Sunday, March 03, 2024

2023 Philippine Deficit Spending: Surging Debt and Debt Servicing and the Widening Impact of the Crowding Out Effect; December’s Unreported Historic Data!

 

Deficit spending is printing money, and it erodes the purchasing power of the currency while destroying the opportunities for the private sector to invest. The entire burden of higher taxes and inflation falls on the middle class and small businesses—Daniel Lacalle

 

In this issue

2023 Philippine Deficit Spending: Surging Debt and Debt Servicing and the Widening Impact of the Crowding Out Effect; December’s Unreported Historic Data!

I.  Unreported by Media: December 2023’s Record Public Spending and Historic Deficit

II. Statistical Charade? Expenditure Boom: The Soaring Share of Interest Payments on Debt

III. Above 1997 Asian Crisis Levels: Near Record 2023 Debt-to-GDP and Debt Servicing-to-GDP approaching 2011 Highs

IV. The Pandora’s Box of Risks: Increasing Dependency on Monetary Liquidity

V. Twin Deficits: The Bigger the Government, The Larger the Crowding Out Effect

VI. Crowding Out of Local Savings Means Increased Dependency on Foreign Money

VII. Crowding Out Effect: Historic Deficit Spending Equals Reduced Private Consumption

 

2023 Philippine Deficit Spending: Surging Debt and Debt Servicing and the Widening Impact of the Crowding Out Effect; December’s Unreported Historic Data!


In 2023, Philippine deficit spending remains in a "stimulus mode."  Yet risks continue to mount as the adverse impact from rising debt, debt servicing, and the crowding effect spreads. 


I.  Unreported by Media: December 2023’s Record Public Spending and Historic Deficit

 

Inquirer.net, March 1 2024: The government’s budget deficit hit P1.512 trillion in 2023, 6.32 percent smaller than the shortfall recorded in 2022 but overshot the target of P1.499 trillion, according to data released on Thursday by the Bureau of the Treasury. This meant that last year’s fiscal gap, as a share of the country’s gross domestic product, stood at 6.2 percent, significantly narrower than the 7.3-percent ratio in 2022, but slightly above the Marcos administration’s deficit cap of 6.1 percent for 2023…Explaining the latest outturn, the Treasury said the smaller year-on-year deficit demonstrates “progress of fiscal consolidation.”

 

Here is what the media didn't say (other media outlets also silent on this). 

 

Though they cited the 2023 outcome relative to the targets, they missed explaining how the deficit breached the government's goals.


Figure 1

 

Pointedly, public spending and fiscal deficit (in peso) hit all-time highs in December!   All. Time.  Highs. (Figure 1, topmost chart)

 

In percentage, public spending numbers looked unimpressive.  It grew by only 2.24% in December, 1.71% in Q4, and 3.42% in 2023.  But statistics can be deceiving.  The reason for this is the "high" base effects!  This year's December record expenditures of Php 661 billion took the tiara from December 2022’s Php 646.6 billion.

 

But how about revenues?

 

Revenues contributed less to the 2023 deficit.  

 

Revenue growth contracted by 3.03% in December, grew by 11.05% in Q4, and 7.9% in 2023 to a record Php 3.824 trillion. (Figure 1, middle window)

 

Briefly, public spending has become the primary determinant of the balance sheet health of the Philippine government!  

 

Its relentless growth brings to the fore some burning questions:

 

-Is the Philippine economy in trouble to require an acceleration of "fiscal stabilizers?"

 

-How could Treasury officials describe this as "fiscal consolidation" when the deficit-to-GDP remains in highly accommodative "stimulus" mode? (Figure 1, lowest graph)

 

Figure 2

 

-Why does the BSP call its actions "tightening" when public debt skyrocketed to a fresh record of Php 14.79 trillion in January 2024? (Figure 2, topmost diagram)

 

-Or is it just the addiction to free lunch politics for the government?

 

II. Statistical Charade? Expenditure Boom: The Soaring Share of Interest Payments on Debt

 

The share of government expenditures (ex-construction) to the NGDP was at 14.2% in 2023.

 

However, using the same Bureau of Treasury (BoTr) data to get the 6.2% debt-to-NGDP, public spending-to-NGDP jumped to 22% in 2023! 

 

So, which is accurate, the PSA's GDP data or the BoTr? Or is the government using an apples-to-oranges comparison to sugarcoat actual conditions?

 

Yet the mainstream impulse has been to ignore or discount the cost of government deficit spending to the (real) economy.

 

With its growing role, the carrying cost of the mounting debt levels represents a major negative factor. 

 

The thing is, an expansive government, the higher the debt load.  Higher debt levels, which weigh on the economy, increase various risk factors covering a wide swath of society (economic, financial, social, and political).

 

In 2023, aside from national expenditures, whose % share expanded from 63.5% to 66.7%, interest payments also soared from 9.75% to 11.8%. (Figure 2, middle pane)

 

While the BoTr data apportions interest payments in the expenditure data, it does not specify its treatment on amortizations. 

 

Nevertheless, total public debt reached a record Php 14.62 trillion in 2023, while debt servicing (interest + amortization) costs surged to an unprecedented Php 1.603 trillion.  (Figure 2, lowest graph)


Figure 3

 

The share of debt servicing has been rising in the context of the budget, viz., revenues (45%) and expenditures (30%) in 2023. (Figure 3, topmost chart)

 

Since bottoming in 2019, the debt onus has started to climb and accelerated in 2023.

 

III. Above 1997 Asian Crisis Levels: Near Record 2023 Debt-to-GDP and Debt Servicing-to-GDP approaching 2011 Highs

 

That's not all. 

 

"This time is different." So they say.

 

While we are no fan of comparing public debt to GDP because of its crucial flaws, after a historic 62.6% in 2021, debt-to-GDP in 2023 was at 60.2%—the third highest! 

 

In the meantime, debt servicing to GDP has swiftly been closing to its 2011 highs!

 

Please note that both variables are HIGHER than the pre-1997 Asian Crisis levels—where debt and debt servicing to GDP exploded when the denominator (GDP) shrank. (Figure 3, middle graph)

 

While debt levels have been constantly rising, a sudden or precipitate slowdown in the GDP (or a recession) would push these ratios to unseen levels!

 

Add to this conditions that debt-financed public spending accounts for about a fifth to a quarter of the GDP—which excludes private sector resources and finances committed to public projects—meaning the economy has transformed into increasing dependence on big government.

 

This fact disputes all purported actions intended supposedly to liberalize the economy, e.g. economic cha-cha.

 

Yet, the debt amortizations—possibly including the unsustainable military pensions—continue to grab a larger share of overall debt payments. But most of the time, public’s attention has been directed towards interest payments alone.

 

That's right. 

 

Statistical opacity may have disguised the actual leveraged conditions of the Philippine balance sheet.   The widening gap between Philippine debt levels and public spending exhibits this likely anomaly. 

 

Yes, the rolling over of public debt may be one of the contributors, but this does not account for the black hole in amortizations.

 

2023 reinforced the uptrend in the share of amortization and the downtrend in interest payments, which accounted for a 60:40 distribution ratio. (Figure 3, lowest diagram)

 

IV. The Pandora’s Box of Risks: Increasing Dependency on Monetary Liquidity

 

Unlike mainstream wisdom, debt levels don't melt away.  Everything is interconnected.  Public debt is entwined with the financial system and the political economy.

 

The previous decline in public debt to GDP (2009-2019) was a function of financial juggling

 

While public spending rose marginally (compared to the present), bank credit substituted for economic financing.  Or, growth financed by bank credit expansion filled the Philippine treasury's coffers. 

 

In 2020, the government shifted from relying on bank credit expansion to public spending to support the GDP.   The pandemic recession amplified this shift, where public debt financing reasserted its dominance.

Figure 4

 

Overall, systemic leveraging (public and Universal and Commercial bank credit) has been cumulative and accounted for a staggering 109% of the GDP in 2023! (Figure 4, topmost graph) The numbers exclude informal debt. 

 

Except for the slowdown in 2009-2010 and 2012-2014, which represented noise, the uptrend in systemic leverage exploded in 2020. 

 

The ramification of the collaboration to inject liquidity by the BSP and its banking cartel was a massive expansion in leverage.

 

The concerted efforts of the BSP and the banks (as well as other financial institutions) resulted in the unparalleled monetization of public debt (net claims on central government or NCoCG) intended to keep the system afloat in liquidity and support collateral values that backed the financial industry's leverage or loans.  (Figure 4, middle chart)

 

Aside from repos, the BSP recently included "BSP Securities" (short-term bills) to augment bank liquidity operations.  Bank credit expansion and these combined operations boosted the money supply levels to historic proportions.

 

As further proof, money supply growth from the BSP and the banking system has entirely financed the record deficits (and debt amortization).  

 

M3-to-GDP rocketed to an all-time high of 79% in 2021, and despite the recent slide, it still accounted for a whopping 72% in 2023! (Figure 4, lowest window)

 

As a stand-alone metric, debt-to-GDP doesn't capture such interrelationships and its attendant risks.

 

Behind the buoyant GDP and other macro indicators lies a Pandora's Box of disguised risks.

 

As Austrian economist Peter St. Onge recently tweeted, "Statistics aren't designed to inform, they're designed to hide the truth."

 

V. Twin Deficits: The Bigger the Government, The Larger the Crowding Out Effect

 

There is also the crowding out effect. 

 

The government doesn't create wealth.  It is funded by taxing its constituents.  Or, since the government taxes, borrows (future taxes), or resorts to inflation to fund its consumption, this constrains the finances and resources of the private sector—the crowding out effect

 

Yes, the government sells some of its consumption activities as "investments," even though they limit the role of the marketplace, which distorts "returns" and increases economic misallocations.

 

Besides, because there is no market price for government functions, such as police, etc., economic calculation barely exists.

 

What's more, popular themes and implicit agendas of the political leaders determine political actions and policies rather than P/L statements.

 

A reduction in production is a repercussion of the "crowding out effect," or when the government competes with the private sector for resources, which leads to increasing dependence on imports.

 

A colossal transformation in the banking system has augmented this structural shift towards record deficit spending: the metamorphosis towards consumer credit. 

 

It is no surprise that record trade deficits have accommodated these monumental developments.

Figure 5

 

The TWIN DEFICITS translate to a splurge in spending or overspending to boost the GDP funded by household savings and external borrowing.  (Figure 5, topmost graph)

 

The Philippine economic model embodies the Keynesian framework of (indiscriminate debt funded) spending to achieve prosperity.

 

VI. Crowding Out of Local Savings Means Increased Dependency on Foreign Money

 

Instead of utopia, we witnessing a boom-bust cycle in motion.

 

Another consequence of the increasing dependence on the leviathan is the crowding out of liquidity—as the government competes with the financial industry and non-financial enterprises for access to household savings. 

 

The banking system's decaying cash-to-deposits have corresponded with the swelling of the fiscal deficits.  The deteriorating ratio is a function of decreasing cash and deposit growth rate. (Figure 5, middle image)

 

The drain in household savings translates to reduced investment capacity from local investors.  This shortfall extrapolates to increasing dependence on FDIs, meaning the domestic economy becomes more sensitive to global developments.

 

However, debt flows have comprised the majority of Philippine FDIs, which comprised an average of 68.5% from January to November 2023, which could mean bridge financing than new investments. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

Figure 6

 

As evidence of savings shortfall, the deteriorating peso volume of the PSE correlates with the enlarged budget deficit. (Figure 6, topmost illustration)

 

The BSP’s external debt levels have also risen in tandem with the deficit-to-GDP ratio, which underscores the increasing dependence on foreign savers. (Figure 6, middle graph)

 

Remember, someone has to fund such spending binges!


VII. Crowding Out Effect: Historic Deficit Spending Equals Reduced Private Consumption

 

Finally, with the government reducing savings and investments, it would be natural to expect a decline in the private sector's household sector's consumption. (Figure 6, lowest diagram)

 

At present, the supposed interim trend "recovery" in per capita household spending reflects the outsized growth in bank consumer loans rather than productivity growth.  

Figure 7

 

Mounting leverage of one's balance sheet also pulls forward future consumption.  The spike in public debt per capita also led to reduced (private sector) liquidity and diminished consumption—as more resources are diverted to debt servicing. (Figure 7, topmost visual)

 

Declining production, increasing dependence on imports (contributes to the weakening peso), and record liquidity expansion have combined to push higher demand, therefore, the uptrend in the CPI (inflation) cycle, which also contributes to the decrease of the consumer's purchasing power. (Figure 7, middle image)

 

So even with the employment rates reportedly hitting a record high last December, consumers have reported reduced spending growth rates!  Ironic, right?


VIII. The BSP as the Keyman Role for Deficit Financing, The Erosion of Fiscal Latitude

 

Government spending also redistributes financial and economic resources to those allied, affiliated, popular demands of the moment, logrolling, underhanded deals, by coercion, or to preferred political subjects (patronage politics). 

 

Once again, this means increased misallocations, concealed losses, and the erosion of productivity, which result in a massive pileup of deficits, exacerbating corrosion in savings and purchasing power and the increased use of leveraging to disguise risks.

 

Widening inequality is a consequence of such political redistribution—favoring political agents and politically connected entities at the expense of the population.

 

Of course, the BSP assumes a principal role in the massive growth in the imbalances in fiscal, trade resource allocation, and credit buildup.

 

Despite the growth in public debt, the BSP’s low rates regime accommodated the decline in general debt servicing costs (2008-2019). (Figure 7, lowest chart)

 

Yet, rising rates have failed to contain the massive debt growth, which, along with its increasing stock, has caused debt servicing costs to spike to record levels in 2023.

 

Could a third wave of inflation translate to a "game over" for the addiction to financial and monetary leveraging?

 

Not only private sector credit bubbles, the BSP's easy money regime feeds on political boondoggles—responsible for the present and upcoming intensifying growth in twin deficits and their associated risks in the financial system, political economy, and social order.

 

In summary, unlike the US, which has been privileged with the "exorbitant privilege" or the de facto reserve currency of the world, the Philippines can't afford to print its way to prosperity.

 

If the Philippine government continues to use its fiscal tool to bolster the GDP at the present pace, it could lose its latitude to unleash policy "stabilizers" when the "sturm and drang" emergeunless it decides to play with the Russian Roulette of hyperinflation.

 

Good luck to those who believe in the perpetuation of free lunches.

Sunday, February 25, 2024

The Philippine PSEi 30’s Push to 7,000: Low Volume Concentrated Pumps, Gaming the Index, and "Blow-Off Tops"


Be careful here – deteriorating internals matter. The condition of market internals is precisely the same hinge that – in market cycles across history – has separated overvalued markets that continued to advance from overvalued markets that collapsed through a trap door. That’s not to say that stocks must collapse immediately; market peaks are a process, not an event. That’s also not to say that market internals could not improve, which wouldn’t relieve extreme valuations, but could very well defer their immediate consequences—Dr. John P Hussman

 

In this issue

The PSEi 30’s Push to 7,000: Low Volume Concentrated Pumps, Gaming the Index, and "Blow-Off Tops"

I. PSEi 30’s Push to 7,000: Desperately Seeking A Bull Market

II. PSEi 30 Almost Reached 7,000 on Lethargic Volume—Despite Foreign Inflows

III. PSEi 30 7,000: Gaming the Index with End-Session Pumps and Dumps

IV. PSE: Concentrated and Organized Pumps on Lack of Retail Participation

V. PSEi 7,000: Price Pumps Concentrated on ICT and Banks

VI. PSEi 30’s Version of "Blow off Tops," the "Rising Wedge," and the US Tech’s "Mother" of All Bubbles!


The Philippine PSEi 30’s Push to 7,000: Low Volume Concentrated Pumps, Gaming the Index, and "Blow-Off Tops"

 

The thrust to PSEi 30 7,000 can be described as a low-volume, concentrated, and organized institutional pumping, with several "blow-off tops" in the making.


I. PSEi 30’s Push to 7,000: Desperately Seeking A Bull Market

 

The establishment has been seeking desperately to inflate a stock market bubble.

 

The thing is, inorganic rallies tend to devitalize market structure. Bear markets slide down the ladder of hope. 

 

Three critical factors depict the underlying health of the alleged renascence of the "bull market."

 

First.  Despite the winning streak in 7 of 8 weeks in 2024, sluggish volume remains the dominant feature of the PSE.  The depressed volume reinforces the long-term underlying trend.   At the same time, lackluster volume manifests unhealthy or divergent breadth or the distribution of gains and deficits.

 

Two.  End-session pumps and dumps continue to shape the PSEi's 30 daily outcomes.

 

Three.  The PSE continues to be plagued by the concentration of trading activities that have led to increasing market pricing contortions or mispricing. 

 

Figure 1


The PSEi 30 closed the week up .58%, extending its winning streak to 7 in the eight weeks of 2024, increasing YTD returns to 7.2%—one of Asia's leading performers. The Philippine bellwether ranked fifth in the region as of February 23rd. (Figure 1, topmost graph)

 

Buoyed by global financial easing, 15 of the region's 19 national indices closed higher in the week YTD, with an average return of 3.2%.

 

This week, the equity benchmarks of Japan (Nikkei 225) and Taiwan (Taiex) joined the group of national equities that has recently carved all-time highs (ATH) like supposedly "unstoppable" Pakistan’s K-100 and India’s Sensex.  Australia's AU200 seems next in line.

 

The once laggard Philippine equity markets now want to "keep up with the Joneses."

 

Let us deal with this in detail.

 

II. PSEi 30 Almost Reached 7,000 on Lethargic Volume—Despite Foreign Inflows

 

Surprisingly, inertia in mainboard volume has accompanied the push towards the PSEi 30 7,000. (Figure 1, middle window)

 

Yet, mainboard volume includes cross (or intra-broker) trades, which account for about 5 to 10+% of the total.

 

Rapidly rising prices should have enticed the public to redirect excess savings to the stock market, but instead, there has barely been growth in the daily (or even weekly) mainboard volume.


Figure 2


It seems no coincidence that lukewarm growth in universal-commercial bank loan growth and M2 savings have coincided with the general trend of the PSEi 30's recent bear market and the long-term slowdown in volume. (Figure 1, lowest chart; Figure 2, topmost graph)

 

Yet, could rising PSE eventually echo with improved bank loan growth and liquidity in the coming months?

 

And it seems odd that the increased foreign fund flows—while boosting the index levels—have barely contributed to the total turnover growth. (Figure 2, middle pane)

 

In 2024, the PSE reported Php 11.09 billion of fund inflows or about 5.3% of gross volume (as of February 23).   These inflows occurred in 7 of the eight weeks.  Foreign trades accounted for 49.23% of the total turnover.

 

Increased foreign trades are likely symptomatic of mounting leveraged carry trades on the backdrop of a weak Japanese yenChinese yuanrecord low Malaysian ringgit, and others alongside global financial easing.   

 

But the irony is, why the seeming deficiency in the expansion in volume given the streak of foreign inflows?

 

Were these foreign funds—for real?  Or were these part of the international satellites or affiliates of PSE-listed firms owned by the elites?   

 

Why were local institutions selling their "appreciated" holdings of select PSEi 30 firms to these international trend-following institutions? 

 

Aside from volume and price levels, market breadth would have been more potent from these supplementary inflows.

 

III. PSEi 30 7,000: Gaming the Index with End-Session Pumps and Dumps


Two.  Gaming the PSEi 30.

 

As recently explained, if the PSE wanted to improve the efficiency of the capital markets and the economy, it would work to ensure an effective market pricing process.

 

Instead, not only do we get inert volume, but the PSEi 30 levels have been determined by relentless (pre-closing) pumps and dumps via increased volatility of share prices of select market cap heavyweights. 

 

These were the biggest daily (pump and dump) movers during the last two weeks. (Figure 2, lowest diagrams)


Figure 3

 

Although the weekly % share of the top 20 traded issues has risen in 2024, it has slowed recently.   Last week's 81% average (daily) remains significant despite the 2024 average of 83%, meaning some of the volume has spread to the broader market. (Figure 3, topmost pane)

 

IV. PSE: Concentrated and Organized Pumps on Lack of Retail Participation

 

Three.  Concentrated trading activities.

 

The good news is that though some trading activities have spilled over to the broader market, most of the trading actions remain in the hands of the top 20. 

 

Further evidence of this is the bounce in the weekly average of the daily traded issues, which recently hit a one-year high but partly retraced this week. (Figure 3, middle chart)

 

While this may partially signal the perking up of retail activities, the overall turnover and other market internals suggest otherwise. 

 

Instead, the rise in traded issues indicates active trading of institutional accounts spreading to the broader market.

 

Figure 4

 

Aside from the volume slack, the weekly averaged daily trades remain in the doldrums, as the output per trade has bounced in 2024, which suggests increased wholesale transactions (by institutions). (Figure 3, lowest graph: Figure 4, topmost graph)

 

Market breadth remains tilted towards decliners.  Oddly, weekly declining issues were ahead (5/8) in 2024.  The aggregate spread in 2024 was a negative 10 (favoring decliners)—despite the 7.2% increase in the PSEi 30! (Figure 4, middle window)

 

The paradox showcases the participation vacuum from retail activities.

 

Meanwhile, the top 10 (mostly wholesale or institutional) brokers continued to corner a substantial 57.42% of the mainboard volume in the week ending February 23, but slightly lower than the YTD weekly average of 59.32%. (Figure 4, lowest graph)

 

V. PSEi 7,000: Price Pumps Concentrated on ICT and Banks

 

Figure 5

 

The PSEi 30 continues to be driven by the top 5 market heavyweights as their share slipped from a record 48.5% to 48.3%, primarily from the partial pullback of the parabolic ICT.  (Figure 5, topmost chart)

 

Aside from ICT, institutional trades have been rotating towards banks. 

 

The market cap share of the banks—consisting of three PSEi 30 banks—hit an all-time high on February 23, as trades shifted from near-record BDO and BPI to MBT. (Figure 5, middle window)

 

Possibly echoing the Q4 2022Q1 2023, and Q2 2023, Other Financial Corporations (OFC) were the primary buyers of bank shares.  Could they be today's buyers?

 

Ironically, the rotational manic bid on banks comes amidst slowing profit growth (2023) and a rising liquidity gap, which is unlikely to diminish substantially anytime soon.

 

And the panic bids have barely spilled over to the non-PSEi banks, with former members Security Bank (-.14% YTD) and Union Bank (-10.63% YTD) hardly recovering from their recent lows.

 

Such selective outperformance could mean attempts at bolstering the PSEi 30's facade.

 

By the way, BDO (9.27%) has supplanted SMPH (9.24%) as the second-largest free float market cap share in the PSEi 30 (February 23).

 

Once again, the distribution of the market cap share of the PSEi 30 resembles the power law, with seven of the thirty issues commanding a considerable heft. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

 

The market share of the top 10 issues accounted for 71.23% of the PSEi 30 (as of February 23).

 

Yes, the market cap share of other issues contributed to PSEi 30's recent rise (GTCAP, MONDE, BLOOM, and CNPF), but these played a minor role.

 

VI. PSEi 30’s Version of "Blow off Tops," the "Rising Wedge," and the US Tech’s "Mother" of All Bubbles!

Figure 6


The concentrated pumps have led to "parabolic" or extreme upside price actions.

 

Despite the PSEi 30 below 7,000, three issues broke records in 2024 (ICT, MER, and CNPF), while BDO and BPI are at a hair-breadth distance from all-time highs.  (Figure 6, topmost charts)

 

As a side note, even at extended overbought levels for some issues, there should have been a few entities who would take on "shorts." Ironically, there have been ZERO takers for the PSE's "short sell" program!  (I haven't seen any since the PSE began posting the daily short sale on its website)

 

The latest bidding shift to Metrobank, which spilled over to GTCAP, demonstrates the rotational pumps to buoy the PSEi 30.

 

Please observe that intense daily pumps have been directed at a few market cap heavyweights, accompanied by the complimentary push on the other top 10 issues to "power" the PSEi 30 higher—on low volume.

 

Like the artificial peak of 9,041.2 on January 26, 2018, driven by select elite issues (9 record highs that year with little broad market participation), concentrated and organized pumps eventually wear down. 

 

Though agnostic on chart patterns, the PSEi 30 bears the shape of a "rising wedge," which could mean an eventual reversal unless a new formation takes over.  

 

Aside from fundamentals, the recent developments in the PSE's internal structure hardly support a sustained upside momentum, which seems to support the "rising wedge" pattern.

 

Nonetheless, forcing an upsurge in the "markets for the big boys" hardly constitutes organic and spontaneously rooted market pricing, which worsening distortions translate to the mounting risk of a market bust.

 

After all, Philippine BVAL treasury yields continue to rise and have recently steepened across the curve.  Rising yields translate to losses in fixed-income security holdings.  It could heighten inflation risks and escalate liquidity and credit-related strains on an economy swimming in debt.  It could spur higher HTM holdings for banks. (Figure 6, middle pane)

 

In closing, this incredible US tech chart outperforming global tech, which has not only soared way past its long-term average but likely forged a "tailed-event," depicts the extent of intensifying leveraged hyper-speculative activities. (Figure 6, lowest graph)

 

Some would call this a "blow-off top."   

 

It also looks like the "Mother" of all bubbles.

 

Yet, when the US market sneezes, the world markets catch a cold.