Showing posts with label World bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label World bank. Show all posts

Sunday, July 05, 2026

World Bank's Philippine Upper-Middle-Income Upgrade: Benchmarkism in Action

  

The Philippines’ most important economic problem is that poverty and hunger have been high for several years now, and are still unrecovered to their historically low levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic—Mahar Mangahas 

In this issue: 

World Bank's Philippine Upper-Middle-Income Upgrade: Benchmarkism in Action

Part I: The Threshold and the Managed Reality

I.1. Benchmarkism

I.2. The Managed Visibility of the Economy

I.3. Why the Upgrade Matters

Part II: The Anatomy of Intervention-Driven Growth

II.1. From Savings to Debt

II.2. Growth and Fragility Are Two Sides of the Same Process

II.3. The Missing Dimension

Part III: Benchmarkism in Action

III.1. From Measurement to Mechanism

III.2. The Benchmark Effect

III.3. Cui Bono?

III.4. On the Question of Coordination

III.5. The Accountability Gap

IV. Conclusion: Beyond the Benchmark 

World Bank's Philippine Upper-Middle-Income Upgrade: Benchmarkism in Action 

When statistical upgrades become instruments of economic narrative management

Part I: The Threshold and the Managed Reality 

World Bank Blog: The Philippines achieved its reclassification through broad-based expansion. GDP grew at an average of 5.8% per year over five years, reflecting gains across all major industries, not a single sector boom, but an economy-wide shift. 

The World Bank has reclassified the Philippines as an upper-middle-income economy after its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita reached approximately US$4,850, surpassing the US$4,636 threshold under the Atlas method. 

On its face, the upgrade is presented as objective statistical recognition of economic progress. Government officials immediately framed it as validation of stronger economic fundamentals, improved investor confidence, and enhanced access to international capital markets. 

But the timing—and more importantly, the economic regime that produced the numbers—matter far more than the threshold itself.


Figure 1 

First, the choice of the measurement window matters. The World Bank highlights average GDP growth of 5.8% from 2021 to 2025. 

Yet that period begins immediately after the deepest economic contraction in modern Philippine history, making it heavily influenced by base effects. Extending the window produces a markedly different picture. Including 2020 lowers the average GDP growth to 3.2%, while extending the comparison back to 2015 reduces it to about 4.7%. (Figure 1, upper window) 

GNI exhibits a similar pattern: approximately 7.1% when measured from 2021, 4.1% from 2020, and roughly 5.0% when measured from 2015. The choice of benchmark materially shapes the narrative. (Figure 1, lower graph) 

In short, the elevated GNI growth figures the World Bank highlights are largely a product of base effects — the 2021 starting point follows the deepest contraction in modern Philippine history, mechanically inflating the measured average. Whether the window was chosen deliberately or by convention, the effect on the narrative is the same. 

Second—and far more importantly—the World Bank's narrative omits the policy regime that generated these outcomes. 

The years feeding into the classification window were defined by an unprecedented macroeconomic configuration: historic monetary expansion, unparalleled fiscal deficits, extraordinary regulatory accommodation, and pandemic-era financial support measures that never fully reverted to their pre-crisis settings. 

Between 2020 and 2021, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas injected a record Php 2.3 trillion into the financial system through liquidity facilities, aggressive monetary easing, and various crisis-response measures designed to stabilize output and financial markets. 

Those interventions were introduced as temporary, countercyclical responses to an extraordinary crisis. 

What followed, however, was not a return to the pre-pandemic policy framework, but the gradual institutionalization of an intervention-heavy economic regime. 

It must be emphasized that the World Bank's Atlas GNI is not a production-based measure of real economic output. 

It is a smoothed, dollar-converted aggregate that combines nominal income, exchange-rate movements, and the effects of credit-supported expansion into a single statistical measure. 

It does not distinguish whether rising income originates from productivity gains, liquidity creation, fiscal stimulus, financial leverage, or some combination thereof. It records the outcome, not the mechanisms that produced it.


Figure 2

The same intervention-heavy macroeconomic regime that elevated measured GNI also coincided with substantial increases in concentrated private wealth. Using the World Bank's own 2021–2025 benchmark period, the combined net worth of the Forbes Philippines 50 Richest grew by roughly 8 percent annually. (Figure 2, upper pane) 

This was not a parallel coincidence but an interconnected consequence of the same policy regime. 

Liquidity expansion, credit creation, fiscal stimulus, and extraordinarily accommodative financial conditions supported corporate earnings, business valuations, and financial asset prices, all of which contributed to the accumulation of private wealth. 

Rising GNI and rising billionaire wealth thus emerged not as independent developments, but as interconnected expressions of the same underlying monetary-financial process. 

Seen this way, the benchmark records only one observable consequence of the policy regime while remaining largely silent about the parallel accumulation of wealth and financial claims generated by the same causal forces. 

Nor does its per-capita average reveal how income is actually distributed across households. 

The threshold itself illustrates how sensitive the classification can be. 

Last year, believe it or not, the Philippines missed upper-middle-income status by only US$26 per person—underscoring how the World Bank's classification rests almost entirely on estimated quantitative outcomes. 

In other words, the period being measured is precisely the period during which emergency intervention evolved into a permanent feature of the Philippine development model. 

I.1. Benchmarkism 

This is where what I have termed benchmarkism begins to operate. 

Benchmarkism is not simply the use of statistical indicators. It is the transformation of statistical and market benchmarks into instruments of narrative management designed to influence expectations, stimulate confidence—or what Keynes famously called animal spirits—and shape market behavior in ways that reinforce an existing political-economic order. 

In practice, the process unfolds through a self-reinforcing feedback loop: 

  • intervention-driven expansion supports nominal income growth;
  • income growth feeds into standardized international benchmarks;
  • benchmark upgrades improve investor confidence and credit perception;
  • improved confidence lowers financing costs;
  • cheaper financing sustains the same intervention-dependent growth model. 

What begins as emergency stabilization gradually becomes institutional structure. 

What begins as temporary policy support evolves into the governing logic of economic development. 

At that point, the benchmark no longer merely measures reality

It becomes one of the mechanisms through which that reality is sustained. 

I.2. The Managed Visibility of the Economy 

This phenomenon is not confined to income statistics. 

Across the same period, other indicators pointed in very different directions beneath the aggregate numbers: 

  • persistent inflation above the BSP's target range;
  • slowing growth momentum even before the latest oil shock and external uncertainties;
  • rising leverage among corporations and major conglomerates;
  • the BSP Financial Stability Coordination Council's warnings over concentrated exposures in real estate, power, energy, and expanding household credit;
  • rising self-rated poverty exceeding 50 percent in national surveys, alongside widening inequality; and (Figure 2, lower chart)
  • Fitch Ratings and Moody's both revised their outlooks on the Philippine banking sector to negative/deteriorating, citing weaker growth, elevated inflation, and rising credit-quality risks. 

These are not anomalies existing outside the system. They are operating realities revealed through different analytical lenses than aggregate income.


Figure 3

Think of it: the Philippines was upgraded to an UPPER-middle-income economy after GNI per capita reached about US$4,850 (roughly Php 290,000 per person on average at USDPHP 60). Yet more than half of Filipinos continue to describe themselves as poor! A 2021 PIDS study suggests that only about 4.9% of the 2015 population fell within the upper-middle-income category (though this share may be higher today).  The same label—"upper-middle income"—thus describes two very different concepts: a national average and the distribution of household incomes. (Figure 3) 

In effect, the income profile of a relatively small segment becomes the statistical basis for relabeling an entire economy! 

This is precisely why SWS founder Mahar Mangahas recently argued that attaining "upper middle income" under the World Bank's standards has no more bearing on the economic well-being of Filipinos than gross national product (GNP) itself, nor does the re-classification indicate the growth of the Filipino middle class. 

His observation underscores the central weakness of benchmark-based classifications: they elevate national aggregates while obscuring the underlying distribution they purport to represent. 

That narrative matters because it influences capital allocation, sovereign risk assessments, financing conditions, and ultimately public perceptions of politically driven economic success.

I.3. Why the Upgrade Matters 

The World Bank's reclassification does not merely describe the Philippine economy. It repositions the country within the global financial architecture. 

Like a sovereign credit-rating upgrade, upper-middle-income status functions as a positive signal. It suggests lower development risk, strengthens perceptions of macroeconomic stability, and improves access to cheaper domestic and international financing

More importantly, it helps validate the existing development model

Governments gain external affirmation of their policies. Large borrowers—particularly the state, banks, and major conglomerates—benefit from lower financing costs and easier access to capital. The benchmark itself becomes part of the financing mechanism

This is precisely how benchmarkism operates. 

The benchmark does not simply measure economic performance. 

It helps manufacture the confidence that facilitates cheaper money

Cheaper money, in turn, reinforces the same intervention-dependent political-economic structure that produced the benchmark in the first place. 

Theoretically, the process becomes self-reinforcing. 

Part II: The Anatomy of Intervention-Driven Growth 

If the World Bank measured the outcome, the more important question is what produced it. 

The answer lies not simply in higher output, but in a transformation of the Philippine economy's financing structure. 

The pandemic response did far more than stabilize economic activity. It altered the relationship between savings, investment, credit, and government spending. Instead of allowing the economy to adjust through market liquidation and the rebuilding of private savings, policy increasingly relied on liquidity creation, deficit spending, and regulatory accommodation to sustain aggregate demand.


Figure 4

Growth therefore became progressively less dependent on internally generated savings and increasingly dependent on policy induced balance-sheet expansion. 

Record domestic claims-to-GDP and the persistence of elevated M2-to-GDP ratios since the pandemic expose the economy's drift toward financialization: a growing dependence on credit expansion and liquidity creation that has made growth increasingly vulnerable to financial fragility. (Figure 4, upper diagram) 

The paradox is that as the economy has become more financialized, growth has steadily slowed since 2022, exposing the diminishing returns of intervention-driven expansion. 

II.1. From Savings to Debt 

One of the least discussed consequences of the post-pandemic policy regime has been the widening savings-investment gap (SIG). Official or GDP based saving-investment gap reached a record Php 3.9 trillion in 2025 (Figure 4, lower image) 

Traditionally, investment is financed by accumulated private savings. Under the intervention regime, however, an increasing share of investment has been financed through government deficits, bank credit, and expanding corporate leverage. 

In effect, policy induced balance-sheet expansion substituted for capital accumulation. 

This distinction is largely invisible in aggregate income statistics. Gross National Income records the resulting income flows, but not whether they were financed through rising productivity or through increasing indebtedness. 

That difference is fundamental because both paths can generate higher measured income in the short run while producing very different long-term outcomes. 

II.2. Growth and Fragility Are Two Sides of the Same Process 

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' own 2025 Financial Stability Report offers a different perspective on the same expansion. 

Rather than focusing on income, it focuses on balance sheets.


Figure 5

Its latest assessment warns of approximately Php 4.8 trillion in leveraged exposures among non-financial corporations, equivalent to 60.0% of total NFC debt and 21.2 % of nominal GDP, largely concentrated in real estate, power, energy, ICT, construction, manufacturing, and other conglomerate-dominated industries. 

Notably, these are substantially the same sectors that the World Bank cites as evidence of "gains across all major industries." What appears in the World Bank's framework as broad-based sectoral progress is, from a political economy perspective, also the expansion of highly leveraged, elite conglomerates that dominate those industries. 

These sectors have also been among the principal channels through which post-pandemic credit expansion has been transmitted. 

San Miguel Corporation provides a concrete illustration of this balance-sheet expansion at the firm level. According to its SEC filings (17-Q and 17-A), outstanding debt reached approximately Php 1.668 trillion in Q1 2026, up from Php 1.587 trillion in Q4 2025. (Figure 5, lower chart) 

While this figure is not directly comparable to the BSP’s aggregate estimate of corporate leverage, it reflects the scale of debt-financed expansion within one of the country’s largest conglomerates operating inside the same macro-financial environment. 

This is not a contradiction.

It is the other side of the same process. 

Credit-supported expansion can simultaneously produce higher income and higher systemic vulnerability. 

Measured growth and financial fragility are therefore not competing explanations. 

They are complementary outcomes generated by the same intervention regime. The benchmark records the expansion in output; the balance sheet reveals the leverage that helped produce it. Looking only at the former mistakes one dimension of the process for the whole. 

II.3. The Missing Dimension 

None of this appears in the World Bank's Atlas GNI. 

Nor is it intended to. 

The Atlas methodology answers a narrow question: 

Has national income crossed a specified statistical threshold? 

It does not ask:

  • how that income was financed;
  • whether national income reflected productivity gains or leverage;
  • whether debt increasingly replaced private savings;
  • whether intervention became permanent policy;
  • whether balance-sheet risks accumulated alongside growth; or
  • whether rising income translated into broad improvements in household welfare. 

Those questions belong to political economy and financial stability—not to the construction of an income benchmark. 

Yet they are precisely the questions that determine whether today's measured prosperity proves durable tomorrow. 

The World Bank's upgrade therefore captures only one dimension of the Philippine economy.

The BSP's Financial Stability Report, Savings-Investment gap, BSP’s liquidity conditions, SWS survey, Top 50 Forbes net worth captures another. 

But taken together, they describe an economy in which rising income and rising fragility have emerged from the same underlying development model. 

Part III: Benchmarkism in Action 

III.1. From Measurement to Mechanism 

Benchmarkism does not end with the publication of a statistic. Its operative function begins when that statistic is accepted as a proxy for economic reality in policy and financial decision-making. 

This is not limited to income classification. 

Across the same period in which the World Bank highlighted the Philippines’ broad-based expansion, other indicators pointed to a more complex underlying structure: persistent inflation above target, slowing economic momentum, rising corporate leverage, concentrated exposures flagged by the BSP Financial Stability Coordination Council, and continued self-rated poverty among a majority of households. These are not anomalies outside the system. (This pattern has been examined in greater detail in the author's earlier stagflation series.) 

They are different manifestations of the same economy observed through non-aggregate lenses. 

Yet the Atlas GNI ultimately presents these diverse developments through a single aggregate benchmark. Once accepted as a signal of economic progress, that benchmark becomes the language through which policymakers, investors, lenders, and the public increasingly interpret the economy. 

III.2. The Benchmark Effect 

The World Bank’s reclassification does not merely describe the Philippine economy. It alters how the economy is interpreted in financial markets and policy discourse. 

The response was immediate. President Marcos Jr.'s administration, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Department of Economy, Planning, and Development presented the reclassification as external validation of the country's economic management, reinforcing the narrative of policy success.  Like a stroke of luck, the UMIC upgrade arrived just as the administration faced record-low popularity ratings and only weeks before the President's State of the Nation Address (SONA). 

Like a sovereign credit-rating upgrade, upper-middle-income status signals reduced development risk, strengthens perceptions of macroeconomic stability, and supports access to cheaper financing. 

This is reflected in market outcomes--the Philippine government’s US$2.5 billion sovereign bond issuance and more than US$1 billion in World Bank financing for the energy sector happened just days before the UMIC upgrade announcement. 

Whether coincidental or not, the sequencing highlights the functional role of benchmarks: statistical upgrades shape perceptions of risk, and perceptions of risk influence financing conditions. 

  • Confidence lowers perceived risk.
  • Lower perceived risk reduces borrowing costs.
  • Cheaper financing extends the policy space of the existing economic model. 

In turn, favorable economic benchmarks also reinforce political legitimacy. They furnish incumbent policymakers with externally certified evidence of success, strengthening the credibility of existing policies and improving the prospects for advancing their political and legislative agenda. 

Confidence, therefore, is not the endpoint. It is the transmission mechanism. 

Cheap money is the immediate financial outcome. Political reinforcement is its institutional counterpart. Together, they help sustain the intervention regime that produced the benchmark in the first place. 

III.3. Cui Bono? 

Political economy asks a simple question: who benefits? 

Governments benefit from external validation of economic performance. The narrative shifts from inflation pressures, rising leverage, and structural constraints toward international recognition of progress

Sovereign borrowers gain improved access to global capital markets. Large conglomerates—among the most credit-dependent actors in the economy—benefit from lower funding costs and easier refinancing conditions. Financial markets receive reinforcement of the prevailing development narrative. 

The distributional effects are uneven. Gains are concentrated among state-linked financial actors and large corporate borrowers, while adjustment costs are diffuse across households facing persistent inflation, structural debt accumulation, and constrained real income growth

Benchmarkism does not eliminate these conditions. It reorganizes how they are perceived and politically processed.

III.4. On the Question of Coordination 

It is important to recognize that benchmark institutions do not operate in political isolation. They function within broader political and diplomatic environments where engagement between sovereign governments and international organizations is continuous and multifaceted, involving formal reporting, technical consultations, policy dialogue, and high-level interactions. Of course, there are also informal dialogues and interactions that can take place. 

Benchmark outcomes may be grounded in standardized statistical methodologies, but their interpretation, framing, and policy significance are shaped within this broader institutional ecosystem. Consequently, formally independent classifications can acquire political and strategic importance when they reinforce the interests, objectives, or narratives of multiple stakeholders. 

None of this, by itself, demonstrates explicit coordination or political bargaining, nor should such claims be presented as established fact. It does suggest, however, that benchmark systems cannot be understood solely as technical exercises divorced from the political economy in which they operate. 

Whether one describes the resulting alignment as coordination, convergence, or mutually reinforcing incentives, the practical consequence is similar: favorable benchmark outcomes strengthen confidence in the prevailing development model at moments when that confidence carries tangible political and financial value.

III.5. The Accountability Gap 

If the underlying fragility — conglomerate leverage, the savings-investment gap, persistent inflation above target — resolves badly in the coming years, there is no mechanism by which the World Bank bears any cost for having certified resilience at the peak of the imbalance (no skin in the game)

The Philippines bears the full cost either way. Balisacan himself conceded as much in the same breath as the celebration: income disparities persist, many still face economic difficulty

Of course, the classification can be revised. The narrative can be updated. 

Benchmarkism can shape expectations. But it cannot absorb economic consequences. 

IV. Conclusion: Beyond the Benchmark 

The Philippines' upgrade to upper-middle-income status is more than a statistical event. In practice, it becomes a political and financial one

Governments present it as external validation of economic management, financial markets interpret it as a positive signal, and institutional confidence is reinforced far beyond the narrow question of national income. 

An aggregate measure of national income thus becomes more than a statistical classification. It becomes a signal of economic success. That signal shapes confidence. Confidence influences the price of risk. Lower perceived risk facilitates cheaper financing, reinforcing the same political-economic structure that generated the benchmark in the first place. 

That is the central proposition of benchmarkism. Benchmarks are not merely passive measures of economic conditions. Once embedded in policy, finance, and public discourse, they become institutional mechanisms that shape expectations, influence the allocation of capital, and reinforce existing political-economic arrangements. 

Whether the Philippines' recent gains ultimately reflect durable productivity and genuine capital formation or an economy increasingly sustained by intervention, leverage, and confidence management remains to be seen. Time—not statistical thresholds—will render that judgment. 

Benchmarks can shape narratives. They can influence incentives. They can buy confidence. 

They cannot repeal economic reality. 

____

Notes

See the author's Stagflation series, Parts 1–11, for a more detailed examination of the interaction between slowing growth, persistent inflation, and intervention-driven expansion.

 


Sunday, February 20, 2022

Kaboom! The World Bank Warns of Hidden Risks in the Philippine Financial System!

 

It is a sad fact that people are reluctant to learn either from theory or from experience. Neither the disasters manifestly brought about by the deficit spending and low-interest-rate policies nor the confirmation of my theories by such eminent thinkers as Frederick van Hayek, Henry Hazlitt and the late Benjamin M. Anderson have up to now been able to put an end to the popularity of the fiat money frenzy. The monetary and credit policies of all nations are headed for a new catastrophe, probably more disastrous than any of the older slumps—Ludwig von Mises 

 

In this issue 

Kaboom! The World Bank Warns of Hidden Risks in the Philippine Financial System! 

I. Kaboom! The World Bank Warns of Hidden Risks in the Philippine Financial System! 

II. Risks Can Be Transferred or Concealed But Not Extinguished! 

III. Statistics are Not Financial or Economic Talismans 

IV. Treasury Markets Signals that the BSP is Massively Behind the Curve, Intensifying The Risk of Policy Errors! 

 

Kaboom! The World Bank Warns of Hidden Risks in the Philippine Financial System! 

 

I. Kaboom! The World Bank Warns of Hidden Risks in the Philippine Financial System! 

 

I am not alone. Even the World Bank can see through the BSP’s statistical charade.  

 

From the ABS-CBN News, February 16: 

 

The World Bank warned that the global economic recovery may be at risk of "financial fragility," citing rise in non-transparent debt as one of the reasons.  

 

In the newly-released World Development Report 2022, World Bank Group senior vice president and chief economist Carmen Reinhart said "there is reason to expect that many vulnerabilities remain hidden."  

 

"It’s time to prioritize early, tailored action to support a healthy financial system that can provide the credit growth needed to fuel recovery. If we don’t, it is the most vulnerable that would be hit hardest," she said. 

 

The Philippines was cited as an example of countries where bad debt is becoming a problem.  

 

"In some economies, these risks are already becoming apparent. Loan defaults have been on the rise in India, Kenya, the Philippines, and a growing number of other middle-income countries. These emerging credit risks are also reflected in the worsening outlooks of the main international rating agencies for financial institutions as forbearance policies are lifted," the report read. 

 

Remember this write up last June? 

 

And another important thing, why the operational, capital, and regulatory relief measures, if not to minimize statistical or accounting impairments on the books of the industry? 

 

It stands to reason that in reflecting the likely sanitization of data, there might have been a considerable understatement of the actual conditions in the bank statistics published by the BSP. 

 

Again, had credit losses been manageable, the banks won’t need incredible amounts of liquidity injections AND relief measures from the BSP.  Yet, it did.  

 

See BSP’s Confession: Leverage Represents The Key Risk Today; An Analysis of the State of Financial Stability June 13, 2021 

 

And from last week. How relief or forbearance measures sanitize bank performance: 

 

Yet, such profit metric represents a false equivalence compared to the past, as massive distortions from relief measures have muddied bank performance in the context of statistics.  

 

 

 

The relief measures designed to boost confidence through statistical magic may have led to the interim peak in NPLs in the 4Q 2021.  

 

However, NPLs emerged from the surge of CPI of 2017-2018, which spurred rising yields. With banks weaker today than in 2018, it would be alarming if NPLs regain their momentum.  

 

In sum, the remarkable surge of the bank profits in 2021 signifies accounting profits from the unprecedented rescue measures instituted by the BSP to sugarcoat or deodorize the balance sheet of the banking system 

 

See BSP Exit Measures: More About Rhetoric Than Action; Bank Profit Zooms in 2021 Even as Core Operations Suffer Deficits! February 13, 2022 

 

This repeat quote demonstrates how authorities publicly withhold the truth about conditions of the impaired credit of the banking system. 

 

From a speech by the BSP Chief last January* (bold mine): "And to provide relief to beleaguered borrowers, we excluded some loans from being tagged as past due or non-performing and allowed a grace period for loan settlement and restructuring of rediscounted loans."  

 

*Benjamin E Diokno: The COVID-19 pandemic and the economy, BIS.org, January 5, 2022 

 

Don’t count, don’t tell. Or, since banks are permitted not to report their actual state, NPLs seem to have trended lower. 

 

In any case, here are some poignant excerpts from the World Bank Development 2022 report authored by their Chief Economist Carmen Reinhart and President David Malpass. (bold mine) 

 

p. xiii 

What we do not yet know, however, is the extent to which governments and private debtors are harboring hidden risks with the potential to stymie economic recovery. In particular, increased complexity and opacity in sovereign debt markets (as to who holds the debt and under what terms) often make it difficult to assess the full extent of risks in government balance sheets. On the private side, common elements of pandemic response programs, such as moratoria on bank loans, general forbearance policies, and a marked relaxation in financial reporting requirements, have made it difficult to determine whether debtors are facing short-term liquidity challenges or whether their incomes have been permanently affected. 

 

p.9  

If not countered by strong bank governance, robust regulatory definitions of NPLs, and careful bank supervision, hidden NPLs can create significant discrepancies between reported asset quality figures and the underlying economic realities. A lack of NPL transparency can stand in the way of a timely identification of potential banking system stress, weaken trust in the financial sector, and lead to reductions in investment and lending, which can hinder an equitable postpandemic recovery 

 

p. 40-41 

Regulatory forbearance refers to the relaxation of regulatory requirements and accounting standards in the hope that this will make it easier for lenders to issue new credit. Although some of these policies used the flexibility embedded in existing regulatory frameworks (such as the Basel III regulations), some countries relaxed prudential regulation and accounting standards beyond the emergency measures allowed by these frameworks. This may have created some respite for banks, but could create significant longer-term risks to financial stability. Regulatory forbearance policies reduce bank balance sheet transparency by enabling banks to hide the true extent of their credit riskdelay the resolution of nonperforming loans, and ultimately weaken the ability of the financial sector to provide financing to creditworthy borrowers during the recovery. Because regulatory forbearance policies can lead to the accumulation of significant hidden credit risks, they can also place further burdens on government finances should government intervention be required to support ailing financial institutions once these risks materialize 

 

Again from this author last August 2021… 

 

Statistics fail to distinguish conditions before the pandemic and contemporary times.   

 

 

 

Under emergency measures, regulatory conditions have drastically changed such that comparative numbers of several sectors, such as banks and the financial industry, with their pasts, are meaningless. 

 

See A Bounce is Not a Recovery: 2Q GDP 11.8% Boom: Low-Base Effect and Government Spending Boom! August 15, 2021 

 

It is striking that the BSP’s pantomime had to be exposed by a member of the establishment of the international order. 

  

But what stands out is that such revelation emanates from the purview of Ms. Carmen Reinhart, an expert on debt defaults and crises. Together with Kenneth Rogoff, they are the author of This Time is Different, their quotes had been cited here on several occasions.    

 

This World Bank critique seems also a pushback against the policy excesses of the "Best Central Banker of the World." 

  

II. Risks Can Be Transferred or Concealed But Not Extinguished! 

 

But here is the thing. 

 

Risks are not extinguished by statistical camouflaging. Instead, the lack of transparency magnifies it. 

 

The World Bank enumerated some factors that drive institutional risks from such forbearance policies: The lack of transparency increases the opacity and complexity of public balance sheets. It weakens trust that may lead to diminished investments. And it may delay the resolution of non-performing loans, thereby decreasing the capacity of financial institutions to lend to creditworthy borrowers. 

 

But the World Bank missed the more important ones: Moral hazard, dependency, and corruption.  These ethical issues may metamorphose into technical issues. 

 

The lack of transparency may induce protected parties to indulge in unnecessary risk activities that magnify vulnerabilities, thereby amplifying institutional and systemic fragilities.  

  

For instance, to hide existing losses, the temptation to double down on either extending loans to low creditworthy borrowers or gamble on speculative market positions becomes an attractive alternative.  

 

Such political privileges may also entrench dependency among the beneficiaries. 

 

Industry lobbying will likely escalate. It will insist on maintaining the status quo or warn of severe repercussions to the industry and the economy should these subsidies or privileges be eliminated.   

 

Most importantly, the arbitrary easing of regulatory standards may encourage misdemeanors in the industry.  

 

That’s right. When the cat's away, the mice will play. 

 

Also, the underlying conditions from such forbearance may also promote or breed corruption in some beneficiaries and regulators. 

 

For example, since accounting chicanery will now be recognized as official, "Cooking the books" may become the next standard. Arbitrary decisions of authorities on compliance will likely be dictated by "I scratch your back, you scratch mine." 

 

The fundamental premise is that financial institutions have become acclimatized to the incumbent regulatory climate. It is hardly a concern here that the current standards are highly flawed and distortive, which is a topic for another day.   

 

That said, regulatory relief or forbearance, which could account for substantial changes, are likely to alter the incentives of such institutions that should magnify operational and business contortions. 

 

At the same time, given that authorities have empowered institutions to camouflage actual risk conditions, this infers to the vast overstatement of the so-called capital structure of banks. 

 

Forbearance policies are also subject to the law of diminishing returns. While this may temporarily provide a cosmetic fix on the credit issues, the imbalances it accrues will eventually surface. 

 

Such policies are barely about regulatory loopholes, which capitalism, said the great Ludwig von Mises, breathes through.  

 

And though the banking system has some semblance of competition, it seems a cartel operated and supervised by the BSP. 

 

Wrote the great Dean of Austrian Economics, Murray N. Rothbard**, 

 

In short, the Central Bank functions as a government cartelizing device to coordinate the banks so that they can evade the restrictions of free markets and free banking and inflate uniformly together. The banks do not chafe under central banking control; instead, they lobby for and welcome it. It is their passport to inflation and easy money 

 

**Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking p.134, Mises.org 

 

Like all politics, the fixation of the BSP and central authorities are on short-term or band-aid fixes, which are dependent on hope rather than sound economics. 

III. Statistics are Not Financial or Economic Talismans 

 

Further, embellishing statistics appears to be a current thrust by the authorities.   

 

For example, the DoF admitted to the overstatement of the financial conditions of the State-run pension funds last December 2021, which everyone seems to have ignored as if the impact is neutral. 

 

See Stagnation is Growth! 3Q PSEi Debt Eclipsed Revenue, Net Income Bounce! DoF Admits Financial Conditions of State-Owned Pensions Overstated! December 5, 2021 

 

For political purposes, we suspect substantial inflation of several data such as the GDP, labor, OFW remittances, the BoP, and FDIs, among others.   

 

Authorities also tend to understate the CPI data, crime, and other politically sensitive statistics. 

 

But this is something we have long anticipated: 

 

5) The last option would be for the NG and BSP to manipulate markets and statistics in the hope that the markets will conform and comply with their political targets. 

 

 [See Why Interest Rates Will Rise: 1Q Fiscal Deficit Blowout Financed by BSP’s Debt Monetization (QE) and Spiking Public Debt! May 6, 2018]  

 

Unfortunately, statistics are not economic or financial talismans.  

 

Reality is not an option. 

 

IV. Treasury Markets Signals that the BSP is Massively Behind the Curve, Intensifying The Risk of Policy Errors! 

 

What is the relationship between the World Bank’s cautionary advice on the hidden risks in the financial system and the BSP’s seemingly intractable stance of maintaining the present monetary policy?  

 

The simple answer: Despite the massive bailouts extended by the BSP, the banking system remains highly vulnerable. 

 

From CNN, February 17 (bold mine): The Monetary Board decided to retain policy rates at an all-time low of 2% in its first meeting for 2022, announced BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno on Thursday. This is the ninth straight meeting that rates were untouched since the surprise cut in November 2020…. "We will commit to exit when we begin to actually see, based on our assessment, evidence of a sustainable recovery or end of increasing risks to inflation. The extraordinary measures can be gradually withdrawn when it appears that actual output growth is poised to already be above its potential level and inflation will rise above its target on a sustained basis," Diokno said when asked about BSP's exit plan…"The inflation projections have slightly increased from the previous monetary policy meeting, reflecting the impact of higher domestic food inflation and global oil prices. Inflation expectations have likewise risen marginally but continue to be anchored within the target band," he said during a virtual briefing. "The risks to the inflation outlook continue to lean slightly towards the upside for 2022 but remain broadly balanced for 2023," the BSP chief added. 

 

Why the readjusted projection by the BSP for a higher CPI?  

 

Figure 1 

 

The Treasury markets have been pushing back vigorously against the BSP! That is why. 

 

The spread between 10-year Treasury rates (PDS) and the BSP official rates has soared to 2018 highs! (Figure 1, upper pane) 

  

But there is an immense difference.  Unlike in 2018, where bond yields chimed with the CPI, today, the direction of the CPI and bond rates have patently diverged. (Figure 1, lower window) 

 

It stands to reason that a lower CPI should have brought down domestic Treasury yields, similar to 2018. This scenario represents the BSP template. 

But this has not been happening. 

 

In contrast, the widening spreads illustrate that the BSP is seriously behind the curve! Or the Treasury markets have continually rebuffed the BSP policies! 

 

The Treasury markets imply that the odds of policy errors of the BSP have only been mounting. 

 

Figure 2 

 

The escalating discrepancy between the Treasury markets and mainstream opinion only underscores growing friction between reality and rhetoric.

bearish steepening slope highlights higher inflation expectations. The 10-year 2-year spread depicts such expectations (PDS). The 10-year yield has risen faster than the 2-year yield. (Figure 2, upper pane) 

  

On the other hand, liquidity issues continue to plague the financial system as the 20-year 5-year (BVAL) spread continues to compress. (Figure 2, lower window) 

 

bearish flattening curve depicts a faster increase of the 5-year treasury yield vis-à-vis the 20-year yield, signifying increased odds of an economic contraction. Rising 5-year yields (the belly) portend hikes in the official rates of the BSP and a possible growth slowdown. 

 

The Philippine treasury markets are harbingers of the direction of interest rates. Yet it presages a STAGFLATIONARY outcome.  

 

The difference between the official policy rates and market yields spurs the misallocation of resources and the misdirection of credit distribution 

 

The BSP previously labeled this a "mismatch." 

 

From their 1H 2018 to 2019, Financial Stability Report (p.19): If there are risk issues to raise, it will have to be the prospects of managing liquidity. Aside from simply having more loans versus deposits, using liquid assets as a source for funding more earning assets needs our attention. However, the bigger issue will be that continuing on the path of being a bank-based financial market means that the provision of credit will require taking on mismatches in tenor and in liquidity. As more credit is dispensed, such mismatches will only increase.   

 

Figure 3 

 

As noted elsewhere here, the CPI spurt in 2017-2018, which fueled a spike in CPI, powered bank NET NPLs higher. That was even before the pandemic. (Figure 3) 

 

Net NPLs have recently declined primarily because of the forbearance policies granted to financial institutions like banks, as noted by the World Bank. 

 

While it may be true that treasury yields are still significantly below the 2018 levels, system leverage (bank credit and public debt) is 54% higher at the close of 2021 compared to the end of 2017! 

 

The greater the scale of leveraging, the lower the capacity of the financial system to absorb rate increases or financial tightening. 

 

The banking system undergoes a real-time stress test only when financial tightening becomes apparent.  

 

At this point, it would be on our horizon whether the vaunted toolbox of the BSP has reached its exhaustion point or if they can still "kick the proverbial can down the road."   

 

Our bet is on the former. 

 

On a positive note, though rising treasury yields punish bondholders (BSP, banks, and financial institutions), it is a boon to savers (saving public or the average consumers). 

 

This relationship will become pronounced when the "real" or inflation-adjusted rates turn positive to signify the culmination of wealth transfers! 

 

V. The Influence of Expected Changes in US Federal Reserve Policies to the Treasury Markets 

 

Finally, others have attributed rising yields to exogenous forces like the implied hikes of the US Federal Reserves. 

 

Figure 4 

 

Given that the BSP's monetary policy operates around the de facto US dollar standard, expected changes in the policies of the US Fed may indeed have some influence on the domestic Treasury yields.  

 

But it is still current domestic inflation, inflation expectations, and credit risks that determine the path of treasury yields.   

 

Because changes in US Fed policies may influence these domestic factors, it also contributes to the dynamics of domestic Treasury yields. 

 

The slope of domestic yield here, represented by the 10-year PDS, resonates with its counterpart, the US 10-year Treasury. But the changes in yields of the Philippine bonds have risen faster than the UST.  The USD-Php continues to climb along with the price underperformance of Philippine bonds relative to the USD. (Figure 4, upmost and middle panes) 

 

But yields of the Philippine 10-year Treasuries have risen most in the ASEAN region from December 2020, which likely translates to a deeper influence of the US Federal Reserve policies on local developments than its regional peers. (Figure 4, lowest window) 

 

The queer thing is the establishment experts stubbornly insist on pushing the "decoupling" agenda so ardently! 

 

The international and domestic financial markets are about to settle this debate soon.  

 

Yours in Liberty, 

 

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