Philippines December 2024 CPI: A Possible Turning Point for the Third Wave of the Current Inflation Cycle?

 

The second mischief is that those engaged in futile and hopeless attempts to fight the inevitable consequences of inflation — the rise in prices — are disguising their endeavors as a fight against inflation. While merely fighting symptoms, they pretend to fight the root causes of the evil. Because they do not comprehend the causal relation between the increase in the quantity of money on the one hand and the rise in prices on the other, they practically make things worse—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Philippines December 2024 CPI: A Possible Turning Point for the Third Wave of the Current Inflation Cycle?

I. A Closer Look at the Flawed Foundations of the CPI

II. Does December’s CPI Mark the Turning Point for the Third Wave of the Current Inflation Cycle?

III. A Brief Look at Inflation Era 1.0; Key Questions

IV. Divergent Sentiments: Government Data vs. SWS 21-Year High in Self-Rated Poverty

V. Demand Side Inflation: Record 11-Month Public Spending 

VI. More Demand Side Inflation: BSP’s Easing Cycle Designed to Rescue the Struggling Real Estate Sector and the Banking System

VII. Demand-Side Inflation: The Impact of the USD-PHP Soft Peg and Rising US Treasury Bond Yields

VIII. Conclusion: Strengthening Signs of an Emergent Third Inflation Wave

Philippines December 2024 CPI: A Possible Turning Point for the Third Wave of the Current Inflation Cycle?

A sharp increase in liquidity conditions last November, driven by BSP measures and bank activities, has likely spilled over into prices. Could December’s CPI signal the start of a third wave in the current inflation cycle?

I. A Closer Look at the Flawed Foundations of the CPI

Before we proceed with our exegesis of the Philippine Consumer Price Index (CPI) from last December, it is essential to clarify our position, which diverges from the mainstream acceptance of the inflation benchmark.

We argue that the CPI is structurally flawed for the following reasons:

1. Subjective Nature of Personal Utilities

Because people engage in exchanges to improve their well-being, prices reflect the subjective evaluations of individual economic participants.

As such, comparing personal utilities is inherently impossible because they are subjectively determined, depending on the specific circumstances of an individual, including their operating environment, preferences, values, and hierarchy of needs.

As we explained in 2022 (bold original):

Yet, the thing is, the most substantial argument against the CPI comes from its essence: it is impossible to quantify or average the spending activities of individuals. Everyone has different 'inflation.' The consumption basket varies from one individual to another. And the composition of an individual's consumption basket is never static or constant because it is subjectively determined; it is dynamic or consistently changes. 

Therefore, because the assumption used to generate an estimated CPI is fallacious, the CPI is structurally flawed. (Prudent Investor 2022) 

2. CPI as a Political Statistic 

The CPI is not merely an economic measure; it is, arguably, the most significant political statistic.  

From the Philippine Statistics Authority (FAQ): CPI allows individuals, businesses, and policymakers to understand inflation trends, make economic decisions, and adjust financial plans accordingly. The CPI is also used to adjust other economic series for price changes. For example, CPI components are used as deflators for most personal consumption expenditures in the calculation of the gross domestic product.  Moreover, it serves as a basis to adjust the wages in labor management contracts, as well as pensions and retirement benefits. Increases in wages through collective bargaining agreements use the CPI as one of their bases.

In this context, the political objectives of the administration may influence the calculation of economic indicators, rather than reflecting actual estimates. 

For example, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) plays a significant role in determining bond market rates and interest rates. By understating the CPI, the government can effectively engage in "financial repression," which entails the implicit and artificial lowering of interest rates to subsidize government debt.  

Moreover, beyond facilitating government borrowing, an artificially suppressed CPI also inflates GDP figures, creating a perception of stronger economic performance. 

The periodic (six-year) base year adjustments used for calculating the CPI—intended to reflect the most current composition of goods and services—are inherently biased toward reducing inflation rates. Consequently, CPI figures would likely be higher if calculated using the previous base year of 2006 compared to the current base year of 2018. 

3. The CPI Data and Official Narrative on Inflation 

CPI data and the official narrative often portray inflation as an inherently supply-side-driven phenomenon. 

The sectoral composition of the CPI baskets appears biased, fostering the perception that price increases (inflation) are predominantly caused by supply-side factors. This perspective is consistently reinforced by official explanations, which highlight supply disruptions as the primary drivers of inflation. 

Ironically, however, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)’s policy responses have been predominantly demand-side in nature. These responses include interest rate adjustments, reserve requirement ratio (RRR) changes, and regulatory relief measures such as the credit card interest rate cap, as well as quantitative easing or liquidity injections. On rare occasions, political interventions, like the Rice Tariffication Law, address supply-side issues directly. 

In reality, if prices were allowed to function freely, supply-side imbalances would typically resolve themselves in the short term. 

Moreover, with a fixed money supply, an increase in demand for specific goods or services, leading to higher prices, would naturally result in reduced demand for other goods or services, causing their prices to decline. This dynamic reflects changes in relative prices (increases and decreases), which do not equate to a general rise in overall price levels. For example, households operating within fixed budgets and without access to credit exemplify this principle. 

However, when prices for most goods and services rise simultaneously, it indicates a condition of "too much money chasing too few goods." In other words, a generalized price increase arises when the growth of money supply (via credit expansion) outpaces the growth in goods and services. 

In the immortal words of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman in an interview: (bold mine) 

It [Inflation] is always and everywhere, a monetary phenomenon. It's always and everywhere, a result of too much money, of a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than an output…

If you listen to people in Washington and talk, they will tell you that inflation is produced by greedy businessmen or it's produced by grasping unions or it's produced by spendthrift consumers, or maybe, it's those terrible Arab Sheikhs who are producing it. Now, of course, businessmen are greedy. Who of us isn't? Trade unions are grasping. Who of us isn't? And there's no doubt that the consumer is a spendthrift. At least every man knows that about his wife. 

But none of them produce inflation for the very simple reason that neither the businessman, nor the trade union, nor the housewife has a printing press in their basement on which they can turn out those green pieces of paper we call money. (Friedman, Heritage Foundation)

This underscores the reality that inflation is driven by excessive monetary expansion rather than purely supply-side factors.

Figure 1

Aside from this author, has anyone pointed out the deepening reliance of GDP on money supply growth? (Figure 1, topmost graph)

4. The CPI as a Tool for Narrative Control

The BSP and the government’s approach to inflation management often involves shaping public perception through strategic "narrative control." A clear example of this is the establishment’s "pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey" CPI forecasting exercise:

-At the close of each month, the BSP releases a forecast range for the monthly inflation rate, usually spanning a margin of approximately 80 basis points.

-"Establishment experts" then publish their single-point predictions, which the media aggregates into a "median estimate."

-When the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) announces the official inflation rate, it almost always falls within the BSP’s forecast range—except during anomalous periods, such as the CPI spikes in 2022-2023.

This practice reinforces the establishment narrative and helps frame the public’s understanding of inflation within a constrained Overton Window, limiting alternative interpretations of its causes and dynamics.

As I elaborated in 2024 (bold and italics original): 

In essence, they blame the supply side for inflation, but use demand-side instruments to manage it. This disconnect is often lost on the lay public, who are unfamiliar with the technical details surrounding the mechanics of inflation. 

The general idea is that distortions from the supply side are seen as representing market failure, namely greed, and that the BSP is considered immaculate, foolproof, and practices Bentham's utilitarianism (for the greater good) when it comes to its demand-side policies. Therefore, it would be easier to sell more interventions when the authorities are perceived as saints.  

Ironically, the BSP has been advocating for the "trickle-down theory" in its policies: subsidize demand while controlling or restricting supply (Kling,2016) 

More importantly, the public is unaware of the entrenched "principal agent syndrome" in action: the BSP regulates these mainstream institutions. As such, the BSP indirectly controls the narratives or dissemination of information on inflation.   

Make no mistake: the structural flaws of the CPI arise not only from a critical economic perspective but, more significantly, from a political dimension designed to shift the blame for price instability onto the market economy.  

II. Does December’s CPI Mark the Turning Point for the Third Wave of the Current Inflation Cycle?

Our dialectic of the CPI’s critical flaws serves as the foundation for examining December’s CPI data. 

Let us explore the issue from the perspective of the mainstream viewpoint.

Reuters, January 7: Philippine annual inflation quickened for a third straight month in December due to the faster pace of increases in food and utility costs, the statistics agency said on Tuesday. The consumer price index (CPI) rose 2.9% in December, higher than the 2.6% forecast in a Reuters poll, and was above the previous month's 2.5% rate. December's inflation print brought average inflation in 2024 to 3.2%, well within the central bank's 2%-4% target for the year, marking the first time since 2021 that the Philippines has achieved its inflation goal. 

Though December marked the third consecutive monthly YoY increase, boosting the month-on-month (MoM) change, the upward momentum has not been strong enough to signal a decisive breakout from its year-on-year (YoY) downtrend. (Figure 1, middle image) 

Typically, a MoM rate exceeding 1% is required to achieve this. 

However, while food prices continue to play a significant role in driving up the headline CPI, their influence has been diminishing. This shift indicates broader sectoral contributions, primarily driven by housing, utilities, and transport in December. (Figure 1, lowest diagram)

Figure 2

The uptrend has been most pronounced in the transport sector, while momentum in housing and utilities has recently gained strength. (Figure 2, topmost chart)

The broadening increase in prices has also led to an expansion in the non-food and energy CORE CPI. Both the CORE and headline CPI appear to have made a turn reminiscent of patterns seen in 2015 and 2022. (Figure 2, middle pane) 

If this momentum persists, the headline CPI may be transitioning into the third wave of the current inflation cycle, which has now entered its tenth year.

III. A Brief Look at Inflation Era 1.0; Key Questions

Should the third wave, characterized by the current series of increases, be confirmed, the headline CPI is likely to surpass its 2022 high of 8.7%. 

This inflation cycle is not an anomaly; it mirrors historical precedent, specifically the secular inflation era (1.0), which spanned three inflation cycles from 1958 to 1986. (Figure 2, lowest graph) 

This brings us to several critical questions:

>How do supply-side (cost-push) factors contribute to driving an inflation cycle or even a prolonged era of inflation?

>Does the current inflation cycle mark the beginning of an "Inflation Era 2.0"?

>Which mainstream experts have anticipated and explained this phenomenon?

IV. Divergent Sentiments: Government Data vs. SWS 21-Year High in Self-Rated Poverty

A striking contrast exists between the government's data on the bottom 30% of income earners and the Social Weather Stations (SWS) self-rated poverty survey.

Figure 3

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the bottom 30% income group presents one of the most fascinating – and somewhat contradictory – data points in CPI coverage. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

It indicates that the food CPI for this income group has decreased at a faster rate than the overall headline CPI, resulting in a negative spread for the first time since at least 2022. This suggests that the bottom 30% has benefited from easing food inflation, ostensibly leading to ‘reduced inequality.’ 

This assumption appears to be based on the notion that stores have provided price discounts to this income group or that conditions have improved due to assistance from food banks. 

Conversely, a private poll reported that instances of self-rated poverty surged to their highest level since 2003, reaching a 21-year high! 

SWS Report, January 8 2025: The December 2024 percentage of Self-Rated Poor families of 63% was 4 points up from 59% in September 2024, rising steadily for the third consecutive quarter since the significant 12-point rise from 46% in March 2024 to 58% in June 2024. This was the highest percentage of Self-Rated Poor families in 21 years, since 64% in November 2003. (Figure 3, middle visual) 

If this poll is accurate, it implies that a vast majority of households continue to suffer from the erosion of the peso’s purchasing power. 

The recent decline in the CPI rate, far from indicating relief, might instead signify a “boiling frog syndrome”—a slow, almost imperceptible build-up of economic hardship. This is evidenced by deteriorating consumption patterns and increasing pessimism, despite near-record employment rates. 

In November 2024, employment rates reached their third-highest level, continuing a trend of near-full employment since Q4 2023. (Figure 3, lowest chart) 

Still, despite this robust employment dynamic, inflation has continued to decline. 

Does this mismatch between self-rated poverty levels and employment gains highlight productivity improvements that are not reflected in wage and income growth?  

Alternatively, could this gap reflect potential manipulation or "padding" of labor data for political purposes ahead of upcoming elections? 

As I noted back in October 2024: (bold and italics original) 

All these factors point to the SWS Q3 data indicating an increase in self-rated poverty, which not only highlights the decline in living standards for a significant majority of families but also emphasizes the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots.  

As a caveat, survey-based statistics are vulnerable to errors and biases; the SWS is no exception. 

Though the proclivity to massage data for political goals is higher for the government, we can’t discount its influence on private sector pollsters either. 

In any case, we suspect that a phone call from the office of the political higher-ups may compel conflicting surveys to align as one. 

Apparently, that phone call to influence the self-rated poverty survey has yet to occur. 

Furthermore, the multi-year high in self-rated poverty could also be symptomatic of government policies involving "financial repression" or an "inflation tax," which redistributes finances and resources from the private sector to the government to subsidize its political spending.

This raises an important question: Whose sentiment truly reflects the public's conditions?  

On one hand, government data suggests a vague improvement for low-income households due to easing food prices.  On the other hand, SWS data indicates a historic rise in self-rated poverty.  

The divergence between these two perspectives underscores the complex economic realities faced by different segments of society as they confront inflation.

V. Demand Side Inflation: Record 11-Month Public Spending

Let us now shift our focus to the demand side of the inflation cycle.

Figure 4

The first and most significant demand-side driver of inflation cycles is public debt-fueled deficit spending. (Figure 4, topmost image)

Thanks to robust tax collections, the 11-month fiscal deficit has fallen to its lowest level since 2020, despite reaching a historic high in public spending over the same period. 

However, while current tax revenues have supported fiscal health, they are subject to the variability of economic conditions and the efficiency of tax administration, whereas government spending is determined by Congressional appropriations. 

Still, diminishing returns and the crowding-out effect could slow GDP growth—or even trigger a recession—leading to reduced tax revenues. This could drive deficits back to record-high levels. 

In any case, public spending at an all-time high inevitably fosters heightened competition with the private sector for resources and financing. This competition—the crowding out syndrome—serves political objectives but disrupts economic allocation, production, and pricing. 

The Philippine budget is set to grow by 9.7% to Php 6.326 trillion in 2025, reinforcing its long-term upward trend in public expenditures. 

Unsurprisingly, this accelerating trend in public spending has closely correlated with the first inflation cycle. 

Also, this is in seeming response to the Q3 2024 GDP slowdown and a deflationary spiral in real estate prices, 'Marcos-nomics' stimulus measures have only intensified. 

That’s in addition to the administration’s positioning for this year’s elections.

VI. More Demand Side Inflation: BSP’s Easing Cycle Designed to Rescue the Struggling Real Estate Sector and the Banking System 

Despite the CPI gradually rising, the BSP cut interest rates twice in Q4 2024, supported by a significant reduction in the bank’s reserve requirements. 

When similar measures were implemented during the pre-pandemic and pandemic phases (2018–2020), they fueled the first leg of the second wave of the inflation cycle. Is history repeating itself? (Figure 4, middle diagram)

After an 11-month plateau, the banking system’s net claims on the central government (NCoCG) surged to a record-high Php 5.31 trillion in November 2024! (Figure 4, lowest window) 

Banks may have responded to an implicit directive from the BSP, which has contributed to the growth of the money supply. 

Additionally, the BSP’s ‘easing cycle’ prompted a surge in bank lending, particularly to the struggling real estate sector and consumers.

Universal-commercial (UC) bank lending grew by 11.34% in November, driven largely by a 10.11% increase in lending to the real estate sector, which reached a record-high Php 2.57 trillion. 

Meanwhile, UC consumer bank lending (excluding real estate) jumped 23.3% to a historic Php 1.54 trillion.

Figure 5

Overall, systemic leverage—defined as UC bank loans plus public debt—expanded by 11.1%, reaching an all-time high of Php 28.44 trillion.  (Figure 5, topmost chart) 

This growth drove a sharp increase in M3 money supply, from 5.43% in October to 7.7% in November. 

Despite BSP claims of ‘restrictive’ financial conditions, growth rates of systemic leverage have been rising steadily since its trough in September 2023. 

The BSP’s easing measures in the second half of 2024 have undoubtedly contributed to this systemic expansion in leverage. 

The combination of liquidity injections through NCoCG and surging systemic leverage has also driven growth in M1 money supply, which again rose 7.7% in November—reaching levels seen in October 2023. 

If history offers any guidance, reminiscent of 2014 and 2019, the current surge in cash circulation—which accounted for 30.83% of November’s M1—has likely contributed to the broadening increase in non-food and non-energy core inflation, supporting the notion that the headline and core CPI have already bottomed out. (Figure 5, middle graph) 

Notably, M1’s influence on price pressures occurs with a time lag. This means that certain price increases, due to increased spending in sectors benefiting most from credit expansion—such as real estate and their principal lenders, the banks—eventually percolates into the broader economy. 

This clearly reflects the BSP’s implicit backstop for the real estate sector and its key counterparties—the banking system. 

VII. Demand-Side Inflation: The Impact of the USD-PHP Soft Peg and Rising US Treasury Bond Yields 

Another factor that appears to be providing a behind-the-scenes support to inflation is the BSP’s US dollar Philippine peso USDPHP exchange rate cap. 

As we previously noted,

Widening Trade Deficit: First, the cap widens the trade deficit by making imports appear cheaper and exports more expensive. An artificial ceiling exacerbates imbalances stemming from the historical credit-financed savings-investment gap. (Prudent Investor, 2024)

Although November’s trade deficit narrowed to USD 4.77 billion due to a 4.93% decline in imports and an 8.7% slump in exports, it remains within the record levels seen in 2022. (Figure 5 lowest window)

Figure 6

The risk of a sudden devaluation grows as the persistent trade deficits erode the BSP's ability to defend the USDPHP ceiling magnifying inflation risks. (Figure 6, topmost diagram) 

Additionally, the recent shift in the Philippine treasury yield curve—from a flattening, belly-inverted slope to a steepening curve driven by surging bond rates—has further underscored this vulnerability. (Figure 6, middle image) 

Besides, rising yields on US Treasury bonds could influence upward pressure on Philippine rates. (Figure 6, lowest chart) 

US inflation can indirectly impact the Philippines through global trade, commodity prices, and capital flows.  For example, rising US inflation may lead to higher prices for imported goods, thus contributing to increased inflation domestically in the Philippines. 

Additionally, US Treasury yields act as a global benchmark for interest rates. When US yields rise, typically due to higher inflation expectations or tightening monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, it can exert upward pressure on bond yields in other countries, including the Philippines. 

This dynamic occurs as foreign investors may seek higher returns, which in turn can push up domestic yields. The influence of rising US bond rates on Philippine yields underscores the interconnectedness of global financial markets and reflects the broader impact of US economic conditions on emerging market economies. 

Furthermore, if the BSP insists on continuing its ‘easing cycle’ under such conditions, it risks stoking the embers of inflation, which could further weaken the USD-Philippine peso exchange rate. 

Sure, while it’s true that the structural economic conditions of the Inflation Era 1.0 differ from today’s—marked by advances in technology, globalization, and other factors—the political landscape remains strikingly similar. Authorities are still using leverage both directly (through deficit spending) and indirectly (through asset bubbles) to extract resources from the private sector. As such, the outcome—an Inflation Era 2.0—seems increasingly likely to echo its predecessor. 

VIII. Conclusion: Strengthening Signs of an Emergent Third Inflation Wave 

To wrap things up, December’s CPI has shown signs of a potential bottom and has laid the groundwork for the third upside wave of this inflation cycle. 

Aside from the turnaround in the CORE CPI, which indicates a broadening of price increases across the economy, the record quantitative easing by banks in support of record public spending and all-time highs in public debt have injected substantial liquidity into the system. 

This, combined with the accelerating growth in bank lending, has intensified liquidity growth. As a result, this increased liquidity tends to diffuse into the economy with a time lag, eventually leading to higher prices.

___

References: 

Prudent Investor, The President and the Markets "Disagree" on the CPI; Global Financial Crisis Icebreaker: The Collapse of Sri Lanka July 11, 2022

Philippine Statistics Authority Consumer Price Index and the Inflation Rate, Frequently Asked Questions 

Milton Friedman, The Real Story Behind Inflation, The Heritage Foundation 

Prudent Investor, Has the May 3.9% CPI Peaked? Are Filipinos Really Spending More On Non-Essentials? Credit Card and Salary Loan NPLs Surged in Q1 2024! June 10 2024  

Prudent Investor, Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees, Unveiling Its Hidden Messages October 13, 2024  

Prudent Investor, How the BSP's Soft Peg will Contribute to the Weakening of the US Dollar-Philippine Peso Exchange Rate, January 2, 2025

 

Adding to the SWS Mangahas’ Critique of Trickle-Down Economics: The Philippine Banking System’s Intrinsic Bias Against SMEs

  

The man in whose power it might be to find out the means of alleviating the sufferings of the poor would have done a far greater deed than the one who contents himself solely with knowing the exact numbers of poor and wealthy people in society—Vilfredo Pareto 

In this issue

Adding to the SWS Mangahas’ Critique of Trickle-Down Economics: The Philippine Banking System’s Intrinsic Bias Against SMEs

I. The Disconnect Between Economic Data and Public Sentiment: Adding to the SWS Mangahas’ Critique of Trickle-Down Economics

II. The Trickle-down Policy: The Philippine Banking System’s Intrinsic Bias Against SMEs

III. Banks' Preference for Government Securities Crowds Out the SMEs

IV. How Trickle-Down Policies Gutted the Magna Carta for MSMEs and Stunted Philippine Capital Market Growth

V. How Trickle-Down Policies Amplify Concentration and Contagion Risks

VI. Trickle-Down Policies: How HTMs Exacerbate Balance Sheet Mismatches

VII. Rising Non-Performing Loans: Moving from the Periphery to the Core?

VIII. More Crowding Out: Banks Magnify Borrowing from Savers Focusing on Short-Term Bills

IX. More Impact of the Trickle-Down Effect on Banks: Mark-to-Market Losses

Adding to the SWS Mangahas’ Critique of Trickle-Down Economics: The Philippine Banking System’s Intrinsic Bias Against SMEs

SWS’ Dr. Mahar Mangahas recently highlighted the failure of trickle-down economics by pointing to the disconnect between government data and public sentiment. Bank data on MSME lending reinforces his position. 

I. The Disconnect Between Economic Data and Public Sentiment: Adding to the SWS Mangahas’ Critique of Trickle-Down Economics

Figure 1 

I believe in rating economic progress by listening to what the people as a whole say about their own progress, rather than by listening to the international banks, big business, politicians, the diplomatic corps, and all others who point to how the aggregate value of production is growing. Counting the number of people who have gotten better off, and comparing it with the number who have gotten worse off, is the oldest survey question in the book. It has now been surveyed 152 times at the national level: annually in 1983-85, semi-annually in 1986-91, and then quarterly since 1992. The finding of more losers than gainers in 126 of those 152 surveys—despite persistent growth in real gross national product per person, coupled with stagnation of real wages—is the clearest proof of the failure of trickle-down economics in the last four decades. (Mangahas, 2024) [Figure 1, topmost quote]

While most don’t realize it, this quote offers a striking opposition or critique of the nation’s adaptive "trickle-down" political-economic framework. Given its dissenting nature, this theme should be unpopular among the establishment.

For starters, we are skeptical of surveys because they are susceptible to manipulation, social desirability bias, or social signaling, rather than reflecting genuine (demonstrated/revealed) preferences. Interestingly, surveys form the basis of much government data.

To illustrate why the CPI is considered the MOST politicized economic data, consider the following example—from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) (bold mine).

CPI allows individuals, businesses, and policymakers to understand inflation trends, make economic decisions, and adjust financial plans accordingly. The CPI is also used to adjust other economic series for price changes. For example, CPI components are used as deflators for most personal consumption expenditures in the calculation of the gross domestic product.  Moreover, it serves as a basis to adjust the wages in labor management contracts, as well as pensions and retirement benefits. Increases in wages through collective bargaining agreements use the CPI as one of their bases. (PSA, FAQ)

In short, the CPI is the basis where economic policymakers…make economic decisions…and adjust financial plans…calculate the GDP…adjust wages in labor-management contracts…in CBA (or minimum wages) …and influence the calculation of pensions (mainly SSS and GSIS) and retirement benefits (also other welfare programs as Philhealth, Pagibigm, etc).

And so, the lowering of the CPI (e.g., by rebasing it from 2006 to 2012 to 2018) bloats the GDP, minimizes payouts for pensions and retirements, and distorts labor-management contracts. Most of all, it helps the government access cheaper savings from the public.

Yet, the (quality-of-life) survey referenced by the author reflects public sentiment rather than a discourse on economic theories or statistics.

The crux of the matter is that public sentiment contradicts the landscape authorities aim to achieve, which is far from its desired state. 

Ironically, this occurs despite the daily onslaught or barrage of news promoting rosy concepts like achieving "upper middle-class status," a "sound" banking system, "reasonable" inflation, a jump in FDIs, and more. 

It demonstrates the blatant disconnect of political economic metrics such as per capita GNP and GDP from grassroots perceptions. 

Simply put, GDP does not equate to the economy. A 

The disparity between the government figures and sentiment reflects the inequality of economic outcomes. 

Or, as much as the CPI does not represent the inflation of the average Juan or Maria, neither does the GDP. Yet, who benefits from it? Cui bono? 

Though we opine a different perspective from the author, the question is, why should government spending be considered a cornerstone of prosperity when it diverts and limits the private sector from fulfilling its primary role of satisfying consumer needs and wants? 

Does historical (public and private) leveraging and near-record deficit spending, which redistributes income and wealth opportunities to the government and the politically connected, contribute to the goal of achieving "upper middle-class status?"   

Based on 2023 (annualized) data, to what extent can the economy sustain this level of debt buildup under the savings-investment gap paradigm? Won't the sheer burden of debt, beyond interest rates, stifle the real economy?  What if interest rates rise along with the debt burden? Debt servicing-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP have been way above the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis levels. (Figure 1, middle charts and lowest graph)

Is this economic paradigm pursued because it is driven by the "trickle-down" ideology, which posits that (indiscriminate) spending drives the economy, or because it favors the centralization of the economy, benefiting a few? 

Yes, the article confirms my priors, but it also suggests that there are others who, in their own ways, share similar perspectives. 

On the other hand, although the author's motivations are unclear, it is uncertain whether they are driven by a political bias. 

Still, given the harsh realities of the prevailing censorship and disinformation in the incumbent political environment, it is unlikely that "analytical independence" could persist. 

II. The Trickle-down Policy: The Philippine Banking System’s Intrinsic Bias Against SMEs

The dispersion of bank credit expansion serves as a prime example of the inefficiencies inherent in the 'trickle-down' economics. 

The government's bank lending data provides valuable insights into the reasons behind its flaws.

Businessworld, June 14, 2024: PHILIPPINE BANKS failed to meet the mandated quota for small business loans in the first quarter, data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed. Loans extended by the banking industry to micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) amounted to P474.922 billion as of end-March. This made up only 4.41% of their total loan portfolio of P10.77 trillion, well-below the mandated 10% quota. Under Republic Act No. 6977 or the Magna Carta for MSMEs, banks are required to allocate 10% of their total loan portfolio for small businesses. Of this, 8% of loans should be allocated for micro and small enterprises, while 2% should go to medium-sized enterprises. However, banks have long opted to incur penalties for noncompliance instead of taking on the risks associated with lending to small businesses. (bold mine)

How can the government achieve its "upper middle-class status" goal when the backbone of the economy – small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – has diminished access to lower-priced formal credit?

Figure 2 

SMEs dominate the economy. 

As noted by the DTI in 2022: "The 2022 List of Establishments (LE) of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) recorded a total of 1,109,684 business enterprises operating in the country. Of these, 1,105,143 (99.59%) are MSMEs and 4,541 (0.41%) are large enterprises. Micro enterprises constitute 90.49% (1,004,195) of total establishments, followed by small enterprises at 8.69% (96,464) and medium enterprises at 0.40% (4,484)." (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

SMEs also have the largest share of employment. 

Again, the DTI stated: "MSMEs generated a total of 5,607,748 jobs or 65.10% of the country’s total employment. Micro enterprises produced the biggest share (32.69%), closely followed by small enterprises (25.35%), while medium enterprises lagged behind at 7.06%. Meanwhile, large enterprises generated a total of 3,006,821 jobs or 34.90% of the country’s overall employment." (Figure 2, middle image)  

The lack of access to formal credit leads to informal or shadow lenders, such as family, friends, local money lenders, NGOs, loan sharks, or '5-6' entities, filling the void. This inefficient means of financing results in higher costs for businesses, which in turn reduces the competitiveness of SMEs compared to large firms. 

The former president initially campaigned to ban '5-6' lending, which would have further stifled SMEs. Since the policy failed to gain traction, it can be inferred an undeclared policy failure.

The uneven effects of inflation via the Cantillon Effect—that the first recipient of the new supply of money has an arbitrage opportunity of being able to spend money before prices have increased—also pose an obstacle to MSMEs.(river.com). (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

In other words, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (BSP) inflation targeting policy benefits large firms because they have access to new money from bank credit before prices increase, while SMEs are disadvantaged (as price takers): a reverse Robin Hood syndrome.

The lack of access to formal credit and the Cantillon Effect forge a 'protective moat' that favors large firms over SMEs.

This explains the innate inequality expressed by public sentiment.

It also weighs on the BSP’s other ambition to expand financial inclusion—a politically correct goal or a euphemism for the "war on cash."

Naturally, why would the SME universe enroll, when the formal financial system constrains their access to livelihood credit?

Figure 3

Yes, there may be improvements in many metrics of financial inclusion, but they remain distant from reaching upper middle-class levels. 

Participation rates in the banking system by the general populace remain dismal (BSP, Financial Inclusion) (Figure 3, topmost table) 

See the inequality at play? 

III. Banks' Preference for Government Securities Crowds Out the SMEs

Moreover, why would the formal financial system prefer to follow the BSP's policies rather than repricing credit higher to accommodate the higher risks associated with grassroots collections?

Repricing credit would likely raise the cost of financing government debt. Banks function as intermediaries in raising funds for the government, which represents the bulk of the bond markets. 

With a higher cost base, any institutional outlier would risk losing market share in the formal credit market. 

Intuitively, the formal financial system would rather pay the penalties associated with missing the 10% government quota than invest in a system that would reflect the higher cost of risks and transactions with SMEs. 

The spread between the average bank lending rate and the BSP's overnight repo rate (ON RRP) dropped to its lowest level in February 2023 and has barely bounced back from there. (Figure 3, middle chart) 

Therefore, there is hardly any motivation by the formal financial institutions to "go outside the box" or defy the convention. 

See how this perpetuates inequality? 

IV. How Trickle-Down Policies Gutted the Magna Carta for MSMEs and Stunted Philippine Capital Market Growth

Since banks have failed to adhere to the law and have resorted to a workaround, this translates to the fiasco of the Magna Carta legislation in its entirety. 

The restricted constellation of the formal credit system can also be found in the limited exposure to the insurance industry and capital markets. Insurance premiums signify a paltry 1.7% of the GDP. (Figure 3, lowest table) 

Figure 4 

It is barely understood that it is not the trading platform (G-stocks or other touted online alternatives) that constrains the PSE's volume, but rather the lack of savings or increases in disposable income. 

The PSE’s volume woes are equally reflected in the banking system’s cascading cash-to-deposit ratio, which eroded further last April to multi-year lows. (Figure 4, topmost chart) 

Why is this the case? 

Because the inflationary "trickle-down" policies pose a financial barrier to the general public, they also drain savings and redistribute resources to cronies and the government. 

Consequently, the paucity of penetration levels in formal institutions has also been reflected in the capital markets (fixed income and stocks). The lack of volume and breadth also characterizes the Philippine bond market, which is one of the most underdeveloped in Asia. (Figure 4, middle image) 

As previously discussed, the BSP seems misguided in thinking that the exclusion of the Philippines from the global market has been due to "foreigners don’t like us." 

Everything starts organically: rather, it’s the lack of local depth, which is a function of the failure of "trickle-down" policies. 

See how it magnifies the mechanisms of inequality? 

V. How Trickle-Down Policies Amplify Concentration and Contagion Risks

But there’s more. 

If banks have jettisoned the SMEs, then this means that they’ve been amassing intensive loan exposure on economic agents at the upper hierarchy.

As a result, this has led to an unprecedented buildup of concentration risks.  

While the mainstream views the record Total Financial Resource (TFR) and its growth positively, there is little understanding that this asset growth has primarily accrued in universal banks.

Despite April’s TFR slipping from historic March levels, it remains at an all-time high, even as the BSP’s official rates stay at a 17-year high. The rapid expansion of universal bank assets, which now constitute 78.2% of the TFR, has propelled the banking system’s aggregate share to 83.4%. Both their % shares declined in April from the unparalleled levels of March. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

The banking system's exposure to heavily leveraged non-financial firms, such as San Miguel Corporation [PSE: SMC], is concerning. SMC's debt have reached a staggering record high of Php 1.44 trillion in Q1 2024, accounting for a significant 4.6% of the TFR in the same period.

The extent of this exposure raises questions about the potential risks to the financial system. Specifically, how much of the banking system's assets are tied up in SMC's debt? What happens within SMC will affect SMC alone? Really? 

VI. Trickle-Down Policies: How HTMs Exacerbate Balance Sheet Mismatches 

Figure 5

Banks have been funding the government through net claims on central government (NCoCG), much of which has been concentrated in Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets. 

Once again, the BSP has acknowledged the liquidity-constraining effects of HTMs. 

The HTM component continues to be significant. Financial assets classified as HTM continued to increase in 2023. From 45.6 percent of financial assets at the beginning of 2021, its share is now nearly 58.8 percent as of November 2023 data. Taken at face value, this suggests that the banks remain defensive against potential MTM losses created by the higher market yields. Invariably, however, the threat of MTM losses can be mitigated by holding the tradable security to maturity. This though comes at the expense of liquidity. (bold original, italics mine) [BSP, FSR 2023] 

HTMs accounted for 55.56% of financial assets last April and 15.7% of the banking system’s total assets. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

Strikingly, the BSP highlighted further concerns in the 2023 Financial Stability Report (FSR), citing the US banking crisis as an example where HTMs created a false illusion of profits while significantly understating risks. 

A case to be highlighted is the phenomenon during the pandemic when the sizable allocation to HTM securities buoyed profits but had a significant impact on some banks’ liquidity during the reversal of interest rates, e.g., the case of SVB. While government securities (GS) are indeed High-Quality Liquid Assets, their liquidity can be further qualified depending on the RORO regime. A Risk-Off environment – when there are significant uncertainties and/or with sharp interest rate hikes – can freeze GS trading as banks would prefer safety. Yet, the difficulties may become too acute that they have to liquidate securities, even those classified as being held to their original maturity. There must be a way to assess the market value of the HTM assets during these periods. (italics mine) [BSP, 2023]

The extent of these maladjustments, partly revealed by balance sheet mismatches, determines the level of volatility.

Although the BSP aims to address this issue, they are hindered by the "knowledge problem," which is precisely why such imbalances exist in the first place—resulting from the policies they implement. 

Simply, if the BSP can do what it wishes to do, then markets won’t be required—a haughty pipe dream. 

VII. Rising Non-Performing Loans: Moving from the Periphery to the Core? 

Next, historic credit expansion suggests that credit delinquencies may arise due to excess exposure to unproductive debt. 

As previously noted, non-performing loans (NPLs) from credit cards and salary loans have not only increased but accelerated in Q1 2024. The relatively stable performance of motor vehicle and real estate loans has slowed down the overall growth of NPLs in consumer loans. 

The total banking sector's fixation with financing unproductive consumer spending opens a Pandora's Box of credit risks. The % shares of consumer loans and production loans are at historic opposite poles! (Figure 5, middle graph) 

Yet, problems are mounting at the periphery of the banking system. 

Net NPLs have increased significantly in government and commercial banks through April 2024. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

One possible explanation is that government bank lending has been less prudent due to political objectives, which differs from those of the private sector. 

Notably, NPLs at commercial banks, the smallest segment, have also been increasing. Foreign banks have also seen a gradual increase in NPLs. However, there was a slight decrease in NPLs at foreign banks in April. 

A presumption here is that for these sectors to stay afloat against their largest competitors, the universal banks, commercial and foreign banks lent aggressively, and now the chicken has come home to roost. 

What happens when this reaches critical mass? 

Could this indicate signs of risks transitioning from the periphery to the core? 

VIII. More Crowding Out: Banks Magnify Borrowing from Savers Focusing on Short-Term Bills

As deposit growth has been insufficient to cover the liquidity shortfall from HTMs and NPLs, the Philippine banking system has increased its borrowings from local savers. 

Figure 6

Further signs of mounting liquidity deficiency include banks increasingly borrowing from the more expensive capital markets. (Figure 6, topmost chart) 

The focus of their financing has been on short-term securities, as evidenced by significant increases in bills payables. (Figure 6, second to the highest image)

So far, though aggregate bank borrowings have risen to near-record highs, the banking system's share of liabilities remains on the lower spectrum. 

However, increasing competition among banks, the government, and non-financial firms is likely to put upward pressure on interest rates. 

As the giants scramble for financing, this crowding out comes at the expense of SMEs. 

Do you see why the inequality persists?

IX. More Impact of the Trickle-Down Effect on Banks: Mark-to-Market Losses 

Finally, HTMs, NPLs, and the crowding out are not only the growing sources of the bank's liquidity deficits; mark-to-market losses will compound their problems as well. 

In addition to dwindling cash reserves, banks have relied on investments and the revival and acceleration of lending to bolster their assets. (Figure 6, second to the lowest chart) 

However, even when 10-year bond yields have been turned sideways, banks' mark-to-market losses have escalated. (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

Therefore, mainstream banks are likely to conserve their resources at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

There you have it: a litany of reasons why the Magna Carta for MSMEs failed and the reasons behind the divergence between public sentiment and mainstream statistics. 

In essence, when it comes to the interests of the Philippine version of Wall Street versus Main Street, policymakers tend to favor rescuing big money.

The infamous fugitive Willie Sutton famously explained why he robbed banks, "Because that's where the money is."

In the local context, "trickle-down" policies manifest the stark realities of political-economic inequalities, perpetuating income disparities and social exclusion. 

____

References: 

Mahar Mangahas, Independence from GNP Inquirer.net, June 16, 2024

Philippine Statistics Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, PSA.gov.ph

River Learn, Cantillon Effect, river.com

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Financial Inclusion in the Philippines Dashboard As of Third Quarter 2023, bsp.gov.ph

FINANCIAL STABILITY COORDINATION COUNCIL, 2023 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, December 2023, (pp. 29 and 31), bsp.gov.ph