Historical research on bank runs indicates that the reason people run is
run is not fear of people running. People typically ran when the bank was
already insolvent. Healthy purpose of closing the bank before the bank lost
even more money. True, the losses were unevenly distributed, depending on
whether you got on the front of the line or the back of the line. In a way,
that provides a useful incentive mechanism: monitor your bank and don't rely on
other people to monitor it for you—Lawrence White
In this issue
The BSP’s One-Two Punch: Can RRR Cuts and PDIC Deposit
Insurance Avert a Liquidity Crisis?
I. From Full Reserves to Fractional Banking: The Risks of
a Zero-Bound RRR
II.
Has the BSP’s "Easing Cycle"—Particularly the RRR Cut—Eased Liquidity
Strains?
III.
Bank Assets: A Tale of Contradictions: Booming Loans and Liquidity Pressures
IV. Bank Credit Boom
Amid Contradictions: Soaring Credit Card NPLs as Real Estate NPLs Ease
V.
Investments: A
Key Source of Liquidity Pressures
VI. Hidden Risks in Held-to-Maturity (HTM) Securities: Government Debt
VII.
Slowing Deposit Growth and the Structural Changes in the Banking System’s Asset
Distribution
VIII.
Liquidity Constraints Fuels Bank Borrowing Frenzy
IX. PDIC’s Doubled Deposit Insurance: A Confidence Tool
or a Risk Mitigant?
X.
Conclusion: Band-aid Solutions Magnify Risks
The BSP’s One-Two Punch: Can RRR Cuts and PDIC Deposit
Insurance Avert a Liquidity Crisis?
Facing the risks from lower
bank reserve requirements, the BSP may have pulled a confidence trick by
doubling deposit insurance. But will it be enough to avert the ongoing
liquidity stress?
I. From Full Reserves to Fractional Banking: The Risks of
a Zero-Bound RRR
Full reserve banking originated during the gold standard era, where
banks acted as custodians of gold deposits and issued paper receipts fully
backed by gold reserves. This system ensured financial stability by preventing
the expansion of money beyond available reserves. However, as banks
realized that depositors rarely withdrew all their funds simultaneously, they
began lending out a portion of deposits, leading to the emergence of fractional
reserve banking.
Over time, governments institutionalized this practice, largely due to
its political convenience—enabling the financing of wars, welfare
programs, and other government expenditures. This shift was epitomized by 1896 Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan's famous speech in which he declared, "You shall
not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!"
Governments reinforced this transition through the creation of
central banks and an expanding framework of regulations, including deposit
insurance. Ultimately, these policies culminated in the abandonment of the
gold standard, most notably with the Nixon Shock of August 1971.
While fractional reserve banking has facilitated economic growth by
expanding credit, it has also introduced significant risks. These
include bank runs and liquidity crises, as seen during the Great
Depression, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2023 U.S. banking crisis;
inflationary pressures from excessive credit creation; and moral hazard,
where banks engage in riskier practices knowing they may be bailed out.
The system’s reliance on high leverage further
contributes to financial fragility.
The risks of fractional reserve banking are amplified when the statutory
reserve requirement (RRR) approaches zero. A zero-bound RRR effectively
removes regulatory constraints on the proportion of deposits banks can lend,
increasing liquidity risk if sudden withdrawals exceed available reserves.
This heightens the probability of bank runs, making institutions
more dependent on central bank intervention for stability.
Additionally, a near-zero RRR expands the money multiplier effect,
increasing the risks of excessive credit creation, exacerbating
asset-liability mismatches, fueling asset bubbles, and intensifying
inflationary pressures—ultimately turning individual failures into systemic
vulnerabilities that repeatedly require central bank intervention.
Without reserve requirements, banking stability relies entirely on the presumed
effectiveness of capital adequacy regulations, liquidity buffers, and
central bank oversight, increasing systemic dependence on monetary
authorities—further assuming they possess both full knowledge and
predictive capabilities (or some combination thereof) necessary to contain
or prevent disorderly outcomes arising from the buildup of unsustainable
financial and economic imbalances (The knowledge problem).
Moreover, increased reliance on these authorities leads to greater
politicization of financial institutions, fostering inefficiencies such
as corruption, regulatory capture, and the revolving door between policymakers
and industry players—further distorting market incentives and deepening
systemic fragility.
Consequently, while a zero-bound RRR enhances short-term credit
availability, it also raises long-term risks of financial instability and
contagion during crises.
At its core, zero-bound RRR magnifies the inherent fragility of
fractional reserve banking, increasing systemic risks and reliance on central
bank intervention. By removing a key buffer against liquidity shocks,
it transforms banking into a highly unstable system prone to crises.
II.
Has the BSP’s "Easing Cycle"—Particularly the RRR Cut—Eased Liquidity
Strains?
Businessworld, March 15, 2025: THE PHILIPPINE BANKING
industry’s total assets jumped by 9.3% year on year as of
end-January, preliminary data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
showed. Banks’ combined assets rose to P27.11 trillion as of end-January from
P24.81 trillion in the same period a year ago. Month on month, total assets
slid by 1.2% from P27.43 trillion as of end-December.
In the second half (2H) of
2024, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) launched its "easing
cycle," implementing three interest
rate cuts and reducing the reserve
requirement ratio (RRR) on October 25.
A second RRR reduction is
scheduled for March 28, 2025, coinciding with the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) doubling its deposit insurance coverage, effective March 15.
Yet, despite these measures,
the Philippine GDP growth slowed to 5.2% in 2H 2024—a puzzling decline amid
record-high public spending, unprecedented employment rates, and historic
consumer-led bank borrowing.
Has the BSP’s easing cycle,
particularly the RRR cuts, alleviated the liquidity strains plaguing the
banking system? The evidence suggests otherwise.
III.
Bank Assets: A Tale of Contradictions: Booming Loans and Liquidity Pressures
Philippine bank
assets consist of cash, loans, investments, real and other properties
acquired (ROPA), and other assets. In January 2025, cash, loans, and
investments dominated, accounting for 9.8%, 54.2%, and 28.3%
respectively—totaling 92.3% of assets.
Figure 1Loan growth has been robust.
The net total loan portfolio (including interbank loans IBLs and reverse repos RRPs)
surged from a 10.7% year-on-year (YoY) increase in January 2024 to 13.7% in
January 2025.
As a matter of fact, loans have consistently outpaced deposit
growth since hitting a low in February 2022, with the loans-to-deposit ratio
accelerating even before the BSP’s first rate cut in August 2024. (Figure 1,
topmost graph)
Historical trends, however,
reveal a nuanced picture.
Loan growth decelerated when
the BSP hiked rates in 2018 and continued to slow even after the BSP started
cutting rates. Weak loan demand at the time overshadowed the liquidity boost
from RRR cuts. (Figure 1, middle image)
Despite the BSP reducing the
RRR from 19% in March 2018 to 12% in April 2020—coinciding with the onset of
the pandemic—loan growth remained weak relative to deposit expansion.
It wasn’t until the BSP's
unprecedented bank bailout package—including RRR cuts, a historic Php 2.3
trillion liquidity injection, record-low interest rates, USD/PHP cap, and
various bank subsidies and relief programs—that bank lending conditions changed
dramatically.
Loan growth surged even
amid rising rates, underscoring the impact of these interventions.
Last year’s combination of RRR
and interest rate cuts deepened the easy money environment, accelerating credit
expansion.
The question remains: why?
IV. Bank Credit Boom
Amid Contradictions: Soaring Credit Card NPLs as Real Estate NPLs Ease
Authorities claim credit
delinquencies remain "low and manageable" despite a January 2025
uptick. Since peaking in Q2 2021, gross and net NPLs, along with distressed
assets, have declined from their highs. (Figure 1, lowest chart)
Figure 2This stability is striking
given record-high consumer credit—the banking system’s fastest-growing
segment—occurring alongside slowing consumer spending. (Figure 2, topmost window)
While credit
card non-performing loans (NPLs) have surged, their relatively small weight
in the system has muted their overall impact.
Real estate NPLs have paradoxically stabilized despite a deflationary
spiral in property prices in Q3 2024.
Real estate GDP fell to just 3% in Q4—its lowest level since the
pandemic recession—dragging its share of total GDP to an all-time low. (Figure
2, middle visual)
Record bank borrowings, a
faltering GDP, and price deflation amidst stable NPLs—this represents
'benchmark-ism,' or 'putting lipstick on a statistical pig,' at its finest.
Ironically, surging loan
growth and low NPLs should signal a banking industry awash in liquidity
and profits.
Yet how much of unpublished
NPLs have been contributing to the bank's liquidity pressures?
Still, more contradictory
evidence.
V.
Investments: A Key Source of Liquidity Pressures
Bank investments, another
major asset class, grew at a substantially slower pace, dropping from 10.7% YoY
in December 2024 to 5.85% in January 2025.
This deceleration stemmed from
a sharp slowdown in Available-for-Sale (AFS) assets (from 20.45% to 12% YoY)
and Held-for-Trading (HFT) assets, which, despite a 22.17% YoY rise, slumped
from December’s 117% spike. This
suggests banks may have suffered losses from short-term speculative activities,
potentially linked to the PSEi 30’s 11.8% YoY and 10.2% MoM plunge in January.
(Figure 2, lowest chart)
Ironically, the Financial
Index—comprising seven listed banks—rose 15.23% YoY and 0.72% MoM, indicating
that losses in bank financial assets stemmed from non-financial equity
holdings.
Figure 3Despite easing interest rates, market losses on the banks’
fixed-income trading portfolios remained elevated, improving (33.5% YoY) only
slightly from Php 42.4 billion in December to Php 38 billion in January. (Figure
3, topmost pane)
VI. Hidden Risks in Held-to-Maturity (HTM) Securities: Government Debt
Yet, HTM assets declined just 0.5% YoY. Given that 10-year PDS rates
remain elevated, HTMs are likely to reach new record highs soon. (Figure 3,
middle image)
Banks play a pivotal role
in supporting the BSP’s liquidity injections by monetizing government
securities. Their holdings of government debt (net
claims on central government—NcoCG) reached an estimated 33% of total
assets in January 2025—a record high. (Figure 3, lowest graph)
Figure 4Public
debt hit a fresh record of Php 16.3 trillion last January 2025. (Figure 4,
topmost diagram)
Valued at amortized cost, HTM
securities mask unrealized losses, potentially straining liquidity.
Overexposure to long-duration HTMs amplifies these risks, while rising
government debt holdings heighten banks’ sensitivity to sovereign risk.
With NCoCG at a record
high, this tells us that banks' HTMs are about to carve out another fresh
milestone in the near future.
In short, losses from market
placements and ballooning HTMs have offset the liquidity surge from a lending
boom, undermining the BSP’s easing efforts.
VII.
Slowing Deposit Growth and the Structural Changes in the Banking System’s Asset
Distribution
Deposit growth should ideally mirror credit expansion, as newly issued
money eventually finds its way into deposit accounts.
Sure, the informal economy
remains a considerable segment. However, unless a huge amount of savings is
stored in jars or piggy banks, it’s unlikely to keep a leash on the money
multiplier.
The BSP’s Financial
Inclusion data shows that more than half of the population has some
form of debt outside the banking system. This tells us that credit
delinquencies are substantially understated—even from the perspective of the
informal economy
Yet, bank deposit liabilities
grew from 7.05% YoY in December 2024 to 6.8% in January 2025, led by peso
deposits (7% YoY), while FX deposits slowed from 7.14% to 6.14%. Peso deposits
comprised 82.8% of total liabilities. (Figure 4, middle image)
Since 2018, deposit growth has been on a structural downtrend, with RRR
cuts failing to reverse this trend. (Figure 4, lowest visual)
Figure 5The gap between the total loan
portfolio (excluding RRPs and IBLs) and savings widened, with TLP growth rising
from 12.7% to 13.54% YoY, while savings growth doubled from 3.3% to 6.8%.
(Figure 5, topmost graph)
How did these affect the bank’s
cash reserves?
Despite the October 2024 RRR
cut, cash reserves contracted 1.44% YoY in January 2025. In peso terms, cash
levels rebounded slightly from an October 2024 interim low—mirroring 2019
troughs—but this bounce appears to be stalling. (Figure 5, middle chart)
The ongoing liquidity drain has effectively erased the BSP’s historic
cash injections.
The bank's cash and due-to-bank deposits ratio has hardly bounced
despite the RRR cuts from 2018 to the present! (Figure 5, lowest pane)
Figure 6Liquidity constraints are
further evident in the declining liquid-to-deposit assets ratio. (Figure 6,
topmost pane)
In perspective, the structural
changes in operations have led to a pivotal shift in the distribution of the
bank's assets. (Figure 6, middle graph)
Cash’s share of bank assets
has shrunk from 23.1% in October 2013 to 9.8% in January 2025.
While the share of loans grew
from 45.3% in November 2010 to a peak of 58.98% in May, it dropped to a low of
51.6% in March 2024 before partially recovering.
Meanwhile, investments,
rebounding from a 21.42% trough in June 2020, have plateaued since the BSP’s
2022 rescue package.
Still, the Philippine banking
system continues to amass significant economic and political clout, effectively
monopolizing the industry, as its share of
total financial resources reached 83.64% in 2024. How does this mounting
concentration risk translate to stability? (Figure 6, lowest chart)
VIII.
Liquidity Constraints Fuels Bank Borrowing Frenzy
In addition to the 'easy
money' effect of fractional banking's money multiplier, banks still require
financing for their lending operations.
Figure 7Evidence of growing liquidity
constraints, exacerbated by insufficient deposit growth, is seen in banks' aggressive
borrowing from capital markets.
Bank borrowing, comprising
bills and bonds payable, reached a new record of PHP 1.78 trillion in January,
marking a 47.02% year-over-year increase and a 6.5% month-over-month rise!
(Figure 7, topmost diagram)
Notably, bills payable
experienced a 67% growth surge, while bonds payable increased by 17.5%. The strong performance of bank borrowing has
resulted in an increase in their share of overall bank liabilities, with bills
payable now accounting for 5.1% and bonds payable for 2.43% in January. (Figure
7, middle pane)
In essence, banks are
competing fiercely among themselves, with non-bank clients, and the government
to secure funding from the public's strained savings.
Moreover, although general
reverse repo usage has decreased, largely due to BSP actions, interbank reverse
repos have surged to their second-highest level since September 2024. (Figure 7,
lowest chart)
The increasing scale of
bank borrowings, supported by BSP liquidity data, reinforces our view that
banks are struggling to maintain system stability.
IX. PDIC’s Doubled Deposit Insurance: A Confidence Tool
or a Risk Mitigant?
The doubling of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation's (PDIC)
deposit insurance coverage took effect on March 15th.
The public is largely unaware that this measure is linked to the second
phase of the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut scheduled for March
28th.
In essence, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its attached agency the PDIC, is
utilizing the enhanced deposit insurance as a confidence-building measure to
reinforce stability within the banking system.
Inquirer.net,
March 15, 2025: The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC)—which is mandated
to safeguard money kept in bank accounts —finally implemented the new maximum
deposit insurance coverage (MDIC) of P1 million per depositor per bank, which
was double the previous coverage of P500,000. The expanded MDIC is projected to
fully insure over 147 million accounts in 2025, or 98.6 percent of the total
deposit accounts in the local banking system. In terms of amount, depositor
funds amounting to P5.3 trillion will be safeguarded by the PDIC, accounting
for 24.1 percent of the total deposits held by the banking sector. To
compare, the ratio of insured accounts under the old MDIC was at 97.6 percent
as of December 2024. In terms of amount, the share of insured funds to total
deposits was at 18.4 percent before. It was the amendments to the PDIC charter
back in 2022 that allowed the state insurer to adjust the MDIC based on
inflation and other relevant economic indicators without the need for a new
law. (bold added)
ABS-CBN
News, March 14: PDIC President Roberto Tan also assured the public that
PDIC has enough funds to cover all depositors even with a higher MDIC. The
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is around P237 billion as of December 2024.
The ration of DIF to the estimated insured deposits (EID) is 5% this 2025,
which Tan said remains adequate to meet potential insurance risks. (bold added)
Our Key Takeaways:
1) An Increase in Compensation rather than Coverage Ratio, Yet Systemic
Coverage Remains Low
-The total insured deposit amount is capped at PHP 1 million per
depositor.
98.6% of accounts are fully insured, up from 97.6% previously.
-The insured deposit amount increased to PHP 5.3 trillion (24.1% of
total deposits) from PHP 3.56 trillion (18.4%) prior to the MDIC.
2) Systemic Risk and Vulnerabilities
-Most of the increase in insured deposits stems from small accounts.
-Large corporate and high-net-worth individual deposits remain largely
uninsured, maintaining systemic vulnerability.
3) PDIC’s Coverage Limitations
-The PDIC only covers BSP-ordered closures, excluding losses due to
fraud.
-If bank failures are triggered by fraud (e.g., misreported loan books,
hidden losses), depositor panic may escalate before the PDIC intervenes.
-Runs on solvent banks could still occur if system trust weakens.
Figure/Table 8 4) Mathematical Constraints on PDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and
Assets
-The PDIC's 2023 total
assets of PHP 339.6 billion account for only 1.74% of total
deposits. (Figure/Table 8)
-The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) of PHP 237 billion represents a mere
6.7% of insured deposits.
-PDIC assets and DIF account for 3.46% and 2.42% of the deposit base of
the four PSEi 30 banks.
-In the event of a mid-to-large bank failure, the DIF would be
insufficient, necessitating government or BSP intervention.
5) The Systemic Policy Blind Spot
-Such policy assumes an "orderly" distribution of bank
failures—small banks failing, not large ones. In reality, tail risks (big
bank failures) drive financial crises, not small-bank failures.
6) Impact of RRR Cuts on Risk-Taking Behavior
-The second leg of the RRR cut in March 2025 injects liquidity,
potentially encouraging higher risk-taking by banks.
-Once again, the increase in deposit insurance likely serves as a
confidence tool rather than a genuine risk mitigant.
7) Rising risk due to moral hazard: The increased insurance may encourage riskier behavior by both
depositors and banks.
8) Consequences of Significant Bank Failures
-If funds are insufficient, the Bureau of Treasury might cover the DIF
gap. Such a bailout would expand the fiscal deficit, with the BSP likely to
monetize debt.
-A more likely scenario is that the BSP intervenes directly, as the
PDIC is an agency of the BSP, by rescuing depositors through liquidity
injections or monetary expansion.
In both scenarios, this would amplify inflation risks and the
devaluation of the Philippine peso, likely exacerbated by increased capital
flight and a higher risk premium on peso assets.
X.
Conclusion: Band-aid Solutions Magnify Risks
The BSP’s easing cycle has fueled a lending boom, masked NPL risks, and
propped up government debt holdings, yet liquidity remains elusive. Cash
reserves are shrinking, deposit growth is faltering, and banks are borrowing
heavily to stay afloat.
The PDIC’s insurance hike offers little systemic protection, leaving
the banking system vulnerable to tail risks. A mid-to-large bank failure would likely burden the government or BSP,
triggering further unintended consequences.
As contradictions mount, a critical question persists: can this
stealth loose financial environment sustain itself, or is it a prelude to a
deeper crisis?