth, statistics are historical accounts derived from selective assumptions that incorporate specific inputs and calculations. They do not encompass all the causal factors that lead to multifarious and intertemporal outcomes. 

Fifth and finally, the PSE-GDP data indicate that there is confusion in associating a high GDP with the performance of the PSEi 30, which is currently in a bear market. (Figure 7, middle window) 

The GDP trendline has failed to revert to its former trajectory, which coincides with the PSEi 30’s bear market. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

Given its structural trickle-down political-economic framework, which is entirely dependent on debt, it also bears substantial balance sheet risk. 

The consensus overlooked the last and most critical aspect of the economy. 

Fifteen minutes of glory doesn’t a bull market make. 

____

References: 

Philippine Statistics Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, Consumer Price Index, psa.org.ph 

Philippine Statistics Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, Philippine System of National Accounts (PSNA), psa.org.ph 

Prudent Investor, Could the Philippine Government Implement a 'Marcosnomics' Stimulus Blending BSP Rate Cuts and Accelerated Deficit Spending? June 30, 2024 

Prudent Investor, Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth July 14, 2024 

Ludwig von Mises, Nation, State, and Economy, 1919 p.190, Mises.org